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This monograph has its roots in theoretical product differentiation, with its extension
to deal with collusion and standardization problems encountered in industrial organi-
zation. Product differentiation, collusion and standardization are among a firm's main
business strategies in an oligopoly. Each strategy influences - and is influenced by - the
other strategies and the firm aims to maximize its profit through these strategies.  This
monograph develops these three concepts and their implications.
1.1    Concepts
1.1.1 Product differentiation
Firms differentiate their products in one way or another, but mainly in four ways.1 First,
they select plant or store locations more convenient (in terms of travel time and/or trans-
portation costs) than rival locations. The locational advantages of the corner drug store
and the local gravel quarry are illustrations. Second, they offer exceptionally good (or
bad) service. Some retailers maintain large and well-trained staffs to provide prompt,
intelligent, and courteous service; others are better known for long check-out lines and
grumbling cashiers, mollifying the effect with rock-bottom prices. Some computer manu-
facturers contribute an array of free programming services to those who use their machines;
others offer no application programming; and so on. Third, there are physical differences
in the products supplied. A suit may incooperate the most finely woven wool worsted
or a coarser substitute; an automobile may navigate curves surefootedly or clumsily; a
television receiver may project vivid or muddy colour; and so forth. Finally, products
are differentiated in terms of subjective image they impress on consumers. Firms at-
iSee Scherer (1980), p.375.
2                                                  Chapter 1. Introduction
tempt to enhance the image of their products through brand labelling, advertising, direct
word-of-mouth sales promotion, and the design of attractive packages.
Much, perhaps most, product differentiation effort observed in a modern private enter-
prise economy represents a natural and healthy response to legitimate demands; people's
wants are diverse, and consumers plainly desire a varied menu of consumption opportuni-
ties.  It is a rare consumer who does not value convenience in the location of suppliers, and
many will pay a price premium for a certain amount of locational convenience. Almost
every consumer prefers good service over poor, though the prices individuals are willing
to pay for extra service vary widely. The diversity of preferences with respect to physical
design and performance characteristics is especially great. Some men prefer cotton shirts,
some silk shirts, some hair shirts, and some no shirt at all. Likewise, different consumers
place varying weights on the subjective image accompanying the products they buy.
The main feature of product differentiation from the point of view of both the supply
and the demand can be captured by distinguishing between horizontal and vertical differ-
entiation. Two variants of a product are said to be horizontally differentiated whenever,
if sold at the same price, one variant is chosen by some consumers, while the alternative
variant is chosen by others. Two variants are vertically differentiated whenever, if sold
at the same price, the same variant is purchased by all consumers - although the prices
consumers are willing to pay for a variant may vary (such is the case of a "standard" and
a "luxury" product).
The economics of product differentiation studies how much product differentiation
there should be from the point of view of both firms and the social planner, and whether
certain market conditions might lead to excessive or inadequate differentiation, or to the
«wrong" kinds of differentiation.
1.1.2   Collusion
If oligopolists make an agreement as a result of repeated price interaction in a purely
non-cooperative manner, we have (tacit) collusion. With repeated interaction, a firm
must   take into account   not   only the possible increase  in its current profit,   but   also   the
possibility of a price war, or retaliation, and the long-run losses when deciding on whether
to undercut a given price. As Chamberlin (1933, p.48.) conjectured, if each oligopolist
seeks his maximum profit «rationally"  and  'intelligently", he will realize that when there
are only two or a few sellers, his own move has a considerable effect upon his competitors,
and that this makes it idle to suppose that they will accept without retaliating the losses
he forces upon them. Since the result of a cut of the given price by any one is inevitably to
decrease his own profits, no one will cut, and although the sellers are entirely independent,
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the equilibrium result is the same as though there were a monopolistic agreement between
thern.
The framework of a supergame provides a technically easier approach to study (tacit)
collusion. The supergame is a price game repeatedly played for finite or infinite times.
For a certain future discount value and well defined strategies, oligopolists may reach
collusion as an equilibrium if the price game is repeatedly played for an infinite number
of stages. This collusive behaviour of oligopolists may significantly influence - and be
influenced by - their degree of product differentiation, which provides policy implications
for welfare analysis or optimal product selection.
1.1.3 Standardization
Standardization, or compatibility, is a technological adoption of the common industry
standards. Product differentiation is not always a good thing; apart from the cost savings
attainable through longer product runs, there are cases in which standardization serves
consumers better than diversity. The adoption of common technical standards for records
and compact discs, so that any product can be played on any manufacturer's audio equip-
ment, is an example. Similarly, typewriter keyboards are standardized on the QWERTY
system so that users can move easily from one machine to another, even though appro-
priately trained persons could type much faster on alternative keyboard layouts.  The
use of computers would be facilitated in numerous applications if compatible data coding
conventions and programming languages were adopted.
Convergence toward a common industry standard may be difficult, however, when
early adopters incur costs or lose sales to rivals, as a result of pioneering. Once they are
established, standards may persist beyond their useful life because the first firms to change
encounter resistance from already committed users, and are unable to capture the benefits
accruing to the customers of rivals who might follow suit. Recognizing the difficulties
of standard changing, industry members often form cooperative standard committees to
coordinate on product specifications and interfaces. These may have negative and positive
effects; for example, they may serve as a forum for collusion, or insiders may influence the
standards adopted so as to make entry more difficult for outsiders. Even without such
formal coordination, entrenched incumbents may, by preempting the announcement of
new standards or taking predatory actions inhibiting the growth of smaller rivals, prevent
the emergence of standards that would prove to be superior if they could gain a sufficient
foothold. Little is known about the distribution of benefits and costs from such standard-
setting activities under different market structures.
The economics of standardization is studied mainly with two approaches: the network
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ezternalities and the miz-and-match approach.  In the presence of network externali-
ties, the valuation of a good increases with the size of the standardized, or compatible,
network. This network may consist of a number of consumers who use compatible tech-
nologies and/or of a number and variety of compatible complementary products.  We may
distinguish between direct and indirect network effects. Direct network effects arise when
users benefit from being linked, physically or psychologically, to a large number of other
agents. This may happen, as in the case of phone or e-mail networks, because consumers
want to be able to communicate with a large group. Alternatively, as illustrated by the
importance of fashion, consumers might just derive some satisfaction from buying the
same product as others.  On the other hand, indirect network benefits come from im-
provements in the supply of complementary inputs. An increase in the sales of a given
product may result in lower prices, better quality and/or greater variety for other goods
or services required for the good to be useful. Greater sales of Philips' DCC machines
are likely to lead to a greater variety of titles available in DCC format. Similarly, the
popularity of WordPerfect makes it easier for an office manager to find help from those
who use that word processor.
In the "mix-and-match" approach, consumers are interested only in using systems
made of several horizontally or vertically differentiated components. Interbrand compat-
ibility may then increase industry demand by allowing consumers to assemble systems
that are closer to their ideal specifications. As examples, one may think of audio sys-
tems made of loudspeakers, receivers, CD players, and tape decks, or of video systems
which include a TV set, a VCR, and a video camera. The effects emphasized by the mix-
and-match approach are rather different from those identified by the network externality
approach. These two approaches differ in the type of compatibility linkages they address,
in the assumed relationships between compatibility, variety and product differentiation,
and, therefore, in the mechanisms through which standardization affects prices, profits
and welfare.
1.2 The scope and method of the research
The interests of this monograph are twofold. First, product differentiation theory is
pursued to explain the prevalence of differentiated goods in a market economy.  The
basic models are enriched by adding several elements - competition from outside goods,
competition and cooperation, and non-uniform but concentrated consumer distributions.
New insights are obtained. Then, product differentiation theory is applied to particular
markets, such as durable goods markets, to study the business strategies of firms and their
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economic implications. The focus of the application is the economics  of standardization
and its implications for antitrust and international trade policy issues.
Differentiated markets are observed rather often; important economic properties can
be explained properly by product differentiation models. Two basic models emerge corre-
sponding to the horizontal and vertical differentiation, respectively: The location or spatial
diferentiation model, and the vertical diferentiation model. In this monograph, we are
interested in competition between a small group of competitors - oligopolists - and hence
we focus on duopolists. For these interests, we shall employ a game-theoretic approach
to study and develop these basic models. We take as given the nature of consumers'
tastes, the specification of technology, and a suitable notion of what would constitute an
equilibrium in the particular problem under consideration.
The models used to study the problems employ the game-theoretic equilibrium and
use comparative statics to derive implications. Firms are assumed to choose among those
alternatives that maximize profits, while consumers are assumed to choose among those
alternatives that maximize their utilities.
A complete model of product differentiation incorporates, first, the set of possible
products, second, the technology used for each product, third, the tastes of consumers
over the set of possible products, and, fourth, an equilibrium concept. At any significant
level of generality such a model seems intractable. Hence, certain simplifying assumptions
must be made.
Applications will be developed by means of the mix-and-match approach.  With
this approach, product differentiation models provide suitable tools for formulating and
analysing many important aspects of the economics of standardization: standardization
choices, related policies, and some antitrust implications and international trade policies.
1.3 Product differentiation and standardization mod-
els: A survey
1.3.1 History
A brief outline of some of the key points in the historical development of models of product
differentiation may help to put the material discussed in this monograph into perspective.
Also, the history of the economics of standardization is reviewed briefly at the end of
this section; there we are interested mainly in standardization and its implications for
antitrust and international trade policies. Because of space limitations and the extensive
literature, we mention only the main contributions. Our concern is with the flow of ideas,
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and we mention names only as illustrative benchmarks.
The history of product differentiation models
Shortly after the death of Alfred Marshall, Sraffa (1926) pointed out the inconsistency
between the observed facts of unexploited scale economics in many manufacturing indus-
tries and the Marshallian theory of perfect competition, where all scale economies must
be exhausted in the long-run equilibrium.
Chamberlin (1933) responded to Sraffa's challenge. In his theory, a large group of
competitive firms, each producing one differentiated product and operating under condi-
tions of free entry, produce in equilibrium outputs less than the minimum efficient scale.
This theory was a triumph in making a small amendment - differentiated products - to
Marshall's theory of perfect competition, which then reconciled competitive theory with
the empirical observation of unexploited economies of scale.
However, the presence of unexploited economies of scale, which became known as the
"excess capacity theorem",  gave  rise to innumerable controversies in response  to  its  ap-
parent implication of free-market inefficiency. This controversy finally faded away when
it became understood that, in a society that values diversity, there is a trade-off between
economizing on resources by reducing the costs of producing existing products, and sat-
isfying the desire for diversity by increasing the number of products. Optimum diversity
occurs when existing products are produced at points to the left of the minimum-efficient
scale; "excess capacity" is therefore not necessarily socially inefficient.
The attention paid to Chamberlin's model decreased later on, for two reasons worth
of mentioning. First, it was shortly realized that virtually all industries containing a mul-
titude of differentiated products contained only a few firms (See, for example, Markham
(1964)). Thus, although the typical real-world set of differentiated products was a large
group, the set of competing firms was a small group. Second, growth of interest in location
theory showed that localized, rather than generalized, competition was also common in
many industries where firms are differentiated by their geographic location. Although, for
example, there are many drugstores in a city, each has a few nearby, and many distant,
neighbours.
To understand the development of small group competition with differentiated prod-
ucts we need to begin with Cournot's (1838) model of quantity competition between
oligopolists producing identical products. Then came Bertrand's (1883) formulation of
the alternative of price competition showing that non-cooperative behaviour would drive
prices down to marginal costs. Bertrand's critique of Cournot opened an important is-
sue that still faces us: What conditions favour the use of either price or quantity as the
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strategic variable for oligopolistic competition?
The seminal article on competition between oligopolists producing differentiated prod-
ucts was Hotelling's (1929) "address branch model". Hotelling's starting point   was
Bertrand's critique of Cournot.  He made a crucial change of assumptions by letting
his duopolists compete to sell a differentiated rather than a homogeneous product.
Hotelling recognized that space, by its very nature, is a source of market power, and
that localized competition between firms is common. Because market activities are per-
formed at dispersed locations in space, each firm finds only a few rivals in its immediate
neighbourhood; further away there might be more competitors, but their influence is
weakened by the existence of transportation costs. Similarly, the firms do not consider all
consumers to be alike; those who are far away from a firm will not buy from that firm
because they have to pay too high a transportation cost. Accordingly, competition in
space occurs "among few", thus leading to an analysis of the problem as a strategic game.
Hotelling's address branch model is better known as the spatial competition model.
In this model, a population of consumers is spread out geographically, while firms selling
a homogeneous product are located in the same area. Consumers have preferences with
respect to the commodity made available by the firms either at the firms' or consumers
place (depending on who controls transport). Since the product is homogeneous, a ba-
sic feature of consumers' behaviour is that they buy from the firm charging the lowest
full price, i.e., the price gross of transportation costs.  As a result, the number of con-
sumers patronizing a particular firm depends on its location and price policy, as well as
on locations and price policies of competing firms established in the relevant area. This
situation can be modelled typically as a noncooperative game, in which the players are
firms, strategies are prices and/or locations, and the payoffs are profit functions.
The economic relevance of location games does not stem exclusively from their initial
geographical set-up. Indeed, location problems are functionally related to many aspects
of business competition in modern economies. First, the spatially dispersed nature of
markets has a direct analog in industrial economies in the form of an industry with
differentiated products. In the latter set-up, product substitutes are dispersed in a space
of characteristics 4 la Lancaster, and the seller of a particular variant enjoys a quasi-
monopolistic position relative to the consumers who most prefer it. The counterpart
of transportation costs is the utility loss incurred by a consumer who does not flnd his
"ideal product" on the market. Hence, modelling spatial competition extends immediately
to modelling competition amongst firms producing differentiated commodities. In this
domain, it has become useful to distinguish between market competition under horizontal
and vertical product differentiation. Along several dimensions, the nature of competition
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turns out to be different under these two types of differentiation. Interesting enough,
they have precise counterparts in spatial competition models. To horizontal product
differentiation corresponds spatial competition with firms locating within the same sub-
space in which the consumers are located; we call the corresponding game inside location
game. To vertical product differentiation corresponds spatial competition, where the
sellers are located outside the residential area, like shopping centres set up along a road
at the outskirts of a city. Given identical prices, all consumers prefer to buy from the
shopping centre which is closest to the city. The corresponding game is called the outside
location game.
Second, the location model is suited well for analysing non-price competition; firms are
thus assumed to compete on other variables than prices; in particular, product specijication
appears as a basic decision variable. Marketers view the product sold by a firm as a mix
of goods in conjunction with an array of services. The spatial analog of a firm choosing
the attributes of a product defined as such, gives some competing facilities.
Third, although the objective in both pricing and product differentiation decisions is
presumably to maximize profits, the time is different. It is not hard to change a pricing
decision once it has been made. Companies can move from a high-profit margin, entry-
encouraging price posture to a low-margin position virtually overnight. This is not nearly
as true of product differentiation decisions.  Once the firm has committed itself to a set of
physical and subjective product attributes, months or even years may be required before
it can escape that commitment. Although each decision evolves both short-run and long-
run considerations, it is not too severe an oversimplification to suggest that products
are chosen first and prices second. This leads to the so-called location-then-price and/or
quality-then-price games.
Hotelling showed that if two competing firms are differentiated, either by having differ-
ent geographic locations or by producing products differentiated in some one-dimensional
characteristics space, price competition could keep prices high enough to cover capital
costs, thus yielding a stable, long-run equilibrium. Lerner and Singer (1941) expanded          I
Hotelling's model by increasing the number of firms beyond two. Smithies (1941) consid-
ered the consequence of altering Hotelling's restrictive demand assumption. Thirty years
after his publication, however, only a modest amount of work could trace its linkage back
to Hotelling's approach.
A renewed interest in addressing models of product differentiation was aided by the          I
development of demand theory. The models developed by Lancaster (1966) and Quandt
and Baumol (1966), in which consumers' preferences are defined over characteristics which
themselves are embodied in goods, provided a structure in which the firm's decisions con-
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cerning product differentiation could be analysed in a meaningful way. Shortly after,
Baumol (1967) studied a producer's optimal product design and observed that the new
characteristic models provided "a promising approach to a problem that seems previously
to have appeared  to be intractable". Addressing models  of competition between firms
selling differentiated goods first concentrated on a finding developed from a variant of
Hotelling's model, which Boulding (1966) christened the principle of minimum diferen-
tiation. Important contributions to this principle have been made by Gabszewicz and
Thisse (1979), Champsaur and Rochet (1988), and Caplin and Nalebuff (1991). Conse-
quent works have provided economically meaningful insights of the market differentiation
behaviour of firms.
The history of standardization models
The revived development of horizontal and vertical differentiation has made these a pop-
ular framework to deal with various imperfect competition problems encountered in in-
dustrial organization. Interests spread quickly over many topics, such as standardization,
and its implications to antitrust markets and international trade policies, studied in this
monograph.
Having started with the early contribution of Hemenway (1975), the economics of stan-
dardization has since then evolved into a well-recognized area of industrial organization.
The theoretical issues of standardization have been studied mainly in two frameworks:
the network externalities and the mix-and-match framework.
In the presence of network externalities, each consumer's willingness to pay for a given
good increases with the size of the network associated with this good.  In the pioneering
papers of Katz and Shapiro (1985), Farrell and Saloner (1985, 1985a) (henceforth KSFS)
this positive relationship between consumers' utility and network size is taken exogenously.
KSFS try to capture both direct and indirect network effects. Subsequent work has tried
to provide firm foundations for indirect network effects.  In Chou and Shy (1990) and
Church and Gandal (1992a, 1993a) (henceforth CSCG), consumers derive utility from the
consumption of a durable good and a set of complementary compatible components. In
Matutes and Padilla (1994), network effects in the banking industry arise from reduced
transportation costs. In this branch of research, differentiation models provide a useful
framework to capture durable goods with indirect network externalities.
Through the mix-and-match approach, however, the differentiation framework estab-
lished its importance in the economics of standardization. The work of Matutes and
Regibeau (1988, 1992), and Economides (1989) (henceforth MRE) abstracts from net-
work externalities and focuses on situations in which consumers derive utility from the
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use of a system consisting of a fixed number of compatible components.
Since a consumer's utility does not directly depend on the choices of other consumers,
the mix-and-match framework emphasizes neither the role of consumers' expectations
nor the lingering effects of past decisions. Moreover, with this approach compatibility
between firms does not change the degree of differentiation between each firm's version
of the same component. It only allows consumers to combine components from different
manufacturers, resulting in a greater variety of available systems. Finally, consumers differ
in their "ideal" specification for each component of the system. If the components from
different brands are compatible, then some consumers choose to assemble components
from different manufacturers in order to form a more satisfactory system than if they had
been forced to use components from the same brand. Since consumers are willing to pay
more for a system which is closer to their ideal, compatibility raises the willingness to pay
of the consumers who prefer to 'mix-and-match" but does not affect the willingness to
pay of consumers who are happiest with the features of components from the same brand.
1.3.2 Insights
Horizontal differentiation
To understand the principle of differentiation, we discuss the sequential game introduced
by Hotelling (1929).
There, price and location are chosen sequentially, where locations are chosen in the first
stage and prices in the second stage of the game. Given that prices are chosen according
to a noncooperative Nash equilibrium in pure strategies in the subgame consisting of the
second stage (a Nash equilibrium in prices is a pair of prices such that no firm can gain
by unilateral deviation), the corresponding equilibrium payoffs are well defined whenever
the price equilibrium exists and is unique. In addition to relying on prices, the payoffs
also depend upon the location choices of firms. Accordingly, they determine the payoff
functions in the first stage of the game in which locations are chosen. A subgame-perfect
location-then-price equilibrium captures the idea that, when firms choose their locations,
they both anticipate the consequences of their choices on price competition. In particular,
they are aware that this competition will be more severe if they locate closer to each other.
Unfortunately, such an equilibrium can be determined only if, for any location choices of
firms, there exists a unique price equilibrium in the second stage of the game; the payoff
function would otherwise be either undefined, or multi-valued. Consequently, the focus
moves to the existence and, a fortiori, to the uniqueness conditions of a price equilibrium.
On the other hand, in some industries firms do not exert any control over their price
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because of either cartel agreements or price regulations by public authorities. Then, firms
may compete on locations, in such a way that they obtain the largest possible sales. So,
in order to derive a subgame-perfect location-then-price equilibrium, it is preferable to,
first of all, fix one parameter while investigating another.
First, consider the price stage. In the price stage firms choose prices to maximize
profits, given their locations. Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) show that with linear trans-
portation costs, there is a unique Nash equilibrium if the distance between the firms'
locations is large enough. However, if the firms are too close, both firms have an incen-
tive to charge a price such that the other firm must become inactive; there is, hence, no
price equilibrium. They also show that with quadratic transportation costs, there exists
a unique Nash equilibrium in prices for all possible locations of firms. The non-existence
of a price equilibrium is caused by the non-quasi-concavity of the profit function (see
Dasgupta and Maskin (1986)). Namely, if the firms are located too close to each other
under linear transportation costs, the positive demand effect dominates the negative price
effect. If the distance between the firms is large enough, profits are quasi-concave and the
price effect dominates.
No general existence of price equilibrium in pure strategies can be proved for the 10-
cation model. To date, the most general sufficient conditions on customer density and
transportation cost functions have been derived by Champsaur and Rochet (1988). Al-
ternatively, the most general sufficient conditions on demand functions which guarantee
the existence and uniqueness of a price equilibrium in pure strategies have been provided
by Caplin and Nalebuff (1991). Moreover, the conditions derived by Caplin and Nalebuff
(1991) can be applied to models of differentiation with multi-dimensional attributes.
Next, consider the location stage. For cartels or regulated prices, locational competi-
tion between firms has been studied by Lerner and Singer (1937) and, more recently, by
Eaton and Lipsey (1975) and Denzau, Kats and Slutsky (1985). Their results appeared
not very robust to the specification of the model; in particular, they turn out to be very
sensitive with respect to the customer distribution and the number of firms. To see this,
let us assume that consumers are continuously distributed  over the interval  [0,1].   Then,
in the two-firm case, there exists a unique location equilibrium in pure strategies in which
both firms are located at the median of the cumulative function.  But for the three-firm
case, no location equilibrium exists.
Somewhat surprisingly, the existence is restored for more than three firms. For the
four-firm case, there exists a unique equilibrium for which two firms are located at the
first quartile and the two others at the third one. For five-firm case, the equilibrium is
unique and such that two firms are located at the first sextile, two others at the fifth one,
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and one firm is isolated at the market centre. If there are more than five firms, there
exists a continuum of equilibrium configurations, characterized as follows:
• not more than two firms are at the same location;
• peripheral firms are paired with their neighbours;
• paired firms have equal sales;
• isolated firms have sales which are at least as large as those of paired firms but not
more than twice as large.
Finally, we come to a complete description of an equilibrium of the sequential location-
then-price game. A subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium for the two-stage location-then-
price game is a pair of locations together with a pair of prices such that, given equilibrium
prices in the second stage, no firm gains by changing its location unilaterally in the first
stage, and no firm gains by changing its price unilaterally for any pair of locations.
Hotelling's (1929) finding that price competition between oligopolistic firms would
result in consumers being offered products with an "excessive sameness" has become
known as the principle of minimum differentiation.  As this principle had been used
widely, the conclusion of d'Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) that this finding
was invalid was quite a shock. Subsequent research tried to understand the invalidity as
well as to find conditions to restore it.
First, we have the maximum diferentiation result due to d'Aspremont, Gabszewicz
and Thisse (1979) in case of quadratic transportation costs. If firms are allowed to locate
outside the interval  it is sometimes called excessive  diferentiation (see Tirole  (1988)).
Gabszewicz and Thisse (1992) show, for example, that transportation costs should be
sufficiently convex in order to guarantee the existence of a price equilibrium for alllocation
pairs.
Second, by generalizing the utility function used by Hotelling (1929), Economides
(1986) shows that the degree of differentiation depends on the curvature of the trans-
portation cost function. The principle of minimum differentiation does not hold for a
family of utility functions having Hotelling's original utility function as a special case.
Furthermore, the maximum differentiation result holds only if transportation costs are
sufficiently convex.
Third, by generalizing the consumers' distribution function, Neven (1986) and Tabuchi
and Thisse (1995), among others, show that the degree of differentiation depends on the
specification of the distribution function.
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Fourth, following Eaton and Lipsey (1975), a no-mill-price-undercutting assumption
may be used (see Novshek (1980)). This means that each firm takes its competitor's price
as given and refrains from setting a price that would eliminate the competitor's prod-
uct. An alternative avoiding-price-war assumption is proposed in Hamilton and Thisse
(1985), who show that over the domain of prices implied by this behavioural constraint,
an equilibrium exists for all location pairs in Hotelling's model.  In the location stage,
the two firms establish themselves at their socially efficient locations. A related model
is that of Friedman and Thisse (1993), describing the equilibrium behaviour in a model
with a countably infinite succession of time periods. If equilibrium behaviour is such as
to have firms collusively arrange a trigger strategy equilibrium in prices, and select their
locations knowing that a particular such trigger strategy price equilibrium will ensue, the
minimum differentiation result applies.
Finally, a different approach to the problem is the probabilistic one (for example,
see de Palma, Ginsburgh, Papageorgiou, and Thisse (1985) or Anderson, de Palma, and
Thisse (1992)). The point of departure for this approach is to recognize the fact that
firms cannot determine a priori differences in consumers' tastes, so that they endow each
consumer with a probabilistic choice rule. At the aggregate level, it is assumed that the
probability functions predict the actual frequencies perfectly well. In this way, consumer
demand is distributed smoothly between firms which, as a result, gives rise to overlapping
market areas. It is shown that the principle of minimum differentiation holds when the
degree of heterogeneity is sufficiently large. An alternative probabilistic approach is to
consider mixed strategies. According to Osborne and Pitchik (1987), it turns out that,
under appropriate conditions, a mixed strategy equilibrium may be viewed as a pure
strategy equilibrium in a game of incomplete information.
Vertical differentiation
Recently, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979, 1986), Mussa and Rosen (1978), and Shaked
and Sutton (1982, 1983, 1987) developed a parallel variant of horizontal differentiation,
namely, vertical differentiation. The study of vertical differentiation resembles that of
horizontal differentiation closely. However, the markets captured by these two types
of models are different, and the nature of competition shows some significant points of
divergence.
First of all, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1986) compared the inside and outside location
models. According to them, inside and outside locations have the analogs of horizontal and
vertical differentiations, respectively. They show that when keeping location a parameter,
more stability in price competition may be expected with vertically (outside locations)
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than with horizontally (inside locations) differentiated products.
Second, perhaps the most important and significant difference is that between the so-
called 'fragmentation" property in Hotelling's model of horizontal differentiation and the
"finiteness" property in Shaked and Sutton's model (1983, 1987) of vertical differentiation.
According to the fragmentation property, each firm earns a monopolistic profit under
horizontal differentiation. With free entry, the size of fixed costs, relative to the size
of the economy, determines the number of firms, and therefore the degree of market
concentration.  As the size of the economy increases, the level of market concentration
falls.  At the limit, the market is able to hold an arbitrarily large number of firms, each
with a positive market share and a price exceeding unit variable cost. Hence, economies of
scale become less of a barrier to entry in "large" economies. This property is fundamental:
As firms become more closely spaced, price competition between them implies that prices
approach the level of unit variable cost. It is this "Chamberlinian" configuration which
forms the basis of the notion of "perfect monopolistic competition".
Under vertical differentiation, on the other hand, the finiteness property or market
concentration holds; there exists an upper bound, independent of product qualities or
market size, to the number of firms that are able to coexist with positive market shares
and prices exceeding unit variable costs, at a Nash equilibrium in prices. The conditions
required for this finiteness property are as follows:
1) Unit variable costs should increase relatively slowly as quality increases (which is
especially true when a sunk cost is mainly incurred for quality improvement);
2) The proportionate rate of increase in fixed costs associated with a given increase
in quality (measured in terms of consumers' willingness to pay) should be bounded from
above for all qualities.
It is worth stressing that the finiteness property is rather strong. The upper bound
depends only on the pattern of tastes and the income distribution and is independent of the
qualities of the various products being offered. The mechanism through which the result
comes about, is that whatever the set of products entered, competition between certain
"surviving" products drives their prices down to a level where every consumer prefers
either to make no purchase, or to buy one of these surviving goods at its equilibrium
price, rather than switch to any of the excluded products, at any price sufIcient to cover
unit variable cost.
Standardization
The economics of standardization provides many insights into the preferences of both the
firms and the government for standardization and into the underlying mechanism:
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1) In the absence of network externalities, horizontally differentiated firms producing
homogeneous goods prefer standardization, and standardization may survive in equilib-
rium. The social preference for standardization normally remains ambiguous, however.
2) An incumbent might want to commit himself to non-standardization in order to
deter entry.
3) A higher degree of standardization may encourage or dissuade Research and De-
velopment (R&D) efforts - depending on whether the firm is a technological leader or
follower and on when firms must commit to a standard. Likewise, incentives to reach
standardization agreements may differ between firms (depending on their technological
level) and do not necessarily remain constant through time.
4) The effects of traditional "strategic" trade policies depend crucially on the firms'
abilities to commit to a network size. This suggests that the effect of trade protection
might well depend on the particular trade instrument utilized. In particular, the relative
effects of tariffs, as well as quantity based restrictions such as quotas, must be determined.
These insights depend critically on the underlying mechanisms of standardization.
Standardization problems arise when system goods and/or complementary products are
provided by competitors in the market. On the one hand, standardization can not inter-
nalize the complementarity between components of a system good or two complementary
products of a producer. Under standardization, cutting the price of one good will increase
the sales of all system goods using that component, or the sales of its complementary prod-
ucts, including system goods or complementary products produced by other firms. Since
some of the benefits of the price cut will be appropriated by other firms, each firm will
behave less aggressively than in the case of non-standardization. Therefore, prices are
higher in the standardization case and consumer surplus is decreased. On the other hand,
standardization makes it possible for consumers to combine components or use products
from different firms, thereby increasing the varieties available to the consumers. As a
result, consumer surplus is increased.
The mechanisms of standardization make the incentives of firms producing system
goods, or complementary products, different from the single product case. Also different
is the social welfare. Since standardization is a popularly observed economic phenomenon,
it becomes important to further explore the implications of standardization.
1.4    Overview of the monograph
After having discussed above the fields to which the models analysed in this monograph
relate, we give an overview of these models. The following five sub-sections briefly intro-
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duce the different economic issues that will be studied and developed in the research.
1.4.1 Vertical product differentiation and outside goods
Walking on the street or shopping in the supermarkets, one finds that a (Philips) shaver
is available in many varieties and qualities; there are computers in many types (where a
smaller, more powerful computer is preferred to a larger, less powerful one in general);
on the automobile market, a Mercedes Benz is, for example, preferred to a Volvo, and a
Volvo preferred to a Hyundai, etc. The qualities of many similar products are different,
and even supermarkets themselves are differentiated and known by selling luxurious or
cheap products.
The wide array of products in the market place is a response to the wide diversity
of consumer tastes. The taste of a consumer may be influenced by his nature, by the
occasion, or by his income. For example, someone with high income may prefer expensive
commodities like Rolls-Royce, a Mercedes Benz car, and a large, comfortable house with a
swimming pool and a big garden, etc. However, if one's income is low, luxury commodities
might be less valuable and unaffordable, so cheap commodities are preferred. If individual
consumers value additional quality by different amounts, then the possibility arises for
different quality products to be priced at levels that induce positive sales; the market is
segmented. Of course, if consumers differ only moderately, products might be expected
to differ little in quality. Since price competition is usually more intensive for the less
heterogeneous products, the number of products existing in equilibrium may be very
restricted and may reflect more the range of differences between consumers, and thus the
demand for this kind of variety, than the number of consumers.
Mussa and Rosen (1978), Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979, 1980), and Shaked and Sutton
(1982, 1983) formalized these commonly observed markets as vertically differentiated. To
illustrate, let us consider Shaked and Sutton (1982). Imagine that a number of firms
are waiting to enter a certain market, in which there is a technologically feasible quality
spectrum for them to choose for the quality specifications of their products. All firms
know that their technologies allow them to choose any quality from the quality spectrum.
However, they are also aware that the product specification involves R&D, is less flexible,
and once it is chosen, will commit them to produce that kind of quality product for a
certain period.  In this period, each of them faces price competition. Prices are more
flexible; they may be adjusted overnight. Moreover, no production costs are involved and
all firms know that consumers' incomes are uniformly distributed over a certain range.
Then, we are in a stylized world in which a number of firms seek to enter a market, each
of them with a package of business strategies in hand, and being aware that all of them
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decide, first, on entry, and then, on product quality, and finally, on price.
Shaked and Sutton (1982) conclude that in this world competition between firms re-
sults in an upper bound of the number of firms enjoying positive market shares and
profits. This reflects the fact that competition between the surviving "high quality' prod-
ucts drives their prices down to a point at which not even the "poorest" consumer prefers
the (excluded) low quality product at price zero.  As a result, only a certain number
of high quality product firms survive. Moreover, they conjecture that this upper bound
rises as the range of incomes increases, but is independent of the qualities supplied and
of a small entry cost. This conjecture has been elaborated further in Shaked and Sutton
(1983), which leads to the finiteness property.
Shaked and Sutton's (1982) pathbreaking work encourages us to amend it by adding
certain elements to consider their influences on product differentiation. In Chapter 2
we are interested, on the one hand, in the existence and uniqueness of a market equi-
librium configuration, we ask if monopoly could survive in the market.  On the other
hand, although the "outside goods" are normally neglected by successors in this tradi-
tion, we suspect that it may play an interesting and significant role in effecting product
differentiation.
1.4.2  Cooperation and competition in a vertically differenti-
ated duopoly
Cooperation can be achieved through (tacit) collusion. Collusion practices can be traced
back to ancient Babylon, Greece and Rome. Adam Smith remarked sagely that "people
of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the con-
versation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices. '7
Industry profits can never be higher than when firms set prices at the monopoly level,
that is, at the price that would be set if one profit-maximizing enterprise controlled the
industry output. However, collusion to secure monopolistic prices and profits is a venera-
ble, if not venerated, situation. Unsuccessful attempts at collusion may backfire - leading
to price wars and heavy losses - not to mention prison terms and other legal sanctions
that may arise in countries where collusive agreements are prohibited.
The fragility of nonbinding collusive agreements arises from two central problems.
First, the colluding parties may have divergent ideas about appropriate price levels and
market shares, making it difficult to reach an understanding respected by all. Second,
when the group agrees to abide by a price close to the monopoly level, strong incentives
are created for individual members to cheat on the agreement - that is, to increase their
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profits by undercutting the fixed price slightly, gaining additional orders at a price that
still exceeds marginal cost.
As a result, firms have to make the best of an oligopolistic market structure and
thus try to devise and maintain communication systems that permit behaviour to be
coordinated in the common interest of the firms. The conflicts that inevitably arise must
be resolved without resorting to price warfare. Adjustments to changes in demand and
cost conditions must be made so as to elicit unanimous consent and minimize the risk
that actions taken in the group's interest will be misinterpreted as Prisoner's Dilemma-
style defecting or self-serving aggression. Collusion is communication par excellence, but
it is generally illegal, and the tide of antitrust legislation is running against it in many
industrialized countries. Firms have an understandable desire to find alternative means
of coordinating their behaviour without running afoul of the law.  One such means is
collusive price leadership.
The concept of price leadership was formulated by Jesse Markham to characterise the
kind of leadership especially apt to support a monopolistic solution to the oligopolists'
pricing coordination problem. According to Markham (1951), collusive price leadership is
most likely to emerge when (a) the industry is tightly oligopolistic, (b) sellers' products
are close substitutes and their cost curves are similar, (c) there are barriers to entry of
new rivals, and (d) demand for the industry's output is relatively inelastic.
The cigarette industry during the 1920s and 1930s affords a classic example of collusive
price leadership used to establish a price structure that tended to yield maximum collusive
profits.  The Big Three (Reynolds, American, and Liggett & Myers), selling from 68 to 90
percent of industry output, mostly through their Camel, Lucky Strike, and Chesterfield
brands, clearly recognised their mutual interdependence. The leading brands were quite
similar physically; blindfold tests revealed that experienced smokers could not distinguish
between them. There is no close substitute for cigarettes in the minds of most consumers,
and so the cigarette manufacturers enjoyed considerable discretion in choosing an overall
price level.
The 1933 departures from the leadership of the Big Three illustrate the high degree of
coordination and retaliation displayed by firms selling cigarettes of different qualities.  The
increased prices by the Big Three, combined with the dire financial straits in which many
cigarette smokers found themselves, opened up significant market penetration possibilities
for firms selling cigarettes of inferior quality. With the standard brands selling at retail
prices of up to fifteen cents per pack, these so-called ten-cent brands increased their market
share from 1 percent in early 1931 to 23 percent in late 1932. In response, the Big Three
counterattacked by reducing their prices and were largely successful; the market share of
1.4.   Overview of the monograph                                                               19
ten-cent brands dropped from 23 percent in November 1932 to 6 percent in May 1933.
Having recovered much of the lost ground, the Big Three increased their prices again in
January 1934 (but the increased price levels were lower than their original ones).
Another example is the American automobile industry. General Motors has long
been acknowledged as price leader. Smaller firms such as American Motors experienced
considerably greater latitude to reduce prices by as much as $200 relative to General
Motors models without provoking retaliation. Reductions of similar magnitude on poorly
selling Chrysler models, were also tolerated. However, when Chrysler offered substantial
rebates to combat an industry-wide 1975 model-year sales slump, Ford and General Motors
quickly retaliated to protect their market shares.
Traditionally, the principal occasion to list-price changes was the day on which new
models were introduced, usually in September. Although General Motors was the price
leader, production scheduling considerations often required the other producers to an-
nounce their new models, and hence their prices, before General Motors did. They then
tried hard to anticipate GM's decisions and set their prices accordingly, but if GM's sub-
sequent announcement brought surprises, they beat a hasty retreat, raising or lowering
their prices in the desired relationship with those of General Motors.
These two examples show that (a) some oligopolistic markets are vertically differ-
entiated; there exist quality leaders and followers, and (b) oligopolists may compete in
collusive or even semicollusive environments. The semicollusive environments arise when
firms compete in the first stage with respect to non-price variables such as advertising,
capacity or R&D, or even product specification. As their positions in the markets become
clear, they then collude on prices in the second stage. However, this collusion on prices
is sustained by non-cooperative dynamic price competition. Price deviation by any side
will trigger price retaliation, and price warfare will ensue. Then, questions arise about
these collusive or semicollusive environments:  What kind of prices can be sustained?  How
should firms specify their products' qualities? Chapter 3 will elaborate on these issues
and answer these questions.
1.4.3 Product differentiation with concentrated consumer  dis-
tributions
There are two important factors in Hotelling's (1929) analysis of a spatial duopoly, the
transportation cost functions and the consumer distributions. While the first factor has
been well analysed and understood following Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979, 1992), the
location theorists are still confused by the second one. The problem is that, following
20                                                   Chapter 1. Introduction
Hotelling's tradition, contributions have generally maintained the assumption of a uni-
form consumer distribution which, although convenient, is far from satisfactory. First,
research in marketing has pointed out the existence of "consumer pockets" in the charac-
teristics space, corresponding to customers whose preferences are clustered around some
fashionable brands (see, for example, Kuchn and Day, 1962). Second, in the urban setting,
it is well known that the distribution of households is concentrated around the central
business district (see, for example, Clark, 1951). Finally, Hotelling's model carries over
to a specific formulation of quality competition where consumers would prefer a higher
quality if available at the same price.  If one were to take a stand that a consumer's
willingness to pay for quality depends on his income, then the density of a consumer's
income distribution most probably shows an asymmetric single-peaked shape with most
of the weight on the lower values.
In summary, increasing densities of consumers towards the centre seem intuitively
more appropriate. Such an assumption captures the idea that economies can be gained
from concentration (a (log-) normal distribution is an obvious candidate), and should
yield a more realistic model. Accordingly, it seems important to analyse whether, and
how, firms' competition is modified by the introduction of this assumption, as compared
to the case of a uniform distribution.
However, being short of handy but powerful tools, successors have hardly touched this
problem. Exceptions include Neven (1986), Caplin and Nalebuff (1991), and Goeree and
Ramer (1995). In particular, Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) threw light on this issue and
provided us the tool to attack this consumer distribution problem in Chapter 4. We shall
thus analyse a location-then-price competition, which arises between duopolists when
consumer density increases towards the centre.
1.4.4     Standardization and protection under international com-
petition
Several network industries are global in scope. The most significant firms in personal com-
puters, telecommunications, VCRs, cars, or numerically controlled machine tools compete
worldwide, sometimes in markets with different government-imposed standards. More-
over, many government-imposed standards seem to intend to protect local producers from
foreign competition. This "hidden" protectionism is problematic with regards to the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade as well as to efforts of the International Organisation
for Standardization (ISO) to harmonise standards across borders. Given the importance
of these policy issues, it is surprising that the theoretical literature on compatibility or
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standardization has focused almost completely on closed economies.
It seems natural to extend market competition between systems from a domestic en-
vironment to an international one for the discussion of the economics of standardization.
This aspect of standardization has been widely observed empirically (Nicolas, 1988). A
typical example is the ISO, which works to harmonise standards internationally and is
responsible, for example, for the Open Systems Interconnection reference model in main-
frame computers.
Extending the literature to an international environment involves two main modifica-
tions. First, there are now both "domestic" and "foreign" firms. The crucial difference
here is that the profits of foreign-owned firms do not contribute to the home country's
welfare so that the optimal standardization policy of the home country might well differ
from what it would be in a closed economy. Secondly, some of the markets in which
foreign and domestic firms compete might be served through exports. This opens the
door to a strategic use of trade-policy instruments such as tariffs, quotas, export taxes,
or subsidies.
One situation we may envision is that in the computer, washing machine, or television
industry, a developing country opens its doors to the outside world, particularly, to a
developed country. The domestic firm has the disadvantage of producing a lower quality
product. It has also some advantages, however, such as being protected by the govern-
ment's tariffs or subsidies, and the first-mover advantage as an incumbent, etc. We are
then led to a situation in which a domestic firm faces competition from a foreign firm
under trade liberalisation and protection. The foreign firm is a production technology
leader and entrant, while the domestic firm is a production technology follower, but in-
cumbent. One characteristic of these industries is that manufacturers produce not only
durable equipment but also repair services. For example, in the computer industry, the
manufacturers produce not only personal computers but also software programmes such
as spreadsheets, word processors, databases, communication software, and so on. We may
call the equipment hardware and the repair parts, programmes and services software. We
shall examine the trade-off between these advantages and disadvantages in Chapter 5,
which will also analyse the impact of trade policies on the compatibility choices of firms
and optimal trade policies.
1.4.5     Desirability of compatibility by durable-goods producers
Many products have little or no value in isolation, but generate value when combined with
others. Examples include home audio or video components and programming, which
together provide entertainment services; automobiles, repair parts and service, which
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together provide transportation services; camera bodies and lenses, which together provide
photographic services; photocopiers/micrographic equipment and repair parts/service,
which together provide photocopy services. These are all examples of products that are
strongly complementary, although they need not be consumed in fixed proportions. We
describe them as forming systems, which refers to collections of two or more components
together with an interface that allow the components to work together. Following the
American Supreme Court's (1992) terms, we refer equipment markets to the primary
markets (where primary products are produced) and aftermarkets to the markets where
«aftermarkets transaction" takes place. This aftermarkets transaction, as defined by
Shapiro and Teece (1994), is any transaction with two characteristics:  (a) the aftermarkets
product or service is used together with a primary product, and (b) the aftermarkets
product or service is purchased after the primary product.  In the case of Kodak, for
example, the equipment markets are for photocopiers and micrographic equipment, and
the aftermarkets involve the parts and service needed to keep these machines in good
running condition.
System goods markets with components selling in equipment markets and aftermar-
kets have at least three characteristics. First, aftermarkets might be proprietary because
of intellectual property rights. Market power by equipment manufacturers in aftermarkets
is more likely to arise if aftermarkets are proprietary. Second, system goods are comple-
mentary goods. The parts and service are complements to equipment in the economic
sense: Lowering the price of equipment raises the demand for parts and service, and
vice versa. As a general rule, there are economic benefits from coordinating the sale of
complementary goods, very possibly within the same firm. Finally, a customer or buyer
who owns one brand of machine may face high switching costs in adopting another brand
because the buyer has made investments in brand-specific skills or complementary assets.
As a consequence, the buyer may engage in an integrated assessment of the life-cycle
costs of rival brands of equipment. That is, the buyer of durable goods takes into account
not only the original purchase price of the equipment, but also the expected maintenance
costs (including supplies, parts, and services) in his decision making.
Market competition between systems, as opposed to market competition between indi-
vidual products, highlights some important issues of compatibility or standardization (we
do not distinguish between them in this monograph). These issues include the following:
(a) How will firms make compatibility decisions, which firms will seek compatibility, and
which will not? (b) How do intellectual property rights influence compatibility choices?
How are the private and social incentives to produce compatible systems compared? (c)
An extension of the compatibility decision is its implications for antitrust.
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These issues of compatibility emerge from distinguishing between the industrial market
structures, for which the primary markets and the aftermarkets can follow several patterns.
First, equipment and service markets can be both competitive (telephones, fax machines);
or both can be monopolized, either by the same firm or by separate firms.  It is also possible
for the primary markets to be competitive and the aftermarkets monopolized. If a single
firm were to develop a proprietary technology to serve refrigerators in compliance with
new environmental restrictions, that firm could conceivably monopolize the refrigerator
service business, even if sales of refrigerators is competitive. The fourth logical possibility,
a monopolized equipment market and competitive aftermarkets, arise if an equipment
manufacturer has monopoly power and many firms service its equipment.
Many studies have focused on the fourth case. The central question asked refers to
whether a firm could transfer his monopoly power from his equipment market over to
his aftermarkets through "tying" when his equipment market is monopolised while the
aftermarkets are competitive. A firm engages in tying when it makes the sale (or price)
of one of its products conditional upon the purchaser also buying some other products
from it. The "leverage theory" of tying says that tying provides a mechanism whereby a
firm with monopoly power in one market can use the leverage provided by this power to
foreclose sales in, and thereby monopolize, a second market. However, Director and Levi
(1956), Bowman (1957), and Posner (1976) demonstrated the opposite and established
the  idea  that "a monopolist  only gets monopoly profits  once". Thus, alternative expla-
nations for tying contend that if a monopolist does employ tying, his motivation could
be price discrimination (Bowman, 1957), achieving economics of joint sales, protection of
goodwill, risk sharing, and cheating on a cartel price. Almost inadvertently, the more for-
mal economics literature on tying (Burstein, 1960; Blair and Kaserman, 1978; Schalensee,
1982) has reinforced this view as a result of its exclusive focus on price discrimination
motivations for practice. Recently, Whinston (1990) argued that tying can indeed serve
as a mechanism for leveraging market power (provided the existence of an oligopolistic
market structure and scale economies). The argument is foreclosure, which says that if
tying causes competitive firms to leave the competitive market, then a monopolist can
raise the price of the (formerly) competitive goods.
There are also studies on the third case that ask the reversed question: will competition
between equipment manufacturers inevitably preclude any finding of monopoly power in
derivative aftermarkets? The answer to this question provided by the economic literature
is   "no". For example, Borenstein, MacKie-Mason  and  Netz (1996), Blair and Herndon
(1996), and Shapiro and Teece (1994) demonstrated that equipment manufacturers have
incentives to exercise market power in their tied aftermarkets. But at the same time, in
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two later papers it is argued that this power of aftermarkets should not be an antitrust
concern.
However, the more realistic and important case that has not been studied refers to
the one in which equipment markets and aftermarkets are both locally monopolised. The
question that may be then asked is whether firms have incentives to tie their aftermarkets
with equipment markets and what are the consequences for social welfare. We shall
formulate these markets and analyse these issues in Chapter 6.
In Chapter 6, we recognize that locally monopolised equipment markets and aftermar-
kets share the similarity with horizontally differentiated markets, and that the "mix-and-
match" approach provides a suitable framework for the formulation of these markets. We
envision a world in which consumers benefit from the use of a system that consists of a
fixed set of compatible components.  In this context, compatibility means that a consumer
can combine components from different producers. This results in a large variety of goods
- although each firm's realisation of the same component is taken as given. However, the
larger the number of varieties, the more likely it is that a consumer is able to buy her
most preferred version of a system good. The willingness to pay will increase for those
consumers who benefit from the mix-and-match possibility. Neither direct nor indirect
network effects are considered. The utility of the consumer does not depend on the choices
of other consumers, at least not directly. With reference to mix-and-match compatibility,
important problems such as antitrust implications will be discussed.
1.4.6 Concluding remarks
This thesis analyses why products become increasingly heterogenous in both their phys-
ical and qualitative appearances in the modern market economy. Among the important
causes, competition from outside goods, non-uniform but concentrated consumer distri-
butions, and competition and cooperation, are studied for the demonstration of their
economic implications. The applications are twofold. First, there are the incentives of
durable-goods producers to tie their aftermarkets with their primary markets, and the
social consequences of that action. Second, there are the international trade policies of
standardization. The analysis focuses on whether a domestic durable-goods producer,
being a quality follower and incumbent, will agree on standardizing its products with a
foreign durable-goods producer, under international competition and government protec-
tion.
Detailed discussions will be provided in the next five chapters, which are modified ver-
sions of Han and Webers (1996) and Han (1995, 1996, 1997, 1997). The main conclusions
of the research are as follows.
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First, consider a vertically differentiated duopoly ti la Shaked and Sutton (1982),
where the quality spectrum from which the firms can choose is narrow. Then, the two
firms will be squeezed into a restricted product space, and competition between the two
firms will be so strong that the effect of outside goods is strictly dominated and the
two firms always try to differentiate their products maximally within the given quality
spectrum. On the other hand, when the feasible quality spectrum is large, the two firms
will have sufficient room in order to make choices of their product qualities. In this case,
competition between the two firms becomes moderate and the effect of outside goods
arises. Without cost differences between the two firms, the standard result is that the
lower quality product producer (firm 1) wants more product differentiation, since this
relaxes price competition and increases profits (Tirole, 1988). When the effect of outside
goods increases, however, the competition that firm 1 faces increases also. Moreover, this
effect of outside goods is stronger for firm 1 than for the higher quality product producer
(firm 2).  As a result, the higher the quality of outside goods, the stronger becomes the
competition that firm 1 will face, and the more product differentiation that firm 1 wants
from firm 2. Moreover, although the degree of product differentiation increases with the
effect of outside goods, the equilibrium levels of prices and profits of the two firms decrease
because of the increased competition.
Second, consider the similar framework of a vertically differentiated duopoly, in which
the quality of outside goods is assumed zero, but the two firms may have more strategic
variables, such as qualities and prices, at their disposal. Then, three cases arise: (a)
cooperation on both qualities and prices, (b) competition on qualities but cooperation on
prices, (c) competition on both qualities and prices. The analysis shows that the two firms
will cooperate on both qualities and prices and differentiate their products maximally.
Third, consider two firms in both inside and outside location games, which are analogs
of horizontal and vertical product differentiations, respectively, corresponding to location
theory. The concentrated consumer distribution creates a market retention force in the
inside location game, and increases the asymmetry between the firms in the outside 10-
cation game. As a result, the firms tend to move toward the inside of the market and
decrease their product differentiation in the inside location game, while they try to move
apart and increase their product differentiation in the outside location game.
Fourth, consider firms producing system goods. A system good consists of several
components. Components are useless unless they form the system good. The situation
considered is that a domestic firm producing system goods faces competition from a for-
eign firm producing higher quality of system goods, and is protected by the government
through trade policies, such as tariffs. The issue arisen is whether the two firms will agree
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on standardizing their components given government protection. We show that trade
liberalization is associated with standardization of the components of the system goods,
while protectionism may lead to non-standardization when consumers' taste parameters
are independent. When consumers' taste parameters are identical, however, the stan-
dardization choices of firms are independent of the government trade policies. We show
also that neither welfare nor the optimal tariff could be changed by the government's
precommitment to a given tariff level, and standardization is always implemented by the
government.
Finally, consider durable-goods industries with aftermarkets. Then, durable-goods
producers or manufacturers may have incentives to use the aftermarkets price as strategic
variable to increase profits, which may cause antitrust concerns. For the duopoly case,
the analysis shows that durable-goods producers will prefer to compete on their aftermar-
kets rather than to protect their proprietary aftermarkets through tying if the consumer's
reservation price is sufficiently low.  If the consumer's reservation price is sufficiently high,
however, the two producers may prefer either to tie or to compete on their aftermarkets
- provided that the aftermarket profit is discounted sufficiently, and tying is particu-
larly preferred in this case if these two firms could coordinate on it.  If the afterrnarket
profit is sufficiently valued, however, no agreement can be reached between the two firms.
Moreover, the social optimum may be consistent with the firms' choices of tying.
1.5 Preliminaries: Dynamic games of complete in-
formation
The games analysed in this monograph are dynamic games of complete (but imperfect)
information, the key features of which are that (a) the moves are in sequential stages but
simultaneous within each stage, (b) all previous moves are observed before the next move
is chosen, and (c) the players' payoffs from each feasible combination of moves are common
knowledge. The fact that moves within each stage are made simultaneously means that
the games have imperfect information. The normal-form game and Nash equilibrium form
the basis of this dynamic game.
The normal-form representation of a game specifies the following: (a) the players in
the game, (b) the strategies available to each player, and (c) the payoff received by each
player for each combination of strategies that could be chosen by the players. In an n-
player game, the players are numbered from 1 to n and an arbitrary player is called player
i. Let S; denote the set of strategies available to player i (called i's strategy space),  and
let si denote an arbitrary element of this set. Write s, € S; to indicate that the strategy
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s,  is  a  member of the set of strategies  S;  and  let  (sl, ···,s„) denote a combination of
strategies, one for each player, and let ui denote player i's payoffunction:  u,(si,..., s.)
is the payoff to player i i f the players choose strategies (st,...,sn)
Definition  1.5.1 The normal-form representation ofan n-player game G=  {Si, . . . , S.; U
specijies the players ' strategy spaces S i, . . . ,S.  and  their payoffunctions  ul, · · · , un.
The definition of a Nash equilibrium of a game in normal form is as follows.
Definition 1.5.2 In the n-player normal-form game G= {S ,...,Sn, ui,,··,un}, the
strategies (s' , s )  are a Nash equilibrium if, for each player i, si is player i's best1,···
response to the strategies specifed for the other players , (Sl,···,S,-1, S,+11···1 n/'s.)·
U,(St, · · · , S;-1, S;,SI+l, · ' ' Sn)  211,(4, · · ·i ·Si'-1, Si, S;+1, I    - ' Sn)
for every feasible strategy s, in S,,· that is, s; solves
..
maxa,€S, Ui<Sl,···,si-1, Si, si+1, · · · , Sn)·
1.5.1 Two-stage games of complete but imperfect information
We first analyse the following simple game, which will apply to most of our economic
problems analysed in this monograph, and we call it, following Gibbons (1992), a two-
stage game of complete but imperfect information:
1. Players 1 and 2 simultaneously choose actions at and a, from feasible sets Ai and
A2, respectively.
2.  Players  1  and 2 observe the outcome of the first stage,  (al, a2),  and then simulta-
neously choose actions a3 and a4 from feasible sets A3 and A4, respectively.
3.  Payoffs are u, (al, a2, a3, a4) for i = 1,2
In case of a two-stage location-then-price or quality-then-price game, the players are
firms, the actions in the first stage are locations or qualities and the actions in the second
stage are prices. We define  h2, the history  at  the  end of stage  2,  to  be the sequence  of
actions  in the previous two periods,  h'  =  (al, a2, a3, a4) Since  h2 by definition describes
an entire sequence of actions from the beginning of the game on, the set of all possible
histories at the end of stage 2 is the same as the set of all possible outcomes when the
game is played.
We solve a game from this class by using an approach in the spirit of backwards
induction. In the first step in working backwards from the end of the game, we solve a
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simultaneous-move game between players 1 and 2 in stage two, given the outcome from
stage one. To keep things simple, we assume that for each feasible outcome of the first-
stage  game,  (al, a2), the second-stage  game that remains between players  1  and  2  has  a
unique Nash equilibrium, denoted  by (al(al,a2),al(al, a2)).
If players 1 and 2 anticipate that their second-stage behaviour will be given by
(a;(al, a2),a;(al, a2)),  then the first-stage interaction between players  1  and 2 amounts
to the following simultaneous-move game:
1. Players 1 and 2 simultaneously choose actions at and a2 from feasible sets Al and
A2, respectively.
2. Payogs are u,(at, ae,a (al,a2), a;(al,ae)) for i = 1,2.
Suppose  (a;,al)  is the unique Nash equilibrium of this simultaneous-move game.   We
call (a;, aL a;(al, a;), a;(a;, al)) the subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome of this two-stage
game. This equilibrium concept has both attractive and unattractive features. Players
1 and 2 should not believe a threat by opponent that the rival will respond with actions
that are not a Nash equilibrium in the remaining second-stage game, because when play
actually reaches the second stage at least one of them will not want to carry out such
a threat (exactly because it is not a Nash equilibrium of the game that remains at that
stage).
1.5.2 Finite-stage games of complete but imperfect informa-
tion
In some situations, the economic problems analysed in this monograph can be modelled
by allowing a longer sequence of stages through allowing players to move in more than
two stages. For this, we need a definition of subgame-perfect equilibrium of finite-stage
games of complete but imperfect information.
Let  I  =  {1,2,...,n}  be the set of n players in the finite-stage game GF, where F
is the number of stages.  In the first stage of GF, each player i €I simultaneously
chooses actions from the choice set Af (ho), where ho = 0 is the history at the start of the
game. At the end of each stage, all players observe the actions chosen in that stage. Let
at = (al'...,al) bethe action profile in stage 1, with af € A3(ho) the action taken by
player  i  €  I  in this stage. We define  hl, the history  at the start  of the second stage  or
at the end of the first stage, to be the action in the previous period, i.e. hi = al given
that ho = 0. At the beginning of stage 2, the players know history hi. In general, the
actions player i€I has available in stage 2 depend on what has happened previously,
so  we  let A42(hi) denote the possible second-stage actions  when the history  is  hl.   In  the
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second stage of GF, each player E G I simultaneously chooses actions from the choice set
A;(hl), where  ht  is the history  at the start  of the second stage.   Let  a2  = (at '..., a,)  be
the action profile in stage 2, and so on. In this setting, a pure strategy for player i C I
is  simply a contingent  plan  of  how  to  play  in each stage k€I C= {1, . . . ,F} for every
possible history  hk-1.  If we let Hk-1 denote  the set of all histories at stage  k,  and
Ak(Hk-1 ) =        U       Ak(hk-1 ),  k E K,
hk-l€Hk-1
then a pure strategy for player i f I i s a s e t of maps s, = {st,..., siF ' where each s,k,
k  E  K,  maps  Hk-1  into the set of player i's feasible actions,  A,(Hk-1 ). The sequence of
action profiles generated by such strategies are found then as follows. The action profile
is al = 51(ho) in stage 1, the action profile is (2 = 82(hi) in stage 2, and so on. The
sequence  (al'...,aF) is called  the  path of the strategy profile. Since a terminal history
represents   an   entire  sequence  of   play,   we   can   represent   player   i's   payoff or projit as a
function IIi : HF »+ R.
Defining subgame-perfection requires a few preliminary steps. First, since all players
know the history hk-1 of moves before stage k f K, we may consider the game from stage
k  on with history  hk-1  as  a game  in  its own right, which we denote  G(hk-1 ). To define
the payoff functions  for  this  game,  note  that  if the action profiles in stages  1  to  F  are  al,
. -'af, the history  at  the end of stage  F will be  hF  = (a l' . . . , ap)  and  so the payoffs  are
IIi (hF) for player iCI. For player i € I, strategies in G(hk-1) are simply maps from
the set of histories to the set of actions, where the only histories we need to consider are
those consistent with hk-1.  So now we can speak of the Nash equilibria of the stage game
G(hk-1), k e K.
Moreover, any strategy profile  s  =  (si,...,sp·)  of  the  game GF induces a strategy
profile s  I  hk-1  on any stage game G(hk-1 ),  k  E  IC,  in the following way.   For each player
i€I, let s,  I hk-1 denote the restriction of s, to the histories consistent with hk-1 'k€K.
Definition 1.5.3 A strategy proMe s of a jinite-stage game GF with observed actions is
a  subgame-perfect  Nash  equilibrium  iL  for  every  hk-1  E  Hk-1,  k  E  K,   the  restriction
s  I  hk-1  to  the game G(hk-1)  is  a Nash  equilibrium  Of G(hk-1 ).
The subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium separates the "reasonable" Nash equilibria
from the "unreasonable"   ones (see Selten  (1965)). In finite-stage games with observed
actions, subgame-perfection requires that the restrictions of the strategy profile yield a
Nash equilibrium from the start of each stage for any history up to that stage. Because
the game has a fixed finite number of stages, we are able to characterise the subgame-
perfect Nash equilibria using backward induction. The strategies in the last stage must be
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a Nash equilibrium of the corresponding one-shot simultaneous-move game, and for each
history hk we replace the last stage by one of its Nash-equilibrium payoffs. By repeating
this step for k=F, . . . ,1,w e reach eventually the first stage, with history ho.  From this
we can easily derive the subgame-perfect Nash equilibria.
1.5.3 Semi-collusive games of complete but imperfect informa-
tion
The semi-collusive games are an extension of finite-stage games with complete but im-
perfect information. The first stages involve simultaneous moves by players for non-price
competition, and the remaining stages are simultaneous moves for price competition re-
peated infinitely. Tacit collusion on prices may emerge from this repeated price compe-
tition if rivals discount their future values and manipulate some well specified strategies.
Suppose players compete on the non-price factor, such as qualities, in the first stages but
anticipate that they will collude on the price in the later stage. Then, it seems that these
players face a finite-stage game in which they play non-cooperatively until the last stage
- and then cooperatively in the final stage. To put it formally, we need first to define the
present value of an infinite sequence of payoffs.
As first introduced in Rubinstein's (1982) bargaining model, a discount factor 6 =
1/(1 + r)  €  (0,1)  is the value today of a dollar to be received one stage later, where
r € (0,1) is the interest rate. Given a discount factor and a player's payoffs from an infinite
sequence of stage games, we are able to compute the present value of those payoffs: the
lump-sum payoff that could be put in the bank now so as to yield the same bank balance
at the end of the sequence.
Definition 1.5.4 Given a discount factor 6, the present value of the injinite sequence
of payoLg  :rl,  71-2,  x3,  ··  ·    is
X1 + 6,1 2 + 627r3 + · · · 4   61-1 7rt-
t=1
Let be given a stage game G = {Al,· · ·, An; ul,· · ·, un}, being a static game of com-
plete information in which players 1 through n simultaneously choose actions al through
an  from the action spaces At through An, respectively,  and get payoffs  ul(al,···ian)
through un(al,···,an), correspondingly.  We can then define an infinitely repeated game.
Definition  1.5.5  Given a stage game G,  let G(00,6) denote the infinitely repeated
game in which G B repeated forever and the players have common discount factor 6 E
(0,1).  At each stage t, the outcomes of the t-1 preceding plays of the stage game are
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observed before  the t - th stage begins.   Each  player's payof in  G(00,6)  is  the  present
value of the player's payofs from the injinite sequence of stage games.
In the infinitely repeated game G(00,8), the history of play through stage t is the record
of the players' choices in stages  1  through  t. The players might have chosen  (aii,...,anl)
in stage 1, (a12,···, a.,2) in the stage 2,..., and (alt, ...,ant) in stage t, for example,
where for each player i and stage s the action ai, belongs to the action space A,.
Definition 1.5.6 In the injinitely repeated game G(00,6), a player's strategy specijies
the action the player  will  take  in  each  stage, for each possible history of play until the
previous stage.
Definition 1.5.7 In the injinitely repeated game G(00,6), a player's Bertrand trigger
strategy is the strategy that each player begins the injinitely repeated game by charging a
cooperative price, and then cooperates in each subsequent stage game if and only if all of
the other players have cooperated at all previous stages, otherwise, each will retatiate by
charging a Bertrand competitive price for ever.
Then we are ready to define a semi-collusive game as follows.
Definition 1.5.8 A semi-collusive game is a dynamic game in which the ./irst stages
involve non-price competition and all subsequent stages involve price collusion sustained
by Bertrand trigger strategies for all players.
To define a semi-collusive equilibrium, we first introduce the subgame of an infinitely
repeated game (see Gibbons (1992)):
Definition 1.5.9 In the injinitely repeated game G(00, 8), each subgame beginning  at
stage  t t l i s  identical  to  the  original game  G(co, 6) .A s i n  the jinite-horizon,   there  are
as many subgames beginning at stage  t t l o f G(00,6)  as  there  are possible  histories  of
play through stage  t.
We are now ready for the definitions of a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium and a
semi-collusive equilibrium.  In a dynamic game, a Nash equilibrium is a collection of
strategies, one for each player, such that each player's strategy is the best response to the
other players' strategies.
Definition 1.5.10 (Setten, 1965) A Nash equilibrium is subgame perfect if the play-
ers's strategies  constitute  a  Nash  equilibrium in every subgame.
Definition 1.5.11 A semi-collusive equilibrium is a subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium of the semicollusive game.
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Chapter 2
Vertical product differentiation and
outside goods
2.1 Introduction
Consumers differ by their income. This may cause them to choose different product qual-
ities, even if their preferences are the same. Firms recognize the diversity of consumers'
tastes caused by income, and differentiate the qualities of their products to capture the
consumers. Consequently, the market is segmented between firms and Bertrand competi-
tion is avoided.
This economic phenomenon has been observed and formalized by Shaked and Sut-
ton  (1982). In their pathbreaking paper, they demonstrate  how the existence of quality
differences relaxes price competition, so that profits are positive in equilibrium. Quality
differences are formalized in a preference framework of Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979).  In
that framework, individuals with identical preferences may choose different goods because
their marginal utilities of income differ.
The formalization of Shaked and Sutton (1982) is usually called vertical product dif-
ferentiation. The fact that product differentiation relaxes price competition is the focus
of their paper. They demonstrate this fact through a three-stage game of entry, quality
specification, and price competition. From this game, Shaked and Sutton (1983) derive
the so-called 'finiteness" property of vertical differentiation which is elaborated further
in Sutton (1986).
This formalization of vertical product differentiation has led interests to spread quickly
over to many other fields. For example, the issues of cooperative R&D, international trade
and investments, and multinational firms with the tariff-jumping problems have been
studied by Motta (1992, 1994) using this vertical differentiation framework. Einhorn
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(1992) uses it to study compatibility decisions of firms, and more recently, Jeanneret and
Verdier (1996) use it to study international competition and protection.
The bulk of this research inspires us to revise the basic model of Shaked and Sutton
(1982), and add several missing elements to it. For example, while a subgame perfect
equilibrium is used to solve the model, the uniqueness of the equilibrium is not discussed,
and most importantly, the degree of product differentiation is not analysed.
These can be done in different ways. One way is to introduce entry. This has been
done by Donnenfeld and Weber (1992).  They set the quality of the outside good equal
to zero, and identify the consumers by their income, which is uniformly distributed over
an  interval [0, I], where I is the upper bound of income. Donnenfeld and Weber show
that there exists a unique equilibrium, at which the first two firms enter the industry and
select two extremes of the qualities that are technologically feasible. The entrant selects
the quality of its product at the middle of the feasible quality interval. Thus, maximal
product differentiation exhibits between the two incumbents. This means that the threat
of entry increases further the degree of product differentiation.
This chapter is based on Han and Webers (1996). In this chapter, we provide an
alternative way through which product differentiation is effected. That is, we consider
the effect of outside goods on product differentiation. This effect is explicitly analysed.
For this analysis, the duopoly case will be the focus of this chapter. Moreover, entry is
blocked given our assumptions of consumers' income.1 Through an explicit analysis of the
subgame perfect equilibria we show that additional insights can be added to the vertical
differentiation model of Shaked and Sutton (1982). First, we correct a flaw in Shaked
and Sutton's proof of the existence of the subgame perfect equilibrium,2 by taking also
the monopoly case into consideration when the equilibrium prices at the second stage of
the game are derived. Second, this correction provides the precondition of the explicit
analysis of the effect of outside goods. Based on the main findings of Shaked and Sutton
(1982), our analysis shows that a subgame perfect equilibrium not only exists,  but  is  also
unique if the range of the technologically feasible quality spectrum is sufficiently small.
Otherwise, if the quality spectrum is sufficiently large, multiple equilibria exist which
exhibit a certain degree of product differentiation. Finally, we show that in the unique
subgame perfect equilibrium case, maximum product differentiation exhibits even in a
1 As  it will become clear later, a sufficiently narrow income range of consumers serves  as a barrier  to
entry.
2We argue that a subgame perfect equilibrium derived from the assumption that two firms segment
the market as in Shaked and Sutton (1982) may not exist, unless the case is excluded in which a subgame
perfect equilibrium of the two-stage game results in a monopoly and creates a higher monopoly profit
than any one of the duopoly profits.
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model without entrants.
The result shows that for given consumers' income interval, the subgame perfect equi-
librium may be unique or multiple depending on the range of the feasible quality spectrum.
The result also makes it clear the degree of product difTerentiation. Particularly, the result
illustrates the effect of outside goods on product differentiation, and provides a taxonomy
of the degree of vertical product differentiation for a model A la Shaked and Sutton  (1982).
Thus, the findings of Shaked and Sutton (1982) are improved, where they demonstrate
that at any subgame perfect equilibrium one firm chooses the highest available quality
while the other firm chooses an available quality somewhere between the two quality
extremes.
The intuition is as follows. When the quality spectrum is narrow, the two firms will
be squeezed into a restricted product space from which they must make a choice of the
product quality. Competition between the two differentiated goods will be so strong
that the competition effect from outside goods is strictly dominated and the two firms
always try to differentiate their products maximally. On the other hand, when the quality
spectrum is large, the two firms will have sufficient room to move in order to make choices
of their product qualities. In this case, the competition between the two differentiated
goods becomes moderate and a competition effect of outside goods arises. Without cost
differences between the two firms one gets the standard result that the lower quality
product firm 1 wants more product difTerentiation, since this relaxes price competition
and increases profits (Tirole, 1988).  When the competition effect of outside goods arises,
firm 1 will face an increased competition. The higher the quality of outside goods, the
stronger the competition that firm 1 will face, and the more product differentiation firm
1 wants from firm 2. As our later analysis will show, the degree of product differentiation
increases with the competition effect from outside goods, while the prices and profits
decrease because of the increased competition.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The model is described in Section
2.2.  In Section 2.3 we give a complete proof of the existence of the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium for the quality-then-price game and a taxonomy of the degree of product
differentiation in this equilibrium. Section 2.4 concludes. The lengthy proof of the main
lemma is given in section 2.5 and the demand functions are specified in the appendix.
2.2 The model
Consider a commodity that can be produced in different quality levels. The technologically
feasible level of quality is described by a continuous range, represented by an interval
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Q  =  [qm, qM], where qo being the quality of outside goods, qm being the lowest possible
quality level, and qM being the highest feasible quality level. Furthermore, we assume
that 0 5 qo < qm < qM < too, with qo being the quality of outside goods. We differ from
Shaked and Sutton by using a lower bound qm on the feasible quality interval which is
independent of the quality of outside goods, while they use the latter as the lower bound
of the quality interval. There are two firms in the industry, a technology follower firm 1
and a technology leader firm 2, each producing a single quality at zero production costs.
The firms play a two-stage game, first quality, then price, and compete for capturing
consumers by offering some packages of price and quality  (pi, qi),ifI=  {1,2}.In  the
non-generic case qi = q2, Bertrand competition results in zero prices and profits for both
firms; this is obviously not an interesting case. Therefore, we let qi < e without loss of
generality. Prices are in terms of the outside goods.
A continuum of consumers have identical preference but different income. Consumers
distribute uniformly by their income t over the interval [a, b], where 0<a<b< +0 0.
A consumer either makes no purchase, or buys exactly one unit of the product from
one supplier.  If a consumer with income t buys one unit of the commodity from firm i€I
with quality qi € Q at price p„ her utility is given by
U(qi, 1 -pi) = qi(t -Pi),
where t - p, is the consumer's disposable income devoted to the consumption of outside
goods, after the purchase of the differentiated good of quality qi. Each consumer selects a
firm by maximizing her utility.  If a consumer does not buy, her utility is given by consum-
ing outside goods so that U(qo, t) = qot, where the price of outside goods is normalized to
zero. This specification of the consumer's utility function implies that individuals with
higher income enjoy quality improvement more than low income consumers. The market
area of the product of firm i#j€I a t qualities q, and qj and at prices pi and pj is
therefore given by
Mi(qi, qi, pi,pj) = {t E  [a, b] 1 U(qi, t - pi) 2 max{qot, U(qi, 1 -pj)}} g [a, bl,
i.e., the set of consumers who prefer to buy from firm i.
At qualities q, and qj and at prices p, and pj, i 3,6 j, i C I, the demand Di(qi, qj,pi,pj)
of the commodity of firm i€I i s the integral over all its market areas.  For a complete
description of the demand functions of firms we refer to the Appendix.
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In Figure 2.1 we give an interpretation of the market segmentation between firm 1
and  firm  2   in   case  of  toi    5   a  and  P2   5 6, where  toi, t12   €   Ia, b] denote the marginal
consumer who is indifferent between buying from outside goods  and  firm  1, and between
buying from firm 1 and firm 2, respectively. Figure 2.1 shows that: (a) the lower quality
producer firm 1 must always charge a lower price Pl in order to survive in a market where
the higher quality producer firm 2 exists, (b) the market is segmented in such a way that
a consumer will buy from firm 1 if her income is lower than 112, and otherwise from firm
2. Thus, firms 1 and 2 capture the market segments of [a, t12} and [t 12, bl, respectively.
U(.) q2(t - P2)
ql (t _ Pt)
qot
0     Pltoi      a        Py                       112 b       '  1
Figure 2.1 Market segmentation for the case  toi 5 a and P, 5 b
The corresponding profits are
lr, (qi,  2, Pl, 7'2   -  P,Di  Pl, P2,  1,  2 , for firm iCI.
2.3   Quality and price competition
Consider the following two-stage game, in which a technology leader flrm 2 and a technol-
ogy follower firm 1 compete first on quality specifications of their products and then on
pricing. From Shaked and Sutton (1982) we know that for n firms offering distinct qualities
of products, if the income distribution interval [a, b] satisfies the condition 2a < b< 4a,
then exactly two firms will have positive market shares at the price equilibrium. Moreover,
at equilibrium the market is covered, i.e., no consumer stays out of the market. Since we
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analyse the duopoly case, we adopt the assumption that 2a <b< 4a.
In this section, we extend Shaked and Sutton's discussion to prove for the duopoly case
that under the assumption of 2a <b< 4a, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium,
at which both firms maximally differentiate their products if the given quality spectrum
is sufficiently narrow. Otherwise, if the quality spectrum is sufficiently large, there exist
multiple equilibria in which some degree of product differentiation arises.
First, we want to show that at such a market consumers can not be monopolized.
That is, neither the technology leader firm 2 nor the technology follower firm 1 is able to
monopolize the given market by excluding its rival.
Lemma 2.3.1  For any given  quality specifications qi  of jirm  1  and q2  offrm 2,  with
qi, q7  €  Q  and qi  <  92,   neither  of the two jirms can force the other jirm to stay out of the
market through price competition.
Proof. See Section 5.
0
This lemma shows that the market is always segmented between firm 1 and firm 2 given
our conditions on the income spectrum. Figure 2.1 shows that a consumer whose income
is lower than t 12 will purchase from firm 1 and otherwise from firm 2. This provides
a necessary condition to analyse the effect of outside goods on product differentiation
explicitly. We are therefore in a position to discuss the subgame perfect equilibrium of
the two-stage game in order to provide a taxonomy of the product differentiation between
the duopoly.  For the subsequent analysis, we shall make use of the marginal consumer
definition and distinguish between the cases qo = 0 and qo > 0.
2.3.1   The case qo = 0
In this case, the condition on marginal consumer leads directly to the following equations
q1(101 - pl) = 0
and
g2(112 - Pl  - 91(t12 - Pl ,
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where 101 and 112 represent the consumers who are indifferent between staying out of the




t12 =  P2 2 - Piqi) (q2 - qi)
(2.3.1)
Because of Lemma 1 and given the assumption that the firms' production costs are zero,
the duopolists' profits can be written as
7rl =   P1(t12 - a)    toi S a14 ( 12 - 101)  tol > ,
71'2 4 1'2(b - 112)·
At this stage we are in a position to apply the finding of Shaked and Sutton (1982).  That
is, given that two firms compete at both stages and that the income range of consumers
satisfies the condition 2a <b< 46, entry is blocked, the vertically differentiated market
holds exactly two firms, and all consumers buy from one of these firms. Therefore, the
firms' profits can be rewritten as
X1 = pl(t12 - a), with pi = tol 5 a (2.3.2)
and
%2 = P2(b- 112 · (2.3.3)
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Substituting (2.3.1) for t12 in (2.3.2) and (2.3.3) we calculate directly the Nash equilib-
rium prices and the associated profits of firms 1 and 2 as
q2 - qip  - 12 -11(b - 2a), with PT = toi S a, and p; = -(26 - a);3qi                                                        3qy
'r; = 11.-11(b - 2a)2,  and ir; - 12-_11(25 - a)2.9qi                                 9qv
Let a = qi/q, denote the degree of product differentiation and a = qm/qM denote the
maximum product differentiation. Then, a s a 5 1 and the lower the a, the larger the
feasible product quality spectrum. The Nash equilibrium prices and the reduced profit
function forms of the firms can thus be written as
74 = 1.--a(b - 2a), with p  = toi S a, and p; - 13-a(25 - a); (2.3.4)
3a
Tin = 1.-a(b - 2a)2, and Mr; = 1-3-2(26 - a)2. (2.3.5)9a
Differentiating the reduced profit function forms of both firms we have that 8,1-;(a)"Ba <
0 and ar;(a)/aa < 0. Therefore, the two firms will differentiate their products as largely
as possible at the first stage of quality competition in order to maximize their respective
profits.  That is, the two firms prefer to keep a as small as possible. Considering that
this  differentiation is restricted  by  toi  =  P;  5 a, however,  we  have  a  2 t*· Therefore,
potentially the two firms would prefer to keep the degree of their product differentiation
at   t*.   Let  ann  denae the degree of product differentiation at equilibria,  we  then  have
an,  = max{gL ti#}.The following proposition then follows.
Proposition 2.3.1 Suppose that two jirms compete jirst on qualities and then on prices.
Then, (i) ifa 2 t*, there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies
which ezhibits maximum product dillerentiation, and the equilibrium prices and projits are
pin = 1-9(b - 2a),  and pr = 130(26 - a);
32
fr = 1-9(b - 2a)2,  and T;n = 19-((26 - a)2.99
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(ii) Otherwise, there exist subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies which exhibit prod-
uct diferentiation at the degree of t*.   The equilibrium prices and projits are
a(2b- a).pf" = a,  and p;" = a+b '
a(b - 2a) a(26 - a)2Tr = and Tr =
3
'
3(a + b)  '
where nn denotes the competition at both stages.
Proof. We are only left to prove that the consequent equilibrium prices and profits hold.
Substituting a and t* for a in (2.3.4)-(2.3.5) in the cases (i) and (ii), respectively, leads
directly to the equilibrium prices and profits.
0
This proposition shows that competition on first qualities and then prices leads the
two   firms to potentially differentiate their products   at a degree   of te. Because   this
potential degree of product differentiation is constrained by the range of the feasible
quality spectrum, the two firms will then differentiate their products maximally if this
potential degree of product differentiation is larger than the range of the feasible quality
spectrum. Otherwise, the potential degree of product differentiation will become the real
degree of product differentiation exhibited between the two firms. In the former case,
the equilibrium is unique, and the quality leader and follower choose the highest and the
lowest product qualities, respectively. In the latter case, however, any choice of product
qualities which exhibits a degree of product differentiation at t* will be an equilibrium.
2.3.2   The case qo > 0
Similarly, in this case the condition on the marginal consumer leads directly to the equa-
tions
q1(toi - Pl) = qotoi
and
q2(112 - P2  =  1(112 - Pl ·
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t12 =                                                                            (2.3.6)
q2 - qi
Repeating the arguments similar to that of the case qo = 0 yields the two firms' profits as
piqirl = Pl(112 - a), with tol = -S a (2.3.7)qi - qo
and
X2 - 1'2(b - 42 · (2.3.8)
Substituting (2.3.6) for 112 in (2.3.7) and (2.3.8) and then applying the first order condi-
tion yield the equilibrium prices and the associated profits of the two firms as
b - 2a 92 - 91 25 -aq2-qi.pr = . with n--m > ki,  and nN = (2.3.9)
3      qi
' 42-91  -  3a v r 3 0 '
(b - 2a)2 q  - qi (26 - a)2 q2 - qiT (ql, q2  -
9
, and T,N(qi, q ) =        9                   '                 (2.3.10)
qi                                      q2
Differentiating the reduced profit function forms of both firms yields 8:riv(qi,q2)/Oqi  < 0
and  B,r (qi, q2)/Bq,  > 0. Therefore,  the two firms will differentiate their products  as
largely as possible at the first stage of quality competition in order to maximize their
respective profits. In other words, the two firms prefer to keep a as small as possi-
ble. Considering that this differentiation is restricted by  Et 2 be, however, we have
° 2 ,+C,-,h). . Therefore, the two firms would potentially differentiate their products at
a degree of . Let ar denote the degree of product differentiation at equilibria,b-2abt(1-22:)a
we then have ar = max {9, H.(1-2*)0 }.  Summarizing, we have
the following proposition.b-2a
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Proposition 2.3.2 Suppose that two jirms compete ,/irst on qualities and then on prices.
Then,  (i) if a 2      6-20     ,  there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure6+(1-2*)0
strategies which exhibits maximum product diferentiation, and the equilibrium prices and
projits are
pin = 1-0(b - 2a),  and p;" = 13a(2b - a);
3a
Ir;n = 1.-a(b - 2a)2,  and ir,An = 1-3- (26 - a)299
(ii) Otherwise, there exist subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies which exhibit prod-
b-2auct diferentiation at the degree of . The equilibrium prices and projits are' bt(1-le)a
a(6 - 2a)p  = a,  and Tr =      9      (3 - 23-);
Ym
a(2b - a) 3 - 212- a(26 - a)2      3-22
pg" =        3        b + a(1 -235),and Tr =         9        6+ a(1 - 215)'
where nn denotes the competition at both stages.
Proof. We are only left to prove that the consequent equilibrium prices and profits hold.
Substituting 9, and 6+.;2;a) for a in (2.3.9) -(2.3.10) in the cases (i), and (ii), respec-
tively, leads directly to the equilibrium prices and profits.
0
This proposition shows that competition on first qualities and then prices leads the
two firms to potentially differentiate their products at a degree of . Becauseb-2a
6+(1-2*)0
this potential degree of product differentiation is constrained by the range of the fea-
sible quality spectrum, the two firms will differentiate their products maximally if this
potential degree of product differentiation is larger than the range of the feasible quality
spectrum. Otherwise, the potential degree of product differentiation will become the real
degree of product differentiation exhibited between the two firms. In the former case, the
equilibrium is unique, and the quality leader and follower choose the highest and lowest
product qualities, respectively. In the latter case, however, any choice of product qualities
which exhibits a degree of product differentiation at 6-2a will be an equilibrium.bt(1 -2e)a
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At this stage, the effect of outside goods on product differentiation can be clearly
observed through comparing Propositions 1 and 2 (see also Figure 2.5 of Section 5).
Potentially, the two firms prefer to differentiate their products at a degree of b-2a
bt(1-22:).
when the competition from outside goods is taken into account. Given the fact that
O S qo < qm, this degree of product differentiation lies between the lower bound of te
and the upper bound  of  <3.
When the feasible quality spectrum is sufficiently small, the two firms will be squeezed
into a limited production space to make a choice of the product quality. Then, competition
between the differentiated goods will be so strong that competition effect from outside
goods is strictly dominated and the two firms always try to differentiate their products
maximally. Otherwise, when the feasible quality spectrum is sufficiently large, the two
firms will have sufficiently large room to move in order to make choices of their product
qualities. In this case, competition between the differentiated goods becomes moderate
and competition effect of outside goods arises. Without any cost differences between the
two firms, one would find the standard result that the lower quality product firm 1 wants
more product differentiation, since this relaxes price competition and increases profits
(Tirole, 1988). When competition effect of outside goods arises, the competition faced by
firm 1 is increased. The higher the quality of outside goods, the stronger the competition
that firm 1 will face, and the more product differentiation that firm 1 wants from firm
2.  At its lower extreme, when the quality of outside goods is zero, the two firms will
differentiate their products at the lower bound of the degree of product differentiation,
which is te.  When the quality of outside goods increases or the competition effect of
outside goods becomes stronger, the degree of product differentiation is also increased.
At its upper extreme, when qo goes to qm the two firms will reach the highest degree of
product differentiation which is ti*. Direct comparison of the equilibrium levels of prices
and profits shows, however, that although the degree of product differentiation is increased
along with the increased competition effect from outside goods, the equilibrium levels of
prices and profits of the two firms are decreased because of the increased competition.
2.4 Conclusions
We have extended Shaked and Sutton's (1982) analysis in this chapter and provided an
taxonomy of the degree of product differentiation when the competition effect of outside
goods is taken into account. In order to extend Shaked and Sutton's discussion and
examine the competition effect of outside goods, a precondition that the concerned market
can not be monopolized must be provided. Due to the fact that this precondition holds,
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the effect of outside goods on product differentiation can be discussed explicitly.
The analysis shows that when the feasible quality spectrum is sufficiently narrow, the
two firms will be squeezed into a limited production space to make a choice of the product
quality. Then, competition between the differentiated goods will be so strong that the
competition effect of outside goods is strictly dominated and the two firms always try to
differentiate their products maximally. Therefore, in this case the effect of outside goods
can not be clearly observed. Otherwise, when the feasible quality spectrum is sufficiently
large, the two firms will have sufficiently large room to move in order to make choices
of their product qualities. Then, competition between the differentiated goods becomes
moderate and the competition effect of outside goods arises and is clearly observed: The
higher the quality of outside goods, the stronger the competition that firm 1 will face, and
the more product differentiation that firm 1 then wants from firm 2. In general, the degree
of product differentiation lies in the range of [t*, te] given that the quality of outside
goods lies between zero and the lower bound of the feasible quality spectrum. Moreover,
although the degree of product differentiation is increased when the competition effect of
outside goods is increased, the equilibrium levels of prices and profits of the two firms are
decreased because of the increased competition.
Thus far, an alternative way through which product differentiation is effected has
been discussed. It is found that, in general, the increased competition from outside goods
increases the degree of product differentiation. Since Shaked and Sutton (1982) discover
that the important concern of product differentiation is to relax price competition, one of
the interests of successors has been to study factors that effect product differentiation (see
de Palma et al. (1985), Shaked and Sutton (1987), and Freedman and Thisse (1993)).
These studies have important implications to the industrial market structure. In the next
chapter, we will fix the quality of outside goods, and turn to study other factors.  More
precisely, the effect of different combinations of business strategies, such as prices and
qualities, on product differentiation will be examined.
2.5 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.3.1
Suppose that a Nash-Bertrand equilibrium at the second stage of the game exists for given
qi  and ,?2, and we denote it by (pf/,p:). We prove that  (p ,p )  can not happen  at  the
case where one of the two firms stays out of the market.
It is straightforward to prove that firm 2 can not stay out of the market at (P , P ),
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because firm 2 can always set a price pi N and take over the market from firm 1 or= Pl
at worst share the market  with  firm  1.    Next  we  need to prove  that  firm  1   can  not  stay
out of the market at  (pT, p:), for which we follow a graphical proof and distinct between
three cases:
case 1: 14 < pr. Then Di(qi,q2,P ,pdv) = 0, and so Tice,qbpr,pv) = 0.
From (a) of Figure 2.2, it is found that if g' < a, then firm 2 has an incentive to
deviate from p7, because by charging an infinitesimal higher price, its demand is not
affected, and consequently its profit is increased. Similarly from (c) of Figure 2.2, it is
found that if p  2 a, then firm 1  has an incentive to deviate from pr by setting its price
at p; with 0 < p; < a, because then firm 1 gains a positive market share.
case 2: p  = pr.  Then Di(ql, q2,PF, P ) = 0, and so 71-1('71, q2,P ,P ) - 0·
From (a) of Figure 2.3 it is found that if pN 2 a, then firm 1 has an incentive to
deviate by setting its price at p; with 0 < p; < a, because then firm 1 gains a positive
market share. Similarly from (b) of Figure 2.3, it is found that if g' < a, firm 2 has an
incentive to deviate, because by charging an infinitesimal higher price, its demand is not
affected, and consequently its profit is increased.
case  3:   p     > p . Then firm 1 stays out of the market if and only if 112 S a, and so
X1(qi,e,pf' 'p )= 0.
From (a) of Figure 2.4 it is found that if t12 < a, then firm 2 has an incentive to
deviate, because by charging an infinitesimal higher price, its demand is not affected, and
consequently its profit is increased. If t12 = a and p  > 0, then firm 1 has an incentive to
deviate, because then firm 1 gains a positive market share, so a positive profit. Otherwise
if 112 = a but p  = 0, then firm 2 has an incentive to deviate. In fact, if firm 2 does not
deviate, its profit.  •rnd is given  by  irnd  =  P (b - 112), where  112  = a satisfies the equation
q1(112 - U  =  2(t12 - P  · Solving the equation for 1,7 and then substituting g' and
t12 into the equation for Mr"d, we derive the profit 7rnd = a(b - a)(q2  -  qi)/q2  for  firm  2
in case it does not deviate.  But if firm 2 deviates by maximizing its profit P2(b - t62),
where t 2 is given by the equation 0(16 - 0) = '72(t& - P2), then its profit rd equals 7rd =
62((12 - qi)/(4, 2).   For 2a < b, we have ,rd > :rnd, so firm 2 has an incentive to deviate.
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Appendix
The demand functions of Firm 1 and Firm 2
We may distinguish three different types of indifferent consumers, namely a consumer
being indifferent between buying from firm 1 and not buying at all, a consumer being
indifferent between buying from firm 2 and not buying at all, and, finally, a consumer being
indifferent between buying from firm 1 and buying from firm 2. We denote t 12 P292 -Plqlq2 -qi
and toi = (-8-)p, for all z €I= {1,2}
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Figure 2.6 (a) pl S a f P2, qo small Figure 2.6 (b) pl S a f 1,2, qo large
If qo is relatively small, as in Figure 2.6(a), there exists a consumer tol being indifferent
between buying from firm 1 and not buying if toi 2 a, otherwise all consumers prefer to
buy. Furthermore, there exists a consumer t12 being indifferent between buying from firm
l and firm 2 if a 5 112 5 b
If qo is relatively high, as in Figure 2.6(b), there does not exist a consumer t 12 being
indifferent between buying from firm 1 and buying from firm 2. The reason is that all
consumers prefer the outside option or the commodity of firm 2 to the commodity of firm
1. Clearly, there does not exist a consumer 102 being indifferent between buying from firm
2 and not buying if 102 2 b.
Consequently, the demand for the firms can be written as
Dl(ql,gl,Pl,Pl)= 0, for Pl 2 P2,
t12 - toi   if a 5 toi 5 112 5 b
t 12 - a if toi S a s ti,  b
and Di(qi,q2,Pl,Pi) = c 6 -toi if astol Sbst12  for P l<P 2
6- a        iftol Sa, 6 5 112
0            otherwise,
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and
I  b-a    if a k 4,2
02(qi,e,Pl,P2)=1 6-112 ifast02 5 b for Pi 2 P,
I 0     otherwise,
and
 
6-a if a 2 max{toi, 112 
02(91, q2,pl,P2) =   6 -max{to2,112} if a 55 t12  S b for    Pi  < 1'2.
l 0            otherwise.
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Chapter 3
Competition and cooperation in a
vertically differentiated duopoly
3.1 Introduction
In a competitive market, firms have generally a package of business strategies, such as
prices, qualities or R&D investments, and quantities, etc, to manipulate. Thus in princi-
ple, firms may collude in some aspects of the interaction and compete in other aspects.
We refer to such behaviour as semicollusion.
In this chapter, we consider the case where firms try to manipulate both qualities and
prices. Because quality improvements involve sunk costs (like R&D investments), product
quality is a less flexible variable, and once chosen, will be fixed for a certain period. This
inflexibility of the product quality choice makes it difficult to reach an agreement between
firms since the binding force is absent and may lead firms to compete in product quality
specifications. Prices, however, are flexible and may be changed overnight. Therefore,
firms may meet each other many times in a certain period. This flexibility of price
choices creates frequent price competition. As a result, firms may lobby for collusive
pricing because a binding force to punish the deviators may be created by repeated price
competition. Conventional wisdom indeed suggests that firms in oligopolistic markets
are better off colluding rather than competing on prices.1  One classic example of this
semicollusion is provided in Scherer (1992, p.250-1). In the American cigarette industry
of the 1920s and 193Os, the Big Three (American, Ligget Myers, and Reynolds) controlled
between 70% and 90% of the market during the period and there is evidence that they
cooperated on prices while competing in product quality controls.
1 See Tirole (1988, ch. 6) and the surveys by Jacquemin and Slade (1989) and Shapiro (1989) in the
Handbook of Industrial Organization.
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Nevertheless, the possibility exists for firms to cooperate in R.&D in order to achieve
a common adopted quality.  In this case, however, it seems reasonable to extend the
cooperation to the price stage to have full cooperation.  The idea is to allow partners who
have achieved inventions together, also to control together their product pricing which
embodies the results of their collaboration, in order to recuperate jointly their R&D
investments.
Hence, three cases arise when firms try to manipulate qualities and prices: (a) co-
operation on both qualities and prices, (b) noncooperation on qualities but cooperation
on prices, (c) noncooperation on both qualities and prices. The consequences of these
business strategies and their effects on the degree of product differentiation emerge then
for analysis.
Several papers have addressed the semicollusion in which the second stage is collusive.
Jehiel (1992) and Friedman and Thisse (1993) consider a variant of Hotelling's (1929)
spatial competition model in which two firms choose product locations non-cooperatively
and then collude on prices through playing trigger strategies.  They show that the location
choices of firms involve a pairing of firms at the market center, that is, the Hotelling's
principle of minimum product differentiation is restored by this semicollusion.
Matsui (1989) and Sevy (1992) consider similar settings but are interested in the effects
of semicollusion on consumer surplus. Matsui considers a model in which firms choose
capacity at the first stage and quantities at the second stage. He shows that consumer
surplus may increase if firms cooperate rather than compete at the second stage.  Sevy
considers a model in which firms invest in R&D a t the first stage and choose prices at
the second stage. He shows that consumer surplus may increase when the firm of lower
production cost is granted a monopoly at the second stage.
Osborne and Pitchik (1987), Davidson and Deneckere (1990), and Fershtman and
Gandal (1994) consider similar settings but investigate profits of semicollusion. They
show that when firms invest in product capacity at the first stage and then choose prices
at the second stage semicollusion leads, in general, to excess capacity, higher prices and
lower profits than noncooperation.
To the best of our knowledge, however, semicollusive equilibrium behaviour of firms
in a vertically differentiated market has not been analysed yet. In the relevant vertical
differentiation settings of Shaked and Sutton (1982) and Gabszewicz and Thisse (1986)
a two-stage game of, first, quality, then, price is played non-cooperatively between firms.
It is shown that product differentiation relaxes price competition. Donnefeld and Weber
(1992) show in a similar setting that further differentiation to the maximum is exhibited
between a duopoly if entry is allowed.
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We study vertical product differentiation in this chapter and are interested in the
business strategies that firms will choose if a package of business strategies such as quality
and price are available. Furthermore, we are interested in the effect of the cooperation
and noncooperation choices of firms on the degree of product differentiation. The latter
is a central proposition considered by successors of Hotelling's (1929) model.
A vertically differentiated duopoly is studied in this chapter and the main results
of this study are as follows: (a) Two firms will cooperate on both qualities and prices
and differentiate their products maximally; the product quality follower charges a price
higher than the full competition price, but lower than the semicollusion price; the product
quality leader, however, charges a price higher than both the full competition price and
the semicollusion price; (b) Competition on both qualities and prices leads the two firms
to differentiate their products at a degree which depends on the range of the income
distribution of consumers; (c) Semicollusion leads the two firms to differentiate their
products either minimally in a partially covered market where both firms choose the
highest feasible product quality, or at any degree in an entirely covered market where
the product quality leader chooses the highest feasible product quality. The first is in
sharp contrast with a mode12 8 la Hotelling (1929), in which two firms differentiate their
products at some degree and locate at one quarter and three quarters of a unit interval,
respectively, if they cooperate at both stages.  The last is parallel to Friedman and Thisse
(1993) in which semicollusion fosters minimum product differentiation. While in their
case two firms agglomerate at the market center, in our case both firms choose the highest
feasible product quality.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the
model while equilibria are derived in Section 3. Comparative statics follows in Section
4 to derive our main conclusions of this chapter. We conclude this chapter in Section 5
with a brief summary.
3.2 The model
The model is a modified variant of Shaked and Sutton (1982), and similar to that of
Chapter 2. Suppose some good may be produced in a continuous range of quality levels,
represented  by a technologically feasible quality interval  Q  =  [q™, qM}, where  0  S  qo  <
qm < qM < too, qo being the quality of the outside good, qm being the lowest feasible
quality level, and qM being the highest feasible quality level. Without loss of generality of
the comparative statistics we assume qo = 0 in this chapter. We differ from Shaked and
2See Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979), for example.
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Sutton by using a lower bound qm on the feasible quality interval that is independent of
the quality of the outside good, while they use the latter as the lower bound on the quality
interval. There are two firms in the industry, a technology follower firm 1 and a technology
leader firm 2, each producing a single quality at zero costs. The firms play a two-stage
game, first qualities, then prices, and compete for consumers by offering packages of price
and quality (pi, qi), i€I= {1,2}.  In the non-generic case qi  = q2, Bertrand competition
results in zero prices and zero profits for both firms; this is obviously not an interesting
case.  Therefore, we let qi < e without loss of generality. Prices are in terms of the
numeraire good.
A continuum of consumers have identical preferences but different incomes. Income t
is uniformly distributed over the interval [a, b] where 0<a<b< too.
Consumers make indivisible and mutually exclusive purchases from the quality inter-
val Q, in the sense that a consumer either makes no purchase, or buys exactly one unit
of the product from either suppliers.  If a consumer with income t buys one unit of the
commodity from  firm iCI with quality  qi  €  Q at price pi, his utility is given  by
U(q„ 1 - Pi)  i q,(1 - pi),
where t - p, is the consumer's disposable income devoted to the consumption of the nu-
meraire good after the purchase of the differentiated good of quality qi. Each consumer
selects a firm by maximizing her utility. If a consumer does not buy, her utility is given by
consuming the outside good only so that U(t, qo, 0) = q t (zero in this chapter).  This spec-
ification of the utility functions of consumers implies that individuals with higher incomes
enjoy quality improvements more than low income consumers. The market area of the
product of firm i#j€I a t qualities q, and qj and at prices p, and pj is therefore given by
Mi(qi, qj, P., Pj) = {t € [a, bl I U(t, q„pi) 2 max{0, U(t, qj, pj)}},
i.e.,  the  set of consumers that prefer  to  buy  from  firm  i.
At qualities * and qj and at prices pi  and pj, 2 4 j, i E I, the demand Di(qi, qj, pi,pj)
for the commodity of firm i€I i s equal to
D,(qi, qi,pi,pj) =                     dt.J M,(q.,gi,pi,p,)
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In Figure 3.1 we give an interpretation of the market segmentation between firm 1 and
firm 2 in case pi  5 a and P2  5 b, where t12 E  [a, b] denotes the marginal consumer who
is indifferent between buying from firm 1 and buying from firm 2. Figure 3.1 shows
that: (a) the lower quality producer firm 1 must always charge a lower price Pl in order
to survive in a market where the higher quality producer firm 2 exists, (b) the market
is segmented in such a way that a consumer will buy from firm 1 if his income is lower
than 112, and otherwise from firm 2. Thus, firms 1 and 2 capture the market segments of
Ia, 112] and [112, b] respectively. For a complete description of the demand functions of the
firms we refer to the Appendix of Chapter 2.
U(.) q2(1 _ P2)
ql (t _ pl)
/       Pla   P2   t 12       6   't
Figure 3.1 Market segmentation for the case Pi 5 a and P2 5 b
From the condition on the marginal consumers we have
qt (101  - Pl)  =  0
and
q2(112 - 1'2  = 91(t12 - Pl ,
where tol represents the marginal consumer who is indifferent between not buying and
buying  from  firm  1.   Thus, it follows  that
t01 - Pl
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and
t12 =  P292 - Piqi)/(e - qi). (3.2.1)
Assuming zero costs we derive the profits (revenues) of the duopolists as follows:
rl =   14(112 - a)    t01 5 aPl ( 12 - 101)  101 > ,
X2 " 1)2(b - 112 ·
3.3   A two-stage game: Quality-then-price
In this section we study a two-stage game in which two firms choose first their prod-
uct qualities and then prices. Three different combination choices of business strategies
mentioned in Section 1 will be studied for this duopoly.  As in Chapter 2, we continu-
ously restrict ourselves to the case where the income range of consumers [a, bl satisfies the
condition 2a <b< 4a.
3.3.1   Competition at both stages
Given that two firms compete at both stages and that the income range of consumers
satisfies the condition 2a <b< 46, we know from Chapter 2 and Shaked and Sutton
(1982) that entry is blocked and the vertically differentiated market holds exactly two
firms and all consumers buy from one of these firms. Therefore, the profits of the firms
can be written as
4 = Pl(112 - a), with Pl = 101 5 a (3.3.1)
and
X2 - P2(b - t12 · (3.3.2)
Substituting (3.2.1) for t12 in (3.3.1) and (3.3.2) we calculate directly the Nash equilib-
rium prices and the associated profits of firms land 2 as follows
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q2 - qi q2 - qip; = -(6 - 2a),  with p; = toi S a,  and p; = -(2b - a);
3qi                                      3q2
r; = 12-qi(b - 2a)2,  and 'r; = 11__11(26 - a)2.
gqi                      gq2
Let a = qi/q2 denote the degree of product differentiation and 9 = qm/qM denote the
maximum product differentiation. Then, g s a 5 1 and the lower the a the larger the
feasible product quality spectrum. The Nash equilibrium prices and the reduced profit
function forms of firms can thus be written as
P; = 1-2(6 - 2a),  with pf = toi S a,  and p;     1.-ia(25 - a); (3.3.3)3a
71'; = 1-a(b - 2a); and 'r; = 19•2(25 - a): (3.3.4)9a
Differentiating the reduced profit function forms of both firms we have that ex;(a)laa <
0 and 8,r,n(a)/Da < 0. Therefore, the two firms will differentiate their products as much
as possible at the first stage of quality competition in order to maximize their respective
profits. That is, the firms prefer to keep a as small as possible. Considering that this
differentiation is restricted by  toi  =  14'  5 a, however, we have a  2  t*. Thus, potentially
the firms would keep the degree of their product differentiation at t*. Let ann denote
the degree of product differentiation at equilibria, we have ann = max{Q, t*}· Summa-
rizing, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3.3.1 Suppose  two jirms compete  at  both stages.   Then,  (i)  if a  k  t*,
there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies which ezhibits maxi-
mum product diferentiation, and the equilibrium prices and projits are
pi = i_a(b - 2a),  and p;" = 1-ya(26 - a);
39
rn" = 1.-va(b - 2a)2,  and r;n = 1.-9<K(25 - a)2.99
(iiI Otherwise, there exist subgame peTfect equilibria in pure strategies which exhibit prod-
uct dillerentiation at the degree of t*.   The equilibrium prices and projits are
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a(b - 2a)pr = a, and :rr =
3    '
p'r = and x;n =a(26 - a) a(26 - a)2a+b ' 3(a + b)  '
where nn denotes the competition at both stages.
Proof. We are only left to prove that the consequent equilibrium prices and profits hold.
Substituting a for a in (3.3.3) in the case (i) and t* for a in (3.3.4) in the case (ii) leads
directly to the equilibrium prices and profits.
0
3.3.2 Quality competition and price cooperation
In the second case, we consider a semicollusive version of the two-stage game, that is, two
firms compete for their product quality specifications at the first stage of the game while
both anticipate that price collusion will be sustained because of the trigger strategies
played at the second stage of the game. The trigger strategies are defined as follows and
we refer to this game as  (P.
Definition 3.3.1  T'rigger strategies are the standard grim strategies projile {s:} of an
injinitely repeated price game for jirm i,if{ 1,2}  at t=l,2, . . .  and satisfy
St =pf,
SJ    =           1},,         if  SJ   =   p, ,  r    -    1,2,...,  t   -1,  j    ili,pI' otherwise,
1-2,3,...,i -1,2,
where K  and p denote the collusion price and the Bertrand competition price, respectively.
0
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Price cooperation
In this chapter, firms are assumed to achieve their price cooperation through tacit collu-
sion, which is sustained by trigger strategies. It is not obvious, however, how to introduce
collusive pricing in an asymmetric game. One way to handle this problem is to follow the
route which Friedman and Thisse (1993) have developed in dealing with the horizontal
case, that is, to focus on collusive prices that support an outcome on the profit-possibility-
frontier at which the market is assumed to be covered and that the profit-sharing rule
regulates  that the ratio of firm l's profit  to that of firm  2 is positively related  to  the same
ratio of profits at the one-shot non-cooperative equilibrium. It is analytically difficult,
however, to apply such a criterion. An alternative criterion is the joint-profit maximiza-
tion rule stating that collusive prices maximize the size of the pie. This rule is analytically
attractive and has been used in HAchner (1994). We will use the second rule for our sub-
sequent analysis. More precisely, we assume that two firms charge prices to maximize
their joint-profit  at the second stage  of  the  game for given  qi   and  q2 · Two cases arise:
partially covered market case versus entirely covered market case.
Partially covered market case. The first case that might arise is that the prices which
maximize the joint-profit of firms may be so high that the market is not entirely covered.
Then, the joint-profit is
rl + X2 =Pl (112 - Pl ) t P2(b- 1122
which is a concave function. So setting the partial derivatives (w.r.t. Pl and P2) equal
to zero yields the necessary and sufficient conditions for global profit maximization. The
corresponding collusive prices are
(1 + a)b c 2b
(3.3.5)pi = and  P,  =   3-7-A'3+a
and the associated collusive profits are
7rc - (1 + O)b2                   262
1       (3 + a)2   and X; =  (3 + a)2
(3.3.6)
The partially covered market implies that pi > a, or fittb> a from (3.3.5), holds. Oth-
erwise, the entirely covered market case arises.
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Entirely covered market case. In the second case that might arise, the market is
entirely served at the prices that maximize joint-profit.  Then, we have the joint-profit as
7rl + X2 = Pl(112 - a) + P2(6 - t12 · (3.3.7)
Obviously p; 5 a. For pi < a, both firms could raise prices by a small amount without
taking a loss in terms of total demand. Joint-profits maximization must therefore imply
p; = a. Differentiating (3.3.7) with respect to P2 yields
a(1 + a) + b(1 - a)p =
(3.3.8)2
The corresponding profits are
Mrc = a(b - a) (b - a)[a(1 + a) + b(1 - a)11       2     and TZ
=
(3.3.9)2
At the end of this section, we point out that the above derived collusive prices in a par-
tially or an entirely covered market case can indeed be an equilibrium sustained by trigger
strategies, to which Hickner's (1994) result applies directly. This result says that price
collusion can be sustained as an equilibrium of trigger strategies between the two firms
if  each firm discounts its future profit  at a certain level  of  7, (a), i  =  1,2,  71 (a)  for  firm
1 and 7,(a) for firm 2. Moreover, these discount factors depend on a or the degree of
product differentiation.  For firm 2, the required discount factor decreases as the value of a
increases, and approaches   at the minimum product differntiation.  For firm 1, however,
the required discount factor may not be a decreasing function of a, but also approaches
& at the minimum product differntiation. The following lemma summarizes this result.
Lemma 3.3.1 (Hackner, 1994, P·163 and p.i69) Suppose that two jirms, say jirm 1 and
jirm 2, accept the joint-projit mazimization rule if they collude on prices. Then, price
collusion is an equilibrium sustained by trigger strategies of an injinitely repeated price
game and the associated discount factors ·y,(a), i =  1,2.   These discount factors are con-
tinuous functions of a Moreover, 72(a) is decreasing and approaches 72(1) =  , and
71(a) approaches 71(1) = 1.
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Lemma 3.3.1 has summarized the main result of HAckner's (1994). While Hickner studies
the effects of quality specifications of firms on their price collusion sustainability, we may
use this result, however, to study the effects of price collusion on quality specifications
of firms. Lemma 3.3.1 shows that for any given qualities qi and q2 of firms 1 and 2,
respectively, price collusion may be sustained as an equilibrium of trigger strategies of an
infinitely repeated price game at the price competition stage. The future discount factor
required by this equilibrium depends on the degree of product differentiation a.
Given Lemma 3.3.1, we are now ready to turn to the proceeding stage of the process,
in which firms compete for their product quality specifications.
Quality competition
In this section, we calculate the equilibrium of quality competition conditional on the
reduced profit function forms of price collusion at the second stage of the game. Since price
collusion may be an equilibrium sustained by trigger strategies under certain conditions,
this equilibrium of quality competition at the first stage, if it exists, will also be a subgame
perfect equilibrium of the semicollusion game G2 under the same conditions. To discuss
the existence of the subgame perfect equilibrium, we distinguish between the partially
covered market case and the entirely covered market case.
Proposition 3.3.2 In a partially couered market, there ezists a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium in pure strategies, in which two jirms minimally diferentiate their products
and both choose the highest feasible product quality.  The corresponding equilibrium prices
and projits are
b                  4
pTI = 2, and ir;" = -8, (3.3.10)b  c b 
1,;c  =   i,    and  T;    = 8, (3.3.11)
where the superscript nc denotes that jirms compete on qualities jirst and then collude on
prices.
Proof. From Lemma 3.3.1, for deriving a subgame perfect equilibrium of the semicollu-
sion game G' it is sufficient to derive a Nash equilibrium of the quality competition at
the first stage of the game conditional on the reduced profit function forms (3.3.6) derived
from the second stage of the game.
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We  first  show that given an arbitrary quality  pair  of  (qi,q,)  at the first stage  of  the
semicollusion game G2, qi for firm 1, and q2 for firm 2, the quality leader firm 2 has no
incentives to jump over to set his product quality lower than that of firm 1.  From (3.3.6)
firm 2 gains
2P                P       ,
71' (ql, qy) = > ., a E [G, 11, (3.3.12)
(3 + a')2 -  8
if he  sets his product quality  at  q;  with  q   2  qi,  and it gains
„ ,             (1   +  a" )b               b2
Qr (ql, ,?2) = 5 -  a" 6 Ie, 11 (3.3.13)(3 ta",2      8 '
.
if he sets his product quality at '72 with q; S qi. Comparing (3.3.12) and (3.3.13), we see
",
7 (qi,q;)  2 1 (qi, q2), so firm 2 will set q2 such that q2 2 qi.
Second, we show that firm 2 will set his product quality q, at qM for any given qi.
This is straightforward because from (3.3.6) 1r;(a) is a strictly decreasing function of a
for  a  €  [a, 1]
Finally, we show that firm 1 will sets his product quality qi at qM· In fact, from (3.3.4)
7rf (a)  is a strictly increasing function  of  a  for  a  E  [a, 1]. So, given  that  firm 2 chooses
qM, firm 1 maximizes his profit by choosing qM also.
Summarizing, we conclude that there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in
pure strategies of the game G2, in which both firms choose qM. The corresponding prices
and profits at the equilibrium are directly derived from substituting 1 for a in equations
(3.3.5) - (3.3.6).
0
Proposition 3.3.3 In an entirely covered market, there exists a continuum of subgame
perfect equilibria, in which the quality leader chooses the highest feasible quality and the
quality foilower chooses randomly from the quality feasible spectrum.   The equilibrium  con-
jigurations are as follows.
a(b - a).
*   €  Iqm, qM], Pr = a,  and ri" = 2    '
-nc -0.    a(1 + a) + 6(1 - a)
q2   = qM, P,    =                     2
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for a =  °/qM  €[g, 11 (3.3.14)2
Proof. From Lemma 3.3.1, for deriving a subgame perfect equilibrium of the semicollu-
sion game (P it is sufficient to derive a Nash equilibrium of quality competition at the
first stage of the game conditional on the reduced profit function forms (3.3.9) derived
from the second stage of the game. Checking the reduced profit function forms (3.3.9)
in the entirely covered market case, we find that T (a) is a strictly decreasing function
of a while 7rf (a) is independent of a. So, for any quality qi chosen by firm 1, firm 2
chooses qM to maximize his profit.  Firm 1 chooses randomly from the interval [q„„ qM]·
The equilibrium prices and profits are directly obtained  from  (3.3.8)  and  (3.3.9).
0
3.3.3   Cooperation at both stages
The third case deals with monopoly. Firms cooperate at both stages of the game. Again
we distinguish between the partially covered market case and the entirely covered market
case.
Partially covered market case. In this case, the collusive prices are given in equation
(3.3.5),  and the reduced function form of the joint-profit conditional  on  qi  and  q2 is given
by
62
TI + 7  = -. (3.3.15)3+a
This joint-profit function is strictly decreasing in a and therefore maximized at a. So,
qfc = q™, ql = qM is the unique equilibrium of the quality competition at the first stage.
Substituting a for a in equation (3.3.5) leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 3.3.4 There exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in a partially cov-
ered market, in which two jirms diferentiate their products maximally.  The equilibrium
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prices and projit are as follows
5(1 + 9)    .       2b                               9Mc =            ,pc2  = -   and ;rfc + T;C = -, (3.3.16)3+Q 3+Q' 3+g
where the superscript cc denotes cooperation at both stages.
0
Entirely covered market case. In this case, the collusive prices are pi = a and P2 as
given in equation (3.3.6). The joint-profit conditional on qi and q2 is given by
4 + 4 = (3.3.17)(b - a)[a(3 + a) + 5(1 - a)]4
This joint-profit function is strictly decreasing in a and therefore maximized at 9.  So,
 c  =   m i     =  qllf  is the unique equilibrium of the quality competition  at the first stage.
Substituting 9 for a in equation (3.3.8) and (3.3.17) leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 3.3.5 There exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in an entirely cov-
ered market, in which two firms diferentiate their products maximally.  The equilibrium
prices and projit are as follows
«c       -     a(lta) + b(1- gr)]
Pi   =a,1'2  =                    2                  '                                                                             (3.3.18)
and
Fla   +   T 2 - (3.3.19)




Having derived Propositions 3.3.1-5, we are now in a position to compare the equilibrium
configurations of firms under alternative combination choices of business strategies of
qualities and prices. The consequences of the alternative business strategies are studied
for qualities, prices, and profits, respectively.
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3.4.1 Quality
A direct observation shows the significant effects of alternative business strategies on
the degree of product differentiation of firms.  In a vertically differentiated duopoly a la
Shaked and Sutton (1982), competition on both qualities and prices leads the two firms to
differentiate potentially their products at a degree of t*. Because this potential degree
of product differentiation is constrained by the range of the feasible quality spectrum, the
two firms will differentiate their products maximally if this potential degree of product
differentiation is larger than the range of the feasible quality spectrum, otherwise, the
potential degree of product differentiation will become the real degree of product differ-
entiation exhibited between the two firms. In the former case, the equilibrium is unique,
and the quality leader and follower choose the highest and lowest product qualities re-
spectively. In the latter case, however, any choice of product qualities which exhibit a
degree of product differentiation at t* will be an equilibrium.
If both firms compete on qualities, and then collude on prices, the product differenti-
ation behaviour of firms may be conditional on how high the collusive prices might be.  If
the collusive prices charged by the two firms are so high that some consumers choose not
to buy from either firm, that is, the market is partially covered, then the two firms will
pursue minimum differentiation and both choose the highest feasible quality product. If
the collusive prices are relatively moderate so that all consumers prefer to buy from one of
these firms, however, the product quality leader will prefer producing the highest feasible
quality product. The product quality follower is, then, indifferent between producing any
quality from the feasible quality spectrum and will randomly choose a feasible quality to
produce.
Finally, cooperation on both qualities and prices leads the two firms to differentiate
their products maximally.
This observation shows a parallel of a vertically differentiated, partially covered market
case to that of horizontal differentiation. That is, if two firms play a two-stage semicollu-
sive game, first competition, and then cooperation, the Hotelling's principle of minimum
differentiation will be restored. In the former case, as demonstrated in this chapter, two
firms minimize their product differentiation by both choosing the highest feasible product
quality, while in the latter case, as shown in Jehiel (1992), and Friedman and Thisse
(1993), two firms minimize their product differentiation and agglomerate at the market
center.
This observation shows also some differences between horizontal and vertical differ-
entiations. First of all, while competition at both stages, first on locations, and then
on prices, leads two firms maximally differentiate their products in the horizontal case
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(See d'Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979)), competition at both stages, first on
qualities, and then on prices, leads, as shown in this chapter, only to some degree of
vertical differentiation which  is   99. This vertical differentiation is maximal  only  if  this
potential degree of t* is larger than the range of the feasible quality spectrum of a.
Moreover, while cooperation at both location and price stages exhibits some degree of
horizontal differentiation and two firms locate at one quarter and three quarters of a unit
interval, respectively (See Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979)), we show in this chapter that
cooperation at both quality and price stages exhibit maximum vertical differentiation.
This observation has been derived by assuming away the effect of outside goods (i.e.,
qo = 0). Han and Webers (1996) shows, however, that outside goods do effect the degree
of product differentiation. Although a comprehensive study on the principle of product
differentiation by incorporating this factor is beyond our consideration, Chapters 2 and
3 indeed provide a classification on the degree of product differentiation under certain
circumstances.
3.4.2 Price
We distinguish the partially covered market case from the entirely covered market case
for the discussion of equilibrium prices. In the former case, the following result holds.
Proposition 3.4.1 In a partially covered market, the following holds.
pr  k pr  2 pre   and
p    2  p;c  2  p;n.
Proof. First, let us check the equilibrium prices of firm 1.  In the partially covered market
we have, first  of all,  that  pic  =  bil:tal  =  5(3+25)+(0-113+2 2   3+a < & = p  since 9 5 1. Next, we
show that %9 2 a. Suppose that %tfl < a. Rearranging this inequality we have
b -2at (1 + a(b-a))< 0, which contradicts the fact that b > 2a.  Thus, we have that
pr  p n because pf" 5 a.
Then, we check the equilibrium prices for firm 2. Direct comparison shows that
Pr =5   2   = Pr since as 1. Moreover, let pr 2 pin' that is, let   2 2'ftiel,
we have (b - 2a)(b - a) 2 0, which is true because b > 2a.
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Proposition 3.4.1 shows that in a partially covered market the quality follower charges
the highest price under semicollusion, a lower price under cooperation at both stages (full
cooperation), and the lowest price under competition at both stages (full competition).
The quality leader, however, charges the highest price under full cooperation, a lower
price under semicollusion, and the lowest price under full competition.
If the market is entirely covered, we may derive the following result.
Proposition 3.4.2 In an entirely covered market, the following results are derived.
 c  =  P ,  =  a  2  P n ;    and
12(   2  ji;I,    and     2  1';I.
Proof. For firm 1, that Pr = Me = a is directly from the Propositions 3.3.3 and 3.3.5.
Moreover, from Proposition 3.3.1 we have that pr 5 a.
For firm 2, we have that MC = .(1+2)+b(1-0) > .(lt.)+6(1-a) = R because a k e and2                   -                   2
b > a. Furthermore, to require that 12( 2 P;. is equivalent to require that 41+2):6(1-2) 2
af ba because the price p " under  e  <   1*   is   25;1,  which is higher  than the price
p;,n under a > 5-22. But «(1+2)+6(1-2) > a+6-19% (6-91a+b                                 2                                      2                 because  g  < t . Moreover,
ath-  2(b-a)  PI. h. ;  >  af*ial.  so,  «(1+9)- 5(1-2)  2 af a holds,  that  is, P&€  2 pqn.
0
Proposition 3.4.2 shows that in an entirely covered market the quality follower charges
the same price under both semicollusion and full cooperation, which is not less than the
price that he charges under full competition. The quality leader, however, charges a higher
price under full cooperation than under semicollusion or full competition. Moreover, direct
observation shows that the quality leader may charge a higher price under full competition
than under semicollusion only if the degree of product differentiation under semicollusion
is sufficiently large.
3.4.3 Profits
Finally, we distinguish the partially covered market case from the entirely covered mar-
ket case for the discussion of the equilibrium profit configurations of firms. Comparison
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between these profits may lead firms to decide on the combination of business strategies
of qualities and prices. First of all, in the partially covered market case, we have the
following result.
Proposition 3.4.3 Given that the market is partially covered, two jirms will choose fuli
cooperation.
Proof. First of all, because 0 5- 1, we have that 7rT° + 7rl = t; + 1; = f; 5 5   = 7rcG.
Therefore, the profits of both firms may be increased if two firms cooperate on both
qualities and prices and a certain profit sharing rule is chosen. Thus, full cooperation
is preferred to semicollusion. Then, we are left to compare the total profits under full
competition and full cooperation.
If fk <  : , then Srcc  =  5   2  f 1, and 'Tr + 1rr =  Slil+ * i =  "(SbliZ -02 ) I
Thus, for proving that x·« 2 'ri'n + 1r;" it is sufiicient to prove that tWP  2  0(5'3il .Si-a'),
that is,
364 - 14aba + 18a262 + 9aab + 04 2 0. (3.4.1)
Let b= (2 + E)a.  Then, € E (0,2) because 2a  < b< 4a. Substituting 6 - (2 + c)a in
(3.4.1) yields that (2 + E)2(362 -2 6+2) + 9(2 +6) +1 2 0, which holds for € € (0,2).
If a > h=22  then 'rr + 7rnn = (1-8)(b-2a)2     (1-9)(26-a)2 = (b-20)2 1 + 62332 - (2bgs)2 0 s- -  atb 3 90            9           9
(b-20)2 6-2a   P_a2   (26--a)  a = (atb)(45-56) - ftki229. Thus, for proving that Jr- 2 grin"+Tr9   a+b 3 9-  9
it is sufficient to prove that (a t b)(45 - 5a) - (26 - a)20 5 i*i, that is, (a t 6)(45 - 5a)  S
(25 - a)29 + *1. Because the right hand side of this inequality is an increasing function
of a, it is sufficient to prove that (atb)(46- 5a) S (26- a)26.-+Z + sf · Simplification
shows that this last inequality is equivalent to (3.4.1), which has been proved to hold.
Therefore, the total profit under full cooperation is higher than that both under semi-
collusion and under full competition. The profits of both firms could be increased through
full cooperation and a properate profit sharing rule. Thus, full cooperation emerges as
the preferred business strategies for both firms.
0
If the market is entirely covered, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3.4.4 Given that the market is entirely covered, two firms will choose full
cooperation.
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Proof. First of all, we have that grrtarr =  °(t-a) 1 (b-a)[O(lto)+b(1-0,)J = (b-a)[0(3+Q)+b(1-0)] <4                                                4                      -
(b-a)[a(3+2)+b(1 -2)] . FF« because Q S a. Thus, two firms prefer full cooperation to semi-4
collusion because their profits may be increased through full cooperation and a certain
profit sharing rule. Then, we are left to prove that their profits under full competition
may be increased through full cooperation and a certain profit sharing rule.
If a < ti#, we have *rn = 21 5 21 and x;n = aflb=212.  So, Tr' + Tr' = a(562-506-02)3(.th) 3(atb)
Moreover, we have that Yuc = (6-a)[«(3+ +b(1-2)1 2 (6-a)[3"+6-15*(6-0)1 = 0(6-a)(9+76)  Let4                         4(0+6)
a(b-o)(a+7b) ) 0(51,2-5ah-I,) we have that (a + b)2 2 0, which is trivial. Therefore, that4(atb) - 3(0+6) 1
,rrn -1-  r S vic holds.
If g:  2  Wl,  we  have  Tr  =  (1-2)t-20)2  and  Tr  =  (1-8)(26-9)2.    So,  Tr + 'r n  =
(1-2)1(b-20)2+(26-a)221.  If Tr + *r > r, we then have that  (1-8)[(6-20)2+(26-0)221  > 3rc  =9. 9.1
(b-a)[c (3+,0»5 - Simplification shows that [(atb)(75-5a)]-2 - 3(b-a)(b- 5a)a- 4(b-
2a)2 < O.  Thus,  (78-5: ;-2.)2     3(6- a)(b- 5a)%*-4(b- 2a)2 < 0. Further simplification
shows that a+b<0, which contradicts to the fact that a>O,b>0. Therefore, we have
that Trn + x2" 5 r.
Summarizing, we have that the total profit under full cooperation is the highest in an
entirely covered market. The profits of both firms may, then, be increased through full
cooperation and a certain profit sharing rule. Therefore, they will choose full cooperation.
0
3.5 Concluding remarks
Despite of the similarity between the horizontal differentiation setting and the vertical
differentiation setting, important differences do exist between these two settings.  For
example, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1986, 1992) find that horizontal differentiation exhibits
less stability than vertical differentiation. Moreover, horizontal differentiation leads to
market 'fragmentation', that is, the level of market concentration falls as the size of
the economy increases and in the limit a horizontally differentiated market may hold an
arbitrarily large number of firms as the size of the economy goes to infinity. Vertical
differentiation, however, may lead to market concentration. As shown in Shaked and
Sutton (1983), if the unit variable costs associated with product quality improvement rise
more slowly than the willingness to pay of consumers or if the main burden of quality
improvement falls on sunk costs rather than variable costs, the market may hold only a
certain number of firms, that is, the 'finiteness' property holds in a vertically differentiated
78                                        Chapter 3. Competition and cooperation
market. In other words, there is a limit to the number of firms with prices exceeding unit
variable costs, and with each firm having a positive market share. Furthermore, this
maximum number is independent of the set of the products being offered, of the size of
the sunk costs, and of the number of potential consumers. What is determinant is, in
fact, the range of the income distributions of consumers.
Also different is the relationship between product differentiation and collusion sus-
tainability. While this relationship is positive, as shown in Chang (1991), in a horizontal
differentiation model 4 la Hotelling (1929), it is shown negative by Hbickner (1994) in a
vertical differentiation model 8 la Shaked and Sutton (1982).
In this chapter, three different combination of choices of business strategies of qualities
and prices and their effects on the degree of product differentiation are studied for a
vertically differentiated duopoly. Two firms play a two-stage game and decide, first, on
quality, and then, on price. They maximize their joint-profit if they cooperate.  It is shown
that the profit of the two firms is higher under full cooperation than under semicollusion
or cooperation at both stages. Therefore, both firms may increase their profits if they
cooperate at both stages and agree on a propriate profit sharing rule. Thus, cooperation
may eventually emerge as a unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this two-stage game,
and the two firms differentiate their products maximally. Moreover, the product quality
follower will charge a full cooperation price lower than the semicollusion price, but higher
than the full competition price. The product quality leader, however, will charge a full
cooperation price higher than either semicollusion or full competition price.
Our analyses have shown further similarities between the horizontal and vertical dif-
ferentiations. For example, Hotelling's (1929) principle of minimum differentiation is
restored and fostered by semicollusion in both horizontal and vertical differentiations.
Jehiel (1992) and Friedman and Thisse (1993) show in horizontal differentiation models 4
la Hotelling (1929) that two firms may agglomerate at the market center if they compete,
first, at the location stage, and then collude at the price stage. We show in a vertical
differentiation model 8 la Shaked and Sutton (1983) that two firms may both choose the
highest feasible product quality if they compete, first, at the quality specification stage,
and then collude at the price stage.
Further difference, however, has also been discovered. While cooperation at both
location and price stages exhibits some degree of horizontal differentiation and two firms
locate at one quarter and three quarters of a unit interval (See Gabszewicz and Thisse
(1979)), we show in this chapter that cooperation at both quality specification and price
stages exhibit maximum vertical differentiation. That is, the two firms choose the highest
and lowest feasible product qualities, respectively.
References 79
References
CHANG,   M.H.,   1991, "The Effects of Product Differentiation on Collusive Pricing",
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 9, 453-470.
DAVIDSON, C. AND R., DENECKERE, 1990, "Excess Capacity and Collusion", Interna-
tional Economic Review, 31, 521-541.
DONNENFELD, S. AND S., WEBER, 1992, "Vertical Product Differentiation with Entry",
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 10, 449-472.
FERSHTMAN, C. AND N., GANDAL, 1994, "Disadvantageous Semicollusion", Interna-
tional Journal of Industrial Organization, 12, 141-154.
FRIEDMAN, J.W. AND J.-F., THIssE, 1993, "Partial Collusion Fosters Minimum Prod-
uct Differentiation", RAND Journal of Economics, 24, 631-645.
GABSZEWICZ, J.J. AND J.-F., THISSE, 1986, "On the Nature of Competition with
Differentiated Products", The Economic Journal, 96, 160-172.
HACKNER,  J., 1994, "Collusive Pricing in Markets for Vertically Differentiated  Prod-
ucts", International Journal of Industrial Organization, 12, 155-177.
HAN, X. AND H., WEBERS, 1996, "A Comment on Shaked and Sutton's Model of
Vertical Product Differentiation", CentER Discussion Paper,   No. 9666, Tilburg
University, Tilburg.
HOTELLING, H., 1929, "Stability in Competition", Economic Journa4 39,41-57.
JACQUEMIN,  A.  AND M.E., SLADE, 1989, "Cartel, Collusion and Horizontal Merger",
in:  R.  Schmalensee and R. Willig, eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization, North-
Holland, Amsterdam, 415-473.
JEHIEL,  P., 1992, "Product  Differentiation and Price Collusion", International  Journal
of Industrial Organization, 10, 633-641.
MATSUI, A., 1989, "Consumer-benefitted Cartels under Strategic Capital Investment
Competition", International Journal of Industrial  Organization, 7, 451-470.
OSBORNE, M. AND C., PrI:CHIK, 1987, "Cartels, Profits and Excess Capacity", Inter-
national Economic Review, 28, 413-428.
80 References
SCHERER, F., 1980, International Market Structure and Economic Performence, Houghton-
Mifflin, Boston.
SEvY, D., 1992, «Faut-il Reguler la RkD"1 Document de Travail 371, Laboratoire
d'Econometrie de l'Ecole Polytechnique, Paris.
SHAKED,  A.  AND J., SUTTON,  1982, "Relaxing Price Competition Through Product
Differentiation", Review of Economic Studies, XLIX, 3-13.
SHAKED, A. AND J., Su'rroN, 1983, "Natural Oligopolies", Econometrica, 51, 1469-
1483.
SHAPIRO,  C., 1989, "Theory of Oligopoly Behavior", in: R. Schmalensee and R. Willig,
eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization, North-Holland, Amsterdam.






4.1    Introduction
Hotelling's (1929) spatial competition model has been studied by distinguishing between
the inside and outside location games.1  In the inside location game, firms may locate
inside the residential area where consumers live. This is the "Main Business Street"
model of Hotelling (1929). The opposite is the outside location game, in which firms are
regulated to locate outside the residential   area,  j ust   like  that some shops locate   at   the
outskirt of a city. Gabszewicz and Thisse (1986) show that the nature of competition of
inside and outside location games turn out to be quite different. That is, while the former
corresponds to horizontal differentiation the latter represents vertical differentiation. In
the inside location game, consumers appear to differ in their tastes because they prefer
to buy from closer firms considering transportation costs. Therefore, at the same price
charged by firms, some consumers choose to buy from one firm while the others choose
alternative ones and so horizontal differentiation prevails.  On the other hand, in the
outside location game, one firm locates closer to all consumers than the others. Therefore,
at the same price all consumers may prefer to buy from this closer firm rather than the
others considering transportation costs. Consequently, vertical differentiation prevails.
i See Gabszewicz and Thisse (1986, 1992), for examples.
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Although a uniform distribution of consumers has been assumed in most of the studies,
an increasing density of consumers toward the market centre seems, intuitively, more
realistic. In particular, a concentrated distribution of consumers arises in a vertically
differentiated market where consumers are assumed to be distributed by their incomes
(a normal distribution is an obvious candidate). Accordingly, it seems important to
analyse whether, and how, the competition of firms is modified by these non-uniform and
concentrated consumer distributions, on which we shall focus in this chapter.
A priori, one might wonder how a non-uniform and concentrated consumer distribution
modifies the competition between firms. It has been shown in the inside location game
that under the uniform consumer distribution, price competition force drives firms to
locate apart in order to relax price competition.2 When consumer distributions are non-
uniform and concentrated, however, market retention force arises, which attracts firms to
locate toward the high consumer density area. This means that firms have incentives to
locate toward the market centre if it is the area where consumers are concentrated.  Then,
in the inside location games market retention force attracts firms to locate closer to each
other. Therefore, price competition force and market retention force are two countervailing
forces that effect the locations of firms or the degree of product differentiation.  The
domination of one force over the other will decide either an increased or a decreased
product differentiation.  On the other hand, in the outside location game, some firms locate
closer to the consumers than the others. This location difference creates an asymmetry
between the firms, and provides the firms locating closer to the consumers an advantage
over the others. The concentration of consumer distribution around the market center
increases the market shares of the firms that locate closer to the consumers while decreases
the market shares of the others. Then, the asymmetry is further increased. As a result,
the firms locating farther from consumers want more product differentiation to relax price
competition, and product differentiation is thus increased.
Because of the analytic difficulty, however, few studies have been found to analyse this
trade-off, except for Neven (1986). Neven considers Hotelling's competition with symmet-
ric, continuous, and concave consumer distributions. Following d'Aspremont, Gabszewicz
and Thisse (1979) he assumes a quadratic transportation cost function. DifTerent from
the finding of d'Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979), however, is that there exists
a range of symmetric and concave consumer distributions over which duopolists differen-
tiate their products maximally, that is, they locate at the ends of the market. When the
consumer distributions become more concentrated, the duopolists tend to move toward
the inside of the market, thus decrease their product differentiation.
2See d'Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979), and Gabszewicz and Thisse (1986).
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Related studies have also been found recently following Caplin and Nalebuff (1991)
who provide conditions on the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium of price compe-
tition for generalised consumer distributions - log-concave consumer distributions. Goeree
and Ramer (1994), for example, consider Hotelling's competition with removed location
restrictions. That is, both consumers and firms may choose locations from the whole
real line. They provide conditions on the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium of
Hotelling's competition. In a similar setting Tabuchi and Thisse (1995) find asymmetric
equilibria. Restoring location restrictions allows one to study inside and outside loca-
tion games or horizontal and vertical differentiation games, but may not guarantee the
existence of the equilibrium.
In this chapter, we try to restore the location restrictions in order to study inside and
outside location games. For this study, we follow a setting of Gabszewicz and Thisse
(1986).  We show that additional insights may be added to the effect of concentrated
consumer distributions on the locations of firms.
More precisely, we study Hotelling's spatial competition to examine the effect of con-
centrated consumer distributions on the degree of product differentiation. Two firms play
a two-stage game non-cooperatively, first locations and then prices. They may locate
either inside or outside of the residential area where consumers live.
For convenience, and also to compare the results derived in this chapter with that
of Gabszewicz and Thisse (1986), we restrict ourselves to quadratic transportation costs
in the inside location game and to linear-quadratic transportation costs in the outside
location game. As usual, we seek subgame perfect equilibria of the two-stage game in
which firms select locations first and then set up their prices.
We show, for the inside location game, that rather flat consumer distributions lead
the two firms to differentiate their products maximally, and when consumer distributions
become more concentrated the duopolists tend to move inside the market. We further
show that precommitment of firms to symmetric locations leads to maximum differen-
tiation, which is independent of concentrated consumer distributions.  For the outside
location game, however, product differentiation is increased when consumers are concen-
trated around the market center.
Our results in the inside location game differ sharply from Neven (1986) in the case
when firms ez ante commit to symmetric locations at the first stage of the game. Other-
wise, the results derived here include the result derived in Neven (1986) as a special case.
This is because consumer distributions are more general (log-concave) than those given
by Neven (concave).
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The model is presented in
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Section 4.2. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 are concerned with inside and outside location games,
respectively. In these two sections, the trade-off between price competition force and
market retention force is analysed and the effect of consumer concentrations on the degree
of product differentiation is examined. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 The model
There are two firms, firm 1 and firm 2, producing a homogeneous good at constant
marginal costs which are normalized to zero. These two firms play a two-stage game non-
cooperatively. They compete first on locations, and then on prices. The location and price
of firm  i  with i  €  {1,2}  are noticed  by 3,  and pi, respectively. We distinguish between
inside and outside location games. Two firms choose their locations over the residential
area [0,1] in the inside location game, and over [1, too), or outside the residential area, in
the outside location game. Without loss of generality, we assume that si < 52· Otherwise
Bertrand competition prevails if 31 = 32.
Consumers are distributed  over a residential area which is normalized  to  [0,11.    The
consumer distribution density function and the cumulative distribution function of con-
sumers are represented  by   f(.) and F(.), respectively. Consumers are assumed to have
identical preferences and to buy one unit product exclusively from one of the firms. The
reservation price of consumers is infinite, which means that all consumers prefer to buy
from either firm. Transportation costs are assumed to be quadratic in the inside location
game, and to be linear-quadratic in the outside location game. Therefore, a consumer
residing at x will buy from firm i where i = argminjf{1,2}Bj + (sj - =)2] in the inside
location game, and from firm i where i = argminj€{1,2} Pj + C(Sj - Z) + d(sj - x)21 in the
outside location game, where c, d are constants, and c, d > 0.
Consequently, at the same price charged by the two firms in the inside location game,
some consumers prefer to buy from firm 1 while the others prefer to buy from firm 2.
Therefore, their tastes appear to be diverse. In the outside location game, however, if
two firms charge the same price, all consumers will prefer the product from firm 1 to
that from firm 2. This is because firm 1 is closer to all consumers than firm 2, and it is,
therefore, cheaper for all consumers to buy from firm 1 than from firm 2. In other words,
it seems that all consumers rank good 1 higher than good 2 because of the fact that
Sl < 82· This allows obviously for an interpretation in term of quality. So, the inside and
the outside location games represent horizontal and vertical product differentiations, re-
spectively. Moreover, beyond the location restrictions it is regarded either technologically
or economically infeasible.
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At the end of this section, we introduce our main restrictions on the consumer distri-
butions. First of all, a p-concave function is defined as follows.
Definition 4.2.1 Let p > 0. A function f: B -* 52+, with B C 32 being an interval, is
p-concave if for every Zo, xi E B,  and for every A E [0,1] it holds that
f(=A) 2 [(1 - A)(f(zo))0 + A(f(zi))']1/0, (4.2.1)
where z, E (1 - A)zo + Axl ·
0
For p<0 the definition of p- concavity is the same as above definition except when
f(zo)f(=1) = 0, in which case there is no restriction other than f(xx) 2 0 Finally, the
definition may be extended to include p = -00,0, too through continuity arguments.
For p = 0, (4.2.1) is equivalent to concavity of 109(f)· In the sequel we shall use
the term log-concave instead of 0-concave.  It can be shown that the higher value of
p corresponds to the more stringent variant of concavity, that is, a p-concave function
is also a p'-concave function for every p' 5 P. Moreover, if the function f(.) is twice
differentiable, then the log-concavity is equivalent to the following second-order condition.
f"(z)f(x) - f'(z)f'(Z) 50, for every z € supp(f), (4.2.2)
where supp(f) denotes the support of f(·), that is, f(z) > 0 for x c supp(f).
We may distinguish between inside and outside location games to study the trade-off
between price competition force and market retention force, for which the following as-
sumption will be repeatedly used.
Assumption 4.2.1 The consumer density function f(.) is log-concave and di erentiable
over the interval [0,1] Moreover, f(Z) > 0 for all z E (0,1).
0
4.3 The inside location game
Let us first examine the effect of concentrated consumer distributions on the locations of
firms or on the degree of product differentiation for the inside location game. Following
the commonly used backwards induction analysis procedure, we focus, first of all, on the
second stage of the game to derive the equilibrium levels of prices.
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4.3.1 Price competition
Let the locations of the two firms be given, sl for firm 1, 62 for firm 2, and sl, 32 E [0,11.
Without loss of generality we assume that sl < 82· Moreover, suppose that transporta-
tion costs are quadratic. Then, the delivering price that a consumer residing at z has to
pay is pl + (81 - Z)2 if she buys from firm 1, and pi + (32 - x)2 if she buys from firm
2. A consumer will buy from a firm to which she pays a lower total price. The marginal
consumer who is indifferent between buying from either firm is, therefore, residing at
P2 - Ptl
(4.3.1)((81,82,Pl,112 =  (31+82 +        '.52 - 81
Thus, firms 1 and 2 segment the market by Di - F(((81,32,Pl,1)2 ) and 82 =1-
F(((31, 32, pl, m)),   respectively, where F(4) E .f  f(z)dz.  The two firms' profits are as
follows
7rl (31,82,Pl,P2  =P1F(((81,32,Pl,P2  , (4.3.2)
71'2(81,32,Pl,I)2   -  2(1 - F(((sl, 82,Pl,P2   · (4.3.3)
Thanks to Caplin and Nalebuff (1991), we may then derive the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3.1 Suppose that transportation costs are quadratic and Assumption 4.2.1
holds.   Then, there ezists a unique equilibrium of price competition for any given loca-
tions of the two jirms. The equilibrium levels of prices and projits are
p; (81'32) = 2(32 - 81)F(('(31,62))/f(<'(sl,s2)), (4.3.4)
p;(81' 82)   = 2(32 - 81)[1 - F((-(31, 82))1/f((-(sl, s2)), (4.3.5)
lr;(81, 32) - 2(32 - 31)F2(6*(81,32))/f( -(31,32)), (4.3.6)
lr;(81, 32)  = 2(32 - 81)[1 - F(('(31, 82))]2/f((*(81,82)), (4.3.7)
where 6-(81,52) - ((81,82,P;(81,82),P;(81,82))·
Proof. Given the conditions that transportation costs are quadratic and Assumption
4.2.1 holds, the finding of Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) applies directly to guarantee the
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existence and the uniqueness of the price equilibrium. We are then left with calculating
the equilibrium configurations using the first order condition.
Differentiating  (4.3.2)  and  (4.3.3) with respect  to Pl  and P2, respectively, yields
alrl 1 -1-=F((*(st,52)) + pif((*(81,32)) (4.3.8)api                                                        2 32 - 61
alr2 -f((-(sl, 52)) 1
- = (1 - F(('(31,32))) + py             2                           = 0 (4.3.9) P2                                                      82 - 81
Solving equations (4.3.8) and (4.3.9) for p; and p;, respectively, and then substituting p;
and pi for pi and P2 in equations (4.3.2) and (4.3.3) yield the equilibrium levels of the
two firms' prices and profits.
0
The marginal consumer's reduced form at the price equilibrium may be derived as
follows. Subtracting (4.3.4)  from (4.3.5)  we have the expression of p;(al, 82) - P;(St, 82)·
Substituting this expression  for P2(sl, 62   - Pl (sl, 32)  in (4.3.1) yields the marginal  con-
sumer's location at the price equilibrium defined by the following implicit equation
1              1 - 2F(<*(81,52))
6.(81,82)=  (81 + 82)+                                                                   (4.3.10)f((·(sl,82))
Differentiating (4.3.10) yields directly the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3.2 8(·(sl' 32)/8.91 = 86'(31, 82)/832 = f2(6'(Sl, 82))/[6f2(('(si, sV)) t 2(1 -
2FC<-(81, 32))) f'(6'(81,82))]·
0
Given Lemma 4.3.1, we have well defined reduced profit function forms of the two
firms conditional on their locations sl and 82· We now turn to the preceding stage of the
game to consider location competition between the two firms.
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4.3.2 Location competition
Turning to the location stage of the game, we know that an equilibrium of the location
game is a location pair of s'  = (4,4) such that s; maximizes t. (s„ s;) with respect to
4 for given s; (i, j = 1,2 and i 0 j). Therefore, the first order condition applies to
generate the necessary conditions of a location equilibrium.3 First of all, we may derive
the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3.3 Let the marginal consumer's location at the price equilibrium be given in
(4.3.10), Then,  at the location equilibrium (4,4)  it follows that
2 - 2FCE'(4,81)) + 2F2((.(4, S;)) = (s; - s;)f(('(S;, si)). (4.3.11)
Proof.4 From Lemma 4.3.2 we define 6  -  06-(51,82)/831  -  86·(31,82)/832  and  (  =
(*(81'82).  Then, differentiating (4.3.6) with respect to sl, (4.3.7) with respect to 32, and
setting the derivatives equal to zero yields
air;(st, 82)   - _ flfil + 2(82 - sl)·Ii'(6)6 - (s·2 - sl)F'2(6)/,(6)6 = 0 (4.3.12)
881 - f<C)
c 12(<)
a,r;(81, 52     _ [1-F(<)12 11 -F(6)121'(4)6
082       - ICE) .,2(()- 2(82 - 31)[1
- F(6)16 - (32 - 81)
== 0. (4.3.13)
Eliminating 8 from equations (4.3.12) and (4.3.13) yields
11 - 2FC<)]f2(C) - [1 - F(6)112(6)f'(6) = 0, (4.3.14)
while taking the sum of equations (4.3.12) and (4.3.13) yields
f(6)(1 - 2FC<)) = (32 - si)f'(6)86./ast,
8We may not be able to guarantee, a prion, that s* as such derived is an equilibrium location pair
since  4   and  4  may  not  fall  into  [O,  1]
4An alternative proof is provided in Goeree and Ramer (1994) We provide, however, a modified
version of their proof for later use.
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which can be rewritten as
F(C)(1 - F(<)) = (s2 - Sl)f(<)04*lasi, (4.3.15)
by making use of (4.3.14). Rewriting 86-/Osi of Lemma 4.3.2 by making use of (4.3.14)
we have 8('/881 = F(6)(1-F(4))/(2 -2F(<) + 2F2(6)). Substituting this expression for
86-/Dsl in (4.3.15) gives (4.3.11).
0
Lemma 4.3.3 implies that at the price equilibrium, two firms locate apart by s; - s; =
2-2FC€ '(s;.i;)) +2IA (4.(4,3; ))
1(6 94,3;))
, which is the degree of product differentiation. Without impos-
ing any restriction on the locations of firms, we may then derive the following necessary
conditions of a location equilibrium.
Corollary 4.3.1 Under Assumption 4.2.1, a subgame perfect eqltilibrium (4,4,PT,PS)
without location restrictions must satisfy
8;      =  •_  (1-F(I7*2-F((.)),
s;     - t. -1. F'(4.)(1+F((.))6   1       1(67
P.       -  4.F'(6*)(1-,f'(f)+F'(6.)),
 .    -  4(1-F((*))(;-:(6*)+F'((.)),
and yielding profts
lr;       =  4F2((.)(1.7;(C)+F,(6.)),
.  _ 4(1-F(€'))2(1-F((')+F (('))
T2
-
12(4•)            '
where  ('   is  the  solution   to   (4.3.14).
Proof. Solving equations (4.3.12) and (4.3.13) yields s; and 4. Substituting 4 - s; of
equation (4.3.11) for 32 - 81 in equations (4.3.4), (4.3.5), (4.3.6) and (4.3.7) yield p;, p;,
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x;  and  TH.
0
To derive a subgame perfect equilibrium, we may further specify the consumer den-
sity function f(.) to be symmetric. Then 4- = F((*) = &. Substituting them into the
equilibrium configurations of Corollary 4.3.1 leads directly to the following corollary.
Corollary 4.3.2 Suppose that the consumer distribution density function f (.) is sym-
metric.   Then,  under Assumption 4.2.1 a subgame perfect equilibrium  (sT, s;, pi, pl)   of the
inside location game satisjies
-1-3
81   - 2    41(1/2)'
s;   -  +  75),
•                   3
pi     = P;  =  27TITIO,
and yields profits
3
71.; = T; -  4f2(1/2)
0
This corollary shows that the two firms will locate at the ends of the market until
the concentration of the consumer distributions around the the market centre increases
to a sufficiently high level, that is, until the value of f(&) reaches 3/2. Thereafter, the
two firms intend to move toward inside the market as the concentration of the consumer
distribution around the market centre, measured by the value of f( ), increases. In other
words, the two firms will maximally differentiate their products if the consumer distri-
bution density function is symmetric and the value of f(.) at the market centre is less
than 3/2. Otherwise, they intend to decrease their product differentiation by moving
toward inside the market as the value of f (.) at the market centre is higher than 3/2 and
increases. The following proposition summarizes the main result thus far.
Proposition 4.3.1 Suppose that the consumer distribution density function f(.)  is sym-
metric. Then, under Assumption 4.2.1 there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium
of the inside location game, in which the equilibrium conjigurations hold as
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4     =0,4=1,
*
Pi      = P;  =  7#)'
71·;      =  Tr;  =   2712)
if f( ) <  ,  and otherwise the same as that given in Corollary 4.3.2.
Proof. Corollary 4.3.2 shows that s; < 0 and s; > 1 if f( ) < 3/2. Then, firm 1 and
firm 2 will locate  at  the  the  left  side and the right  side out  of the unit residential area
(line), respectively. Moreover, to the right side of s; the profit of firm 1 is down sloping
while to the left side of s; the profit of firm 2 is up sloping. Therefore, with the location
restrictions by which firms 1 and 2 have to locate inside the market, they will end up
by locating at the left end and the right end of the market, respectively. Consequently,
the two firms maximally differentiate their products. The equilibrium configurations then
follow directly from substituting s;  =  0, s;  =  1,  and  4- = F((*) =  into equations
(4.3.4)-(4.3.7).
If f( ) 23/2, however, we have that s; 2 0 and si 5 1, and then the necessary con-
dition of Corollary 4.3.2 becomes also sufficient. Thus, the given outcome becomes the
equilibrium configurations. The two firms then differentiate their products at the degree
3
of  4 -  4  =  57(1121
0
At the end of this section, we further restrict our attention to consider a situation that
not only consumers are distributed symmetrically around the market centre, but also firms
commit themselves to symmetric locations. This commitment of firms to symmetric 10-
cations may be imposed by zone regulations. It may also be interpreted as cooperation
or collusion between the two firms because under symmetric consumer distributions the
commitment of firms to symmetric locations guarantees them equal profits. In this case,
the following proposition is derived.
Proposition 4.3.2  Let the consumer density Junction f(.) be symmetric, and two jirms
commit   to   symmetric   locations.      Then,    under  Assumption 4.2.1 there exists   a   unique
subgame perfect equilibrium of the inside location game, which exhibits maximum product
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di#erentiation. The equilibrium prices and projits are
p;    = P; = 1/f(1/2),
r;  = lr; = 1/(2f(1/2)).
Proof. Given that the consumers' distribution density function is symmetric and that
the two firms commit to symmetric locations, we have from Lemma 4.3.1 that price
competition  at the second stage  of  the game results  in  that  (-   =   1/2,  p; (81,82)   -
 (si, 32) = (82 - si)/f(1 2), and lr;(st, 62) = T;(81,32) = (32 - st)/(2f(1/2)).  Dif-
ferentiating the two firms' profits yields that  ar;(31,82)/Osi  =  -1/(2f(1/2))  <  0  and
ax;(81,82)/882  =  1/(21(1/2))  > 0. Therefore,  at the first stage of the game, location
competition leads firms 1 and 2 to choose the locations at 4 = 0 and 4 = 1, respectively.
The consequent equilibrium levels of prices and profits follow directly from substituting
s; and  s; into p; (81,32),P;(sl, 32)' 4(31,82) and T;(31, 32) in equations (4.3.4),  (4.3.5),
(4.3.6) and (4.3.7) consequently.
0
At this stage, the difference arising from the firms' precommitment to symmetric
locations becomes clear. Proposition 4.3.1 and Proposition 4.3.2 show that when con-
sumers are distributed symmetrically and the consumer distribution density at 1/2, f( ),
is lower than 3/2, maximum product differentiation prevails no matter whether the two
firms commit to symmetric locations or not. Moreover, precommitment to symmetric
locations changes neither the equilibrium configurations nor the social welfare.
If consumers are distributed around the market centre with a sufficiently high con-
centration,  or  if  f( )  > 3/2, however, differences arise. Then, under the commitment
to symmetric locations two firms' profits will be higher while consumer surplus is lower
because of the increased prices and longer transportation (and thus higher transportation
costs). Consequently, social welfare remains ambiguous. In summary, suppose that the
firms may choose between precommitment and non-precommitment to symmetric loca-
tions, they will choose precommitment to symmetric locations if consumers are sufficiently
concentrated around the market centre. Otherwise, no difference can be made by pre-
commitment to symmetric locations. Moreover, in the former case consumer surplus is
lower and social welfare is ambiguous
Thus far, our analysis of the inside location game shows that the concentration of
consumer distributions effects product differentiation. The higher the concentration, the
higher the market retention force and the lower the degree of the product differentiation.
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This effect is observed for a class of specialized consumer distributions - symmetric con-
sumer distributions. Moreover, this observation is quite intuitive. Locating at a area
where consumers are highly concentrated a firm increases its market share but may also
decreases its price because of the increased intensity of price competition; locating apart
a firm may mitigate the intensity of the price competition and increases its price, but
may also decrease its market share. Decreased product differentiation is observed when
consumers are highly concentrated around the market center and market retention force
dominates price competition force.
Having examined the effect of concentration of consumer distribution on product dif-
ferentiation for the inside location game case, we now turn to the outside location game
case to continue our discussion of the effect.
4.4 The outside location game
Let us now turn to the outside location game to examine the effect of consumer concen-
tration on the degree of product differentiation.  For this purpose, we may use Gabszewicz
and Thisse (1986) as a benchmark, and keep all assumptions unchanged except substi-
tuting the concentrated consumer distributions for their uniform consumer distributions.
Following backwards induction analysis procedure, we focus first on the second stage of
price competition.
4.4.1 Price competition
To recall Gabszewicz and Thisse (1986), we have that in the outside location game, two
firms choose their locations outside of the residential area [0,1], that is,  1  5  31   56  82  <  too.
Transportation costs are linear-quadratic, implying that the total price a consumer resid-
ing at z €  [0,1] has to pay equals p, + c(s, - z) + d(si - z)2 if he buys from firm i, i = 1,2.
The marginal consumer is then defined as
,     p2- Pl + 482 - 81) + 44-4)
(4.4.1)((81'82,Pl,12) = 2d(s2 - 81)
Given this marginal consumer's location and the assumption that the consumer's reserva-
tion price is infinite, firms 1 and 2 then share the market by Di = F(((81, 82,Pl,Pi)) and
D2  =  (1 - F(((31, 82,Pl, 1'2   , respectively. Their consequent profits  are thus represented
by the same function forms as that given in (4.3.2) and (4.3.3).
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As a corollary, the following lemma is derived directly from Caplin and Nalebuff (1991).
Lemma 4.4.1 Under Assumption 4.2.1 there exists a unique equilibrium of price compe-
tition in pure strategies for any given location pair (sl, 32),  31 for jirm 1 and 32 for jirm
2,  with  1  5 81  6  82  <  too.   The equilibrium prices and projits  are as follows
p;(31'32) = 201(82 - 81)F(('(st,32))/f((-(sl, S2)), (4.4.2)
P;(Sl' 82)   = 2*62 - 81)[1 - F((-(sl,s2))]/f((*(sl, 82)); (4.4.3)
r/(31,82) = 2*32 - 81)F2(<.(81, 82))/f((-(sl, 82)), (4.4.4)
lr;(81'82)  = 2d(32 - 81)[1 - F((-(sl, 82))]2/f(€-(sl, 82)) (4.4.5)
where <'(sl, 82) = 6*( 61,82,P; (Sl,S2),Pe(St,S 2)).
Proof. First, under Assumption 4.2.1 Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) applies directly to
guarantee the existence and uniqueness of the price equilibrium. Then, using the first
order condition we may calculate the equilibrium configurations as follows
 7rl plf(6)   - 0 (4.4.6)3     = F(<  - 2d(4-4) -  1
87r2-  =1- FC<) -  P'f(<) -0 (4.4.7)
Qp2 2d(„
-.1)-.
These two equations together with equations (4.3.2) and (4.3.3) lead to the equilibrium
configurations.
0
At price equilibrium, the marginal consumer's location is specified as follows. Subtract-
ing (4.4.2) from (4.4.3) yields the expression of p;(81, 32) - P;(st, 32). Then, substituting
this expression in (4.4.1) leads to the marginal consumer's location (* defined as
c 1 1-2F(6.(81,32))
(4.4.8)T(44)=-+ §(81 + 82) +2d                     f((*(81,82))
Moreover, differentiating <*(sl, 32)  in  (4.4.8) with respect  to  81  and 32 yields a property
that is the same as that given in Lemma 4.3.2. Having derived the equilibrium configu-
rations of the price competition, we are then in a position to consider the location stage
of the garne.
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4.4.2 Location competition
First of all, we show that in the outside location game the two firms are asymmetric.
That is, given our assumption on the two firms' locations, firm 1 earns a higher profit
than firm 2. This property holds for quite general transportation cost functions as shown
in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.4.2 Let the transportation cost function c(.) in the outside location game be dif-
ferentiable and increasing,  and suppose further that st < s2·  Then, T;(31,82) > lr; (31,82)·
Proof. By setting up pl = ((82 - 1) - c(St - 1) - €for arbitrarily small € > 0, it is clear
that firm 1 guarantees itself a strictly positive profit.
Let us then consider an equilibrium where only firm 1 is active, that is, lr; (81,82) = 0.
In this case, Lemma 4.4.1 holds trivially. We may thus restrict ourselves to equilibria
where both firms are active. Given that the indifferent consumer resides at 6. it must
hold that pi + c(81 - C') - P2 + c(82 - 4'). The resulting profits of firms 1 and 2 are
T; = PlF(<-), r; = P2(1 - 12(6-)). Differentiating x; and 71-; with respect to
pi and P2, respectively, yields pl = :a?i[C'(32 - 6.) - c'(sl - 4.)], and ;'2 = 1.F :il[C'(52 -
(I)  - c (81  - 6*)1, because pl  + c(51 - (I)  = P2 + c(82 - (*) Consequently,  we have that
lr;(81,82)-'r; (81,32) = P7F(6·)_p2(1-F((I)) = F((.)2;5:I:f((.))2[C'(82-6.)-C'(Sl-(*)1 =
2FC€')-1 r '1
F'( .)   C 92- r)- C (81 - 6.)1 = Pl - P2 =C(82 - 4.)- C(st - 4.) > 0.
0
This lemma shows an asymmetry between firm 1 and firm 2. The location restrictions
that 1 5 81 5 82 < too provide firm 1 with an advantage over firm 2. This advantage
arises because of firm 1 locating closer to the consumers than firm 2. It looks like that
firm 1 provides a higher quality product than firm 2. Therefore, the restriction has the
interpretation that firm 1 is a quality (or technology) leader and firm 2 is a quality (or
technology) follower.
Solving equations (4.3.11) and (4.4.8) provides us the following necessary condition
that a subgame perfect equilibrium, if it exists, should satisfy.
Lemma 4.4.3 Under Assumption 4.2.1, a subgame perfect equilibrium (4,4,p;, pi) of
the location-then-price game without location restriction, if it exists, must satisfy
3;  = (• _ (1-F(<7#2)-F<(')) _   
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S;    = (•   F((•) 1 -F(( )) _  '
p;         =  4dF(€0)(171:')+172(6.)),
;,;   = 4,1(1-17(4.))(12 1(.)+F'((.)),
and yield projits
7r;        =  4dF'2(40)(liF((.)+F'2(€.)),




where (' is the solution to (4.3.14).
Proof. Lemmas 4.3.1 and 4.4.1 show that equation (4.3.11) holds also under the condi-
tions of Lemma 4.4.3. Solving equations (4.3.11) and (4.4.8) yields s; and 4 Substituting
the expression of 31 - s; in the equation (4.3.11) for s2 - sl in (4.4.2)-(4.4.5) yields PT,
p;,  lr;  and  lr;
0
Clearly, Lemma 4.4.3 is not a sufficient condition of a subgame perfect equilibrium of
the outside location game because s; < 1. To derive the sufflcient condition, a further
assumption is introduced, under which the result of Goeree and Ramer (1994) applies di-
rectly to guarantee the uniqueness of the maximum extreme of the firms' profit functions.
Assumption 4.4.1 The consumer density function and the consumer cumulative func-
tion satisfy
2F(x) -1., f(x) ,.,    , f(x)  ,  2FC=) -1,
<C    f(z)    J + 1)(F2(x))  - C.FiCT)) (C    j.(z)    ) + 1)  > 0,
for all z € [0,1], and a similar condition with f  l  F'    replaced  by   f  1  F (1  -   F)2   holds.
0
Following Assumption 4.4.1 is a sufficient condition on the existence and uniqueness
of a subgame perfect equilibrium of the outside location game, derived as follows.
Proposition 4.4.1 Under Assumptions  4.2.1  and 4.4.1, there exists  a  unique  subgame
perfect equilibrium  (4, si, pi, pi)  of the  outside  location  game,  which  satisjies
4 =1, (4.4.9)
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4 =1+ 6 (Co)+2(1 -2/7(€'))1'(60) (4.4.10)AL.) 2. 2(Co)t(1-F((•))1'(C•) 1
 ;  - 4dF((')(1-F((')) 312((.)+(1-2F(('))/'((o) (4.4.11)f*(69 2. 2(Elt(1-F(Egf'(69 '
     _ 41(1-F(€'))2 312(60)+(1-2F(€0))1'(6.) (4.4.12)/2 (6.) 212((•)+(1-12(6•)f'(6•) 1
and yields projits




X2 - f2(6•) 2.f2((.)+(1-F(€0)1'(€7 '
41(1-F(('))3 , 3f'((')+(1-2.F'(6')),f'(C')
where <* is determined by
4. =l t
1- 2F(<*)   1- 12((.) 3,P((.) + (1 - 2.12((*))f'((-) .1- _c
f(6*) f((-) 2f2((.) + (1
-
F(<-) f'(4-) 2d
Proof. Under Assumption 4.2.1 Lemma 4.4.3 shows that s; < 1. Moreover, Assumption
4.4.1 guarantees that the profit function of firm 1 has only one peak. Therefore, at the
right side of the location corresponding to this peak point the profit function of firm 1 is
always downward sloping.   Thus,  4  =  1  maximizes firm  l's  profit  in the outside location
game under the restriction si 21.
The profit maximization of firm 2 yields a equation which is equivalent to equation
(4.3.13). Therefore, substituting 4 = 1 for 4 in equation (4.3.13) yields s;, which gives
6- when being substituted into (4.4.8) together with 4 = 1. Finally, substituting 81 - s;
into (4.4.2)-(4.4.5) yields pi, pl, ,r;, and T;
0
This proposition provides a unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the outside location
game, in which firm 1 locates at the left end of the location space or 4 = 1 while firm 2
chooses a location somewhere on the right side of firm 1.  Thus, the two firms differentiate
their products   with a degree  of  4  -  4.     To   see  the  effect of consumer concentration
on the degree of product differentiation, we may specify further the consumer density
function.  In the next section, this effect is discussed through an example in which a
concrete consumer density function is defined.
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4.4.3 Ttiangular consumer distributions
In this section, we follow Gabszewicz and Thisse's (1986) model, but substitute a trian-
gular consumer distribution for their uniform consumer distribution. This substitution
may provide us a clear observation of the effects of consumer concentrations around the
market centre on the degree of product differentiation.
More precisely, we assume that consumers are distributed with a density function
f(x) = 2 - 12 - 4z  over the interval [0,1]. Then, the density function has the following
expression
f(x)-      4x          if 
x s 14 - 4x  otherwise,
and its cumulative function holds as
2z2 if =5 
F(z) =  -2z2 + 4x - 1  otherwise.
Given this distribution of consumers, we claim that the equilibrium levels of locations
and prices of the two firms hold as follows.
Proposition  4.4.2  Let the consumer density function f(x) = 2-12-4=lforanx E [0,1].
Then, there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, in which the following equilibrium
conjigurations hold
4=            1,
85 =     1+  t   64 + * ,
p; =   V +69 2d- 8'1 64 + 9 2,
P; =  i+ & - Tis, 64 + *.
Proof. Because f(.) is not differentiable at z =  , Assumption 4.2.1 does not hold.
Therefore, Proposition 4.4.1 does not apply. We may, however, seek for an alternative
way of the proof through selection and elimination.
First, we prove  that  E-(31,32)   fi  IO, 1/21 Otherwise, from equation  (4.4.8),  32  =





Secondly, we solve <* when no restriction is imposed on locations. From the fact that
4* 96  , we have that f is differentiable at (*. Solving (4.3.14), we get the following values
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for (-: 0,1/ /5,1- 1/V , 1. But at any location equilibrium, 6* = 0 or 1 can not happen
since otherwise one firm would be driven out of business.
Finally, we focus on the outside location game. Then, 6. = 1/ 46 ¢ ( ,1]  can  also  not
happen. So we are left with (' =1- 1  11/6. Substituting (- into equations (4.3.11) and
(4.4.8), and then solving these equations yield that s; =1- 5/(3 ) - c/(2d) < 1 and
 =lt 2/(3 /6) - c/(2d). Again s; and s; can not hold as equilibrium locations in the
outside location game. But it is straightforward that 4 = 1 will be the optimal location
of firm 1 for any given location of firm 2 in the outside location game. Then we are left
with solving the optimizing location of firm 2 given s; = 1.
Since,5.(1,82) 0 [0,1/2), we have f(x) = 4-4:r and F(z) = -2=2+43-1. Substituting
f(z) and F(z) into the equation for s; and (' in (4.4.7) and (4.4.10), we obtain
2 cl/ 9c2
4. -1- and s; =l t- + -1/64 + - .
5 + 464 + 9% 8d    8 V       d2
Subsequently, p; and pi follow from substituting s; and s; into (4.4.11) and (4.4.12),
respectively.
0
This result shows that when the consumer distribution density takes the above given
triangular form, there exhibits a differentiation between the two firms' products with a
degree of 4 - s;  =   i +   V 64 +  5 . When consumers are distributed uniformly, however,
direct calculation from Proposition 4.4.1 leads to a unique subgame perfect equilibrium,
in which firm 1 and firm 2 locate at 1 and 1 + 2/3 - c/(3d), respectively. Thus, the two
firms exhibit a degree of product differentiation at 2/3 - c/(3d). Moreover, the unique-
ness of the equilibrium requires that <- < 1 holds, for which c < 2d must be assumed.
Otherwise, if c 2 2d, then (' 2 1, which means that firm 2 stays out of the market. This
is exactly the result given in Gabszewicz and Thisse (1986). Direct comparison between
these degrees of product differentiation leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 4.4.1 In a outside location game with the linear-quadratic transportation cost
and the assumption that c < 2d, the two jirms will increase their product diferentiation
if the consumers' distribution changes from the uniform density to the triangular one.
0
This corollary shows that when consumers are sufficiently concentrated around the
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market center, the firms' location behaviour in the outside location game is sharply dif-
ferent from that in the inside location game. While product differentiation is decreased
in the latter case, it is increased in the former case. The difference arises from the asym-
metry between the two firms in the outside location game. The intuition is as follows.
Standard results of a vertical product differentiation model show that the lower quality
product firm wants more product differentiation, since this relaxes price competition and
increases profits (see Tirole, 1988). When consumers are sufficiently concentrated around
the market center, however, at the same prices and locations firm l's market share is
increased. This increased market share of firm 1 provides firm 1 a further advantage over
firm 2, and forces firm 2 to locate further apart to relax price competition. As a result,
product differentiation is increased. Although it is impossible to calculate for every case,
we believe that the result remains in general true when consumer distribution changes
from a uniform density to a non-uniform density but concentrated around the market
centre.
4.5 Conclusion
Relaxing the assumption of a uniform consumer distribution by a log-concave distribution
density function provides a more realistic model, but creates a market retention force in
the inside location game or increases the asymmetry between firms in the outside location
game.  Firms then try to balance the trade-off in the inside location game between locating
apart to relax price competition and moving closer to increase market share. As a result,
when consumers are not too concentrated around the market centre, the price competition
force dominates the market retention force, and firms will differentiate their products
maximally. When consumers are sufficiently concentrated over a certain level, the market
retention force starts to dominate the price competition force, and the firms gradually
move toward the inside of the market along with increasing concentration of consumer
distribution around the market centre. An exception is the case with ex ante commitment
to symmetric locations. In that case, increasing concentration of consumer distributions
around the market centre does not affect the locations of both firms, and the two firms
always maximally differentiate their products by locating at the two extremes.
The opposite behaviour is observed in the outside location game and shown in the
triangular example. Although it is impossible to calculate for every case of the outside 10-
cation game, we believe that the result remains generally true when consumer distribution
changes from uniform to non-uniform but concentrated around the market centre. This
is because the consumer concentration around the market center increases the market
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shares of the firms that locate closer to consumers while it decreases the market shares
of the other firms. Then, the asymmetry between firms is increased further. As a result,
the firms with inferior positions want to move apart further from the others, and product
differentiation is thus increased.
The work may be extended by considering an alternative vertical product differenti-
ation model as, e.g., Shaked and Sutton (1982). This is because the alternative model
captures quality competition more precisely whereas consumers are distributed by their
tastes or incomes. Intuitively, consumers are concentrately distributed by their incomes
(being concentrated around the average income is the most plausible example). Thus, the
extension may provide a more realistic vertical product differentiation model.
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Several industries are global in scope. The most significant firms in personal comput-
ers, telecommunications, VCRs, cars, or numerically controlled machine tools compete
worldwide. In these markets, different government standards may be imposed. Moreover,
many government-imposed standards seem to intend to protect local producers from for-
eign competition. This "hidden" protectionism is problematic with regards to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade as well as to ISO's efforts to harmonize standards across
borders. Given the importance of these policy issues it is surprising that the theoretical
literature on standardization has focused almost completely on closed economies.
Extending the literature to an international environment involves two main modifica-
tions in the model. First, there are now domestic and foreign firms. The crucial difference
here is that the profits of foreign-owned firms do not or at least do not completely con-
tribute to the home country's surplus so that the optimal standardization policies of the
home country might well differ from what it would be in a closed economy. Second, some
of the markets in which foreign and domestic firms compete might be served through
exports. This opens the door to a strategic use of trade-policy instruments such as tariffs,
quotas, export taxes, or subsidies. As noted by Matutes and Regibeau (1996), however,
one hardly finds any study on the consequences of these two departures from the tradi-
tional assumptions. The only exception, to the best of our knowledge, might be Jeanneret
and Verdier (1996).  In that paper, the impact of trade policies on the standardization
choices of the firms in an international environment is studied in the absence of network
externalities. But, the limit of that study is that the perceived qualities of both the firms'
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products and the perceived quality gap between them are exogenously decided.
In this chapter, the vertical product differentiation framework is extended to deal
with trade policy issues under international competition. In particular, trade policies
may effect - and be effected by - the standardization choices of firms, which decides then
on the standardization choices of firms and optimal trade policies of the government.
These will be the focus of this chapter.
A vertically differentiated duopoly is studied. The domestic firm is an incumbent and
quality follower, while the foreign firm is an entrant and quality leader. The perceived
qualities of and the perceived quality gap between both firms' products are endogenized.
The two firms produce system goods instead of single goods. A system good consists
of a hardware and a software, any component of which alone is not useful. Under stan-
dardization, a hardware component from one firm can be used together with a software
component from any of the other firms in order to produce a useful system good. Further-
more, in our considerations the two firms play a Stackelberg game in price competition
instead of a Bertrand game. Since the domestic firm is an incumbent, it enjoys the first-
mover advantage. As an entrant, the foreign firm is a follower of the price competition
game. We shall look at first the effect of trade policies on the standardization choices
of firms.  Then, we consider the incentives of governments in the process of setting up
international standards.
More precisely, we consider a situation where a domestic firm faces competition from
a foreign firm when the home country changes its closed economy into an open economy.
The foreign firm is the production technology leader and entrant, while the domestic
firm is the production technology follower and incumbent. Each producer produces not
only hardware but also software. Examples include durable equipment and repair service
(the equipment is hardware, the repair service is software) and personal computers and
softwares (computers are hardware, spreadsheets, word processors, databases, communi-
cation software, etc., are softwares). The situation might be envisioned by considering a
computer, washing machine, or television industry, in which a developing country opens
its door to the outside world, particularly, to a developed country. The domestic firm has
the disadvantage of producing a lower quality product. It has also, however, some advan-
tages, such as being protected by the government's tariffs or subsidies, and the first-mover
advantage of being an incumbent. We examine the trade-off between these advantages
and disadvantages. The impact of trade policies on standardization choices of firms and
optimal trade policies are then analysed.
Katz and Shapiro (1994) argue that for system goods that are compatible, the locus
of competition shifts from an overall package to specific costs and performance character-
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istics of each component individually. This general principle implies that if one firm has a
distinctly superior overall package, including product offering, installed base and reputa-
tion, that firm is likely to prefer non-standardization and may in fact spend resources to
block standardization. If, however, each firm has a distinctly superior component, both
firms may prefer standardization and may spend resources to achieve it. Similarly, as we
will demonstrate, to the extent that the quality differences create one type of asymmetry
between firms, and trade policies and the first-mover advantage create another type of
asymmetry, it is conjectured that standardization might be achieved.
We show that trade liberalization (which means that the tariff level goes to zero) is
associated with standardization of the system goods while protectionism (which means
that the tariff level goes to infinity) may lead to non-standardization, when the consumers'
taste parameters are independent. When the consumers' taste parameters are identical,
however, the standardization choices of firms are independent of the government's trade
policies. We also show that neither domestic surplus nor optimal trade policies will be
changed by the government's precommitment to a given tariff level, and that standard-
ization is always implemented by the government. This result is based on the assumption
of explicit agreement on standardization between firms, i.e., standardization can only be
achieved when both firms agree on it.
The intuition of the results is as follows. First of all, from a consumer's point of
view, the foreign firm's hardware and software advantages augment one another. When
consumers' taste parameters are independent, a consumer's valuation of quality upgrades
in hardware and software is uncorrelated, and the value-augmenting effect of hardware
and software is more diffuse. This tends to overall decrease the foreign firm's ability to
distinguish his product under non-standardization; as a result, its market power and the
price decline. Under standardization, however, the hardware and software markets are
completely separated, and the foreign firm can differentiate its hardware and software
from that of the domestic firm without being effected by consumers' tastes of hardware
and software. Thus, product differentiation is increased under standardization when the
consumers' taste parameters are independent. The standardization choices of the two
firms, however, depend on the overall advantages they may enjoy. For the foreign firm,
the advantage enjoyed by acting as a quality leader is balanced by the cost disadvan-
tage created by the government's tariff and by acting as an entrant. The foreign firm
then prefers standardization. The reversal is true for the domestic firm. The advantage
enjoyed by the foreign firm is the disadvantage of the domestic firm, and vice versa. Fur-
thermore, the advantage and disadvantages of the domestic firm will be balanced if the
tariff level imposed by the government is sufficiently low, and standardization is therefore
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also preferred. Otherwise, the domestic firm will enjoy overall advantages over the foreign
firm because of the heavily government-imposed tariff on the foreign firm, and thus the
strong government protection from foreign competition. The domestic firm then prefers
non-standardization. Because standardization can not survive unless both firms agree on
it, non-standardization will be the choice of the two firms if the government-imposed tariff
is sufficiently high. This observation is consistent to the finding derived from Katz and
Shapiro (1994).
When consumers' taste parameters are identical, the hardware and software of a system
good are correlated, and the foreign firm can differentiate its system good from that of the
domestic firm under non-standardization. In this case, standardization can not increase
further the product differentiation, neither does the government's trade policies.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. First, a model is presented in
Section 5.2 to formalize the situation described above. Then, equilibrium configurations
under non-standardization and standardization are derived in Sections 5.3 and 5.4, re-
spectively. In Section 5.5, we compare the equilibrium prices and profits derived from
the non-standardization and standardization cases to discuss the impacts of trade policies
on the standardization choices of firms. Finally, the reversed impacts are discussed by
distinguishing between the government as a leader and as a follower in Section 5.6 to
decide on optimal trade policies. Section 5.7 concludes.
5.2 The model
Consider a durable-goods industry in a country with a domestic producer (firm 1), the
incumbent, facing competition from a foreign producer (firm 2), the entrant.  Let each
producer manufacture both hardware and software, where firm 2 produces hardware and
software of "superior" quality. Assume that the unit production costs of both firms are
zero.1 The government of the country may impose a tariff of level t, with t > 0, on
each unit of the system good sold or exported by firm 2; the tariffs are imposed on the
hardware and software of the foreign firm's system good individually according to their
quality shares in the system good. Both producers' decision making processes evolve a
three-stage game.  In the first stage, firms decide on standardization simultaneously.  If the
two firms agree on standardization or make their products compatible, a hardware from
one firm may be then used together with a software from the rival in order to produce
a useful system good.  In the remaining two stages, the two firms play a Stackelberg
1Assuming different unit production costs does not change the results qualitatively but complicates
the analysis and the presentation.
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price game. In the second stage, the domestic firm optimizes its prices in anticipating
its pricing effect on the foreign firm's pricing behaviour. In the third stage, the foreign
firm decides on pricing given the domestic firm's pricing. The game is solved through
backwards induction to yield a subgame perfect equilibrium.
We consider a type of standardization mechanism where coordination on standards
is obtained through an explicit agreement between firms. This standardization mech-
anism has been widely observed empirically (Nicolas, 1988). A typical example is the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO). This organization attempts to har-
monize standards internationally, and is responsible, for instance, for the Open Systems
Interconnection reference model in mainframe computers.
To derive positive utility, a consumer must get one unit of both hardware and software;
owning more than one unit of either does not increase utility. For convenience, we assume
that each consumer purchases one unit of both hardware and software.
Let  subscript  (i, j) designate a system  good,  with i denoting hardware  of firm  i  and
j software of firm j. The numbers ill and pj represent the prices of hardware z of firm
i and software j of firm j, respectively. Each consumer has the same reservation price,
1/6, for the worst available system. Let Q and q represent the incremental value of the
superior hardware and software to the average consumer, respectively. We assume that
9 > q, that is, hardware is more valuable than software. Let kq and kq be the consumer's
taste parameters for the qualities of hardware and software, respectively; 4 and kq differ
among consumers.  Then, a consumer's utility derived from owning the system good  (i, j)
can be written as
Ul''i) - Y+Vo+ItkQQ+Ijkqq-P,-pi, (5.2.1)
where
Y =personal endowment, assumed identical for all consumers,
Ii' = If = 0, and I# = I; = 1.
This functional form is similar to the one used in Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) and
Einhorn (1992).
5.3 Equilibrium under non-standardization
To derive the equilibrium levels of prices and profits for the two firms under non-standardization,
we may distinguish between the cases of identical and independent taste parameters.
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Identical taste parameters. We assume, first, that an individual's taste parameters of
hardware and software are identical, that is, kq - kq = k. We suppose further that the
taste parameter k is uniformly distributed with support  [0,21, with density 1/2. Given
non-standardization, consumers can only choose between systems (1,1) and (2,2). Let K
be the taste parameter value of the crossover consumer, the one who is indifferent between
the systems (1,1) and (2,2) (that is, U(1,1) = U(2,2) .From equation (5.2.1), it follows that
K=  2-A+P2-PlQ+q
Given the foreign firm 2's quality leadership in both hardware and software, consumers
with a taste parameter k smaller (larger) than K select system (1,1) ((2,2)). Therefore,
the market shares of the system goods (1,1) and (2,2) are A41,1) = * and M(2,2) -1- *,
respectively.
Given that the unit production costs of both firms are zero, and that t>0 represents
the unit tariff cost of firm 2's system good, the profits erl of firm 1 and x2 of firm 2 under
non-standardization are
 2- 1+P2-Pl7rl     =    (Pl  + pl)
2(Q + q)
P2- 1+ P2 -Pl)X2   =   (P2 + P2 - t)(1 -
2(Q + q)       '.
Define Pl  := Pi t Pl,  P2   = P2 t P2,  and  Q  :=  Q + q. Solving for the Stackelberg price
game with firm 1 being the leader yields the equilibrium levels of prices and profits as
follows
Pt. tQ + -, (5.3.1)2
Pt,          (2* + t), (5.3.2)
id           -1-(2Q + t)2, (5.3.3)7rlns 160
id           -L(677 - t)2, (5.3.4)lr2- 32Q
at which the crossover consumer is given by




Given that k is uniformly distributed, we have that 824/827:I < 0, which guarantees a
unique profit-maximum. In a shared Stackelberg price equilibrium at which both firms
share the market, both market shares must be positive, which means that  P2 +7'2  > Pi +Pl
and M(2,2) > 0 must hold in a shared equilibrium. From (5.3.1)-(5.3.2), these inequalities
hold if and only if -2Q <t< 60 Therefore, to ensure a shared equilibrium, this in-
equality must hold.
Independent taste parameters. Next, we consider the case that a consumer's taste
parameters kq and kq differ, and are independently and jointly uniformly distributed with
support [0,2] x [0,2], with density 1/4 and means (1,1). The value for a consumer (4, kg)
upgrading system good from (1,1) to (2,2) is S = kgQ + kqq; S distributes with support
[0,2(Q + q)], with mean Q + q, and cumulative distribution
s2/[8qQ] if S 5 2q
GCS) = * [S - q]/[2Q] i f 2 q S S 5 2 9
1 - [2(Q + q) - S]2/[8qQ]  if S 2 20
9(S) -





0          2q               29              2[Q + q]      s
Figure 5.1 Density g(S) for independent taste parameters.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the density g(S) = G'(S) of S. To derive the equilibrium prices
and the associate profits for both firms, we restrict ourselves to the intermediate range of
g(S), that is, 24 <S< 20, 9(S) = 1/[2QI, and GCS) = [S- q]/[29].
A consumer will prefer system (1,1) ((2,2)) if the quality differential is less (greater) than
110 Chapter 5. Standardization and protection
the price differential. The crossover consumer is then
S = koetkqq=P2+P2-Pl-Pl·
Therefore, under non-standardization, the market shares of the system good (i,i), i = 1,2,
are
1141,1)   =   G(P2 + P2 -Pi- Pl),
M(2,2)   =   1-G(1'2 +P, -P l- Pl).
And profits are
 2+P2 -  1 - Pl-  
rl                                                    j
= (pi + pi)            2Q
X2   =   (P2 + P2 -t)(1 -
 2 +112-  1 -Pl-  )
29      -
- '
Again, let Pl = Pi t pl and P2 = P2 t Py· Solving for the Stackelberg price game with
firm 1 being the leader yields equilibrium levels of prices and profits as follows
Pt,  = e t; -1 (5.3.5)2'
Pt.  -    Q +  , t  " (5.3.6)
in          _1(2Q +t- q)2, (5.3.7)1rin' - 16Q
urts  =   _1(60 +q- 1)2, (5.3.8)
32Q
at which the crossover consumer is given by
S = ;Q +  , +  1'.
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To ensure a shared Stackelberg price equilibrium, both market shares must be pos-
itive, which means that P2 + P2 > Pit pi and M(2,2) > 0 must be assumed to hold,
or -2Q - 3 q<t<6 0+q i s required. To ensure that 2q <S< 29, we require
-20 +5 q<t<6 0-3 0 The second required inequality subsumes the first and the tariff
restriction under identical taste parameters, and therefore must be assumed from now on.
Equilibria compared. Comparing (5.3.1)-(5.3.4) with (5.3.5)-(5.3.8), the composite
system price Pi + Pi decreases by  q while P2 + Pi decreases by  q when consumers
taste parameters kg and kq are independent of each other.  In fact, producer 2's hardware
and software advantages augment one another.  If the parameters are independent, a
consumer's valuation of quality upgrades in hardware and software are uncorrelated, and
the value-augmenting effect of hardware and software is more diffuse. This tends to
overall decrease producer 2's ability to distinguish his product; and as a result, its market
power and equilibrium prices decline.  Firm l's equilibrium price declines more because of
its first-mover advantage, that is, the effect of product differentiation on the first-mover
advantage is negative: The more differentiation, the less first-mover advantage.
A consequence of this reduced product differentiation is the shrinking of the market.
In the identical consumers' taste parameters case, the maximum tariff level for the market
to hold both firms is 6(Q + q), while in the independent consumers' taste parameters case
this maximum tariff level is reduced to 60 + q.
5.4 Equilibrium under standardization
Under standardization, a consumer's software and hardware choices are entirely inde-
pendent of each other.  Let J and L represent crossover points at which a consumer is
indifferent between paying for a quality upgrade in software and hardware markets, re-
spectively. It follows from equation (5.2.1) that
J   =   P2 -Pl  L =P2 -Plq' Q.
Consumers with kq < (>)J select software 1 (software 2); consumers with 4 < (>)L
select hardware 1 (hardware 2).
Let n, and N, represent respective market shares of the software and the hardware man-
ufactured by producer i, then we have that
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3 1
nt    =    2, ni= 1-2;
LL
Nt    =    2, N2-1-2
Given that the unit tariff cost imposed on firm 2 by the domestic government is t, and
out of which  it and  fit are imposed on the hardware and the software of the sys-
tem good of firm 2, respectively, we can derive the respective profits of firm 1 and firm 2 as
7rl    =    111 P2 - Pl  + P  P2 - Pl
2Q       2q  '
11 2   =   (,1'2 - -- t)(1 - 1,2 - Pl) + ( 2 - -Lt)(1 - P2 -Pl  .Q+q   2Q    Q+q   2q
Solving for the Stackelberg price game with firm 1 being the leader yields the equilibrium
levels of prices and profits for the two firms as follows
pi,   =   q+ -Li, Pl. =9+ -4 (5.4.1)29         2Qi,
3 3q 3   3Q,1'2.   =    -q + -t, P23=-Q + -t. (5.4.2)
2 40 2   4Q'
fl,   =    -1=(2Q + 1)2 (5.4.3)
16(2
X28   -   -L(69 - t)2, (5.4.4)
32Q
at  which  J  =  L  =     +1  .
Thus far, we have derived the equilibrium configurations for both firms under their
standardization and non-standardization choices, respectively. We are then in a position
to perform a comparative statics analysis of these choices.
5.5    Comparison of equilibrium prices and profits
Comparing (5.4.1)-(5.4.4) with (5.3.1)-(5.3.4), we find that the standardization choices of
firms have no influence on the prices and profits of firms' system goods when consumers'
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tastes of hardware and software are identical. On the other hand, standardization in-
creases the degree of product differentiation and the consequent market power that the
two firms enjoy. Regarding profits, subtracting (5.4.3)-(5.4.4) from (5.3.7)-(5.3.8), respec-
tively, we have that
in      1=(20 + t)2 - -1(20 +t- q)2A,rl   .  vrl, - 'rl., = 16Q 1662
1   1    1  2   2q        q2
=   -[(= - -)t  + -1 + 8q - -1,
1 6 0   Q     Q        Q
and
A,2  =  X2,- T , =1(6*- 02 - -1(6Q+q- 42
320 329
1   1    1  2  2q          2
=   [(Q - Q)1  + Q.1 + 24q -  ]
Some computation shows that there exist tariffs 11 =Q+ v/02 + 0(80 -q) and t2 =
  + \/ 2 + *(249 - q) such that the profit difference is positive for firm 1 if t < tl and
positive for firm 2 if t < t2· Since tl < t2, standardization benefits both producers if
t  <  tl,  and  -  if less costly adoptable through agreement between  the two firms  -  is  a
unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Otherwise, non-standardization is the unique sub-
game perfect equilibrium under our assumption of explicit agreement on standardization.
To decide on the standardization choices of firms for a given government tariff level,
we should take into consideration the restriction of -20 +5 q<t<6 9-3 q which is
imposed under the non-standardization and independent taste parameters case. Simple
algebra shows that ti > 69 - 3q when Q is sufficiently close to q and the reversal holds
otherwise. Moreover, we have that 12 > 69-30 Therefore, under the restriction on tariffs
that t < 6Q - 3q, firm 2 always prefers standardization. Under the same restriction, firm
1 prefers also standardization if tl > 6Q - 3q or if Q is sufficiently close to q. Otherwise,
firm 1 prefers standardization if t<1 1 and non-standardization if 11 f t<6 Q- 3q.
In summary, we conclude that under the restriction of tariffs that t < 69 - 3q, the two
firms are always in favour of standardization if Q is sufficiently close to q. Otherwise, the
two firms choose standardization if t< 11, and non-standardization if tl   t<6 9- 3q.
If we call the policy in which the tariff level goes down below the benchmark tl trade
liberalization, and trade protectionism, otherwise, we have then the following proposition.
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Proposition 5.5.1  If the quality dillerential between hardware and software is stdiciently
large, then trade liberalization leads to standardization while protectionism leads to non-
standardization; otherwise, standardization is a strategic choice of the two jirms.
0
This proposition suggests that the standardization choices of firms are heavily effected by
the government's trade policy through tariffs. This observation is consistent to the finding
derived from Katz and Shapiro (1994). Given our restriction of tariffs that -29 + 5q <
t < 6Q - 3q, the two firms decide on standardization depending on the overall advantages
they may enjoy.  For firm 2, the advantage enjoyed by acting as a quality leader is balanced
by the cost disadvantage created by government's tariff and by acting as an entrant. Firm
2 then prefers standardization. The reversal is true for firm 1. The advantage enjoyed
by  firm  2   is the disadvantage  of  firm   1,   and vice versa. Furthermore, the advantage
and disadvantages of firm 1 will be balanced if the tariff imposed by the government is
sufficiently low, and standardization is therefore also preferred. Otherwise, firm 1 will
enjoy overall advantages over firm 2 because of the heavily government-imposed tariff on
firm 2 or the strong government's protection from foreign competition.  Firm 1 then prefers
non-standardization. Because standardization can not survive unless both firms agree on
it, non-standardization is then the choice of the two firms if the government-imposed tariff
is sufficiently high or if tl S t<6 0- 30
An immediate implication of the proposition is that if standardization was imposed
by the government, removing or increasing trade barriers would induce the domestic
and the foreign firms to lobby for the same political platform (in favour of or against
standardization).
5.6 Optimal trade policy
In the previous section we have seen that the government's trade policy effects the stan-
dardization choices of firms. Standardization depends on the government's decision about
the tariff level.  In this section, we consider the reversed situation. The government's trade
policy is also effected by the standardization choices of the firms. For this consideration,
we may distinguish between two cases.  In the first case, the government may commit
itself to a tariff level before the standardization choices of firms. In the alternative case,
it is assumed that standardization decision is more irreversible than trade policies, which
is particularly true if the cooperative choice of standardization implies sunk investments,
and trade policies are discretionary. In this case, it seems natural to assume that firms
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make their standardization decisions before the government's trade policy decisions.
5.6.1 The government being a leader
In the first case let us consider the government acting as a leader to both firms. This
situation can be treated as if the government enters the original game in stage 0, where
the government specifies the tariff levels taking into account the standardization choices
of firms as described previously. Because the standardization choices of firms effect the
national surplus through both the consumer surplus and the domestic firm's profit, the
government has to take into account the change of regime caused by the tariff level.
By definition, the domestic surplus W is given by the domestic consumer surplus plus
the domestic firm's profit plus the tariff revenue. Let W,(t), W,(1(1), Wt(t) represent W in
cases of standardization, non-standardization with identical and with independent taste
parameters, respectively. Then, taking into account the fact that J=L=K w e have for
any given tariff level t that
W,(t) = liF,%(t)   = fOK  (Y + 1/6 - Pl,)dk + .f#  (Y + 1/6 + Qk - 72,)dk + *Pl,
tt(1 - * ) =Y+ 1,6 - 25(6Q - t)2 + dti(60(12 - 4Qt - 12),
and
Ii't:(t)   =f 2 1 9(k)(Y +V o- 711,)dk + fs29 9(k)(Y +V o t k- 7  1,)dk
+G(S)711, + 1(1 - G(S))
= »(y + vo) + 35(Q -1+  ) - *( 9 -   q- it)( 9 -   q t  t)
+*1(69 +q- t)
Taking into account the government's tariff restrictions under non-standardization we de-
fine t„ tfa, and tt as t, = min{argmazikoW,(t), 69-3q}, t:i = min{argmaztkow':1(t),69},
and tz = min{argmaztzowt:(t), 69-3q}. Then, t„ t , and tt are the tariff levels which
maximize domestic surplus in the standardization regime, in the non-standardization
regimes with identical taste parameters and with independent taste parameters, respec-
tively. Optimization of the domestic surplus shows that
t, =min{130p, 69 - 3q} =    130-Q' if q>>q,60 - 3q, otherwise,
t;d - 1275ns - 3 Y'
and
t;: = min{130Q+ 3q, 6Q - 3q} = <    13'Q+ 3q, if Q >> q,69 - 3q, otherwise,
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at which
W.(t.) = Wn,(t:1)=Y+ 1/6 + 9-9, if Q> >q,
and
Wn,(ti:,) = <     Qst(Y + 1/6) + 1* - W*(492 + 16Qq + 3q2), if Q >> q,
l     %1(Y + Mo) +  :QQQ-11, otherwise.
For ease of exposition, let us denote t* = 69 - 30 To discuss optimal trade policy
or the optimal tariff level, let us first notice that the two firms are indifferent between
standardization and non-standardization choices when the consumer's tastes of hardware
and software are identical. The government will then choose the tariff level at t, to
optimize the domestic surplus. The analysis thus leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 5.6.1  When the consumer's tastes of hardware and software are identical,
the government chooses the tarill level at t. while the two jirms choose randomly stan-
dardization or non-standardization.
0
The more interesting case comes when the consumer's tastes of hardware and software
are independent of each other.  In this case, we may distinguish further between the case
that the hardware quality Q is sufficiently larger than the software quality q (or that 3
goes to 0) and the case that the hardware quality Q is sufliciently close to the software
quality  q   (or  that   3   goes  to  1) .
The quality difference between hardware and software is sufficiently large. In
this case, the following results can be directly derived.
Lemma 5.6.1  If Q is sti Oiciently larger than q, such that 3 < 0.172, then both 1, < ti
and tz < 11 hold.
Proof. First of all, given that Q is sufficiently larger than q we have that t, = 13'Q.
Suppose that t, 2 ti· Then ,w e have that  11!Q 2 -Qt v *2 + (1(8Q - q), or that  3 2  5.
Contradiction to the condition that 3 < 0.172.
Similarly, given that 3 < 0.172 we have that t;: = 130Q + 3q. Suppose that iN: 2 ti.
Then, we have that  13'Q +3 q 2  Q+ \AP + *(80-q), or that 1433 +256(3)2  2 32.
Given the condition that Q is sufficiently larger than q, or that 6 < 0.172, this inequality
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does not hold. Contradiction.
0
Our former analysis shows  that  4  < t*,  and the intervals  (0, ti) and  (ti, t') are standard-
ization and non-standardization regimes, respectively, provided   that   3   < 0.172 holds.
Therefore, Lemma 5.6.1 shows that t, falls into the right standardization regime while t::
does not fall into the right non-standardization regime. Hence, to ensure that the two
firms choose non-standardization, the government will choose tariff tl.   This is because
that the surplus function is downwards-sloping to the right of t:: Consequently, to decide
on the optimal tariff level, it is sufficient to compare W,(t,) with Wn,(tl). The comparison
leads directly to the following proposition.
Proposition 5.6.2 Suppose  that  consumers'  tastes of hardware and software  are  inde-
pendent and that Q is sulliciently larger than q. Then, the government chooses the tarif
level at t. and standardization follows.
Proof. Direct comparison shows that W,(t,)> W.,(t:) if Q is sufficiently larger than
q. Moreover, it is obvious that Wn,(tt) 2 Wn,(11) by definition. Therefore, we have that         -
FF,(ta) > PFn,(tl holds. Because W,(t,) and Wn,(11) are the maximum surplus that the
government can expect under standardization and non-standardization choices of firms,
respectively, the government will then choose the tariff level of t, and standardization
follows.
0
The quality difference between hardware and software is sufficiently small. In
this case, the following results can be directly derived.
Lemma 5.6.2 If Q is sulliciently close to q, such that 3 > 0.372, then t. = 1  = t' < 4
Proof. Given that Q is sufficiently close to q, our former analysis shows that t. = tt =
69 -3 q= t'. Suppose that t- 2 ti. We have that 60 -3 q 2 9+  /92 + 0(89 -q)o r
16 2498 - 16(3)2. Contradiction to the condition that 3 > 0.372.
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0
This lemma shows that non-standardization could never be the firms' choice. In fact, the
maximum tariff level which the government can choose such that non-standardization is
the feasible choice is t:  When 3 goes to 1, however, t* is less than tl, which leads the two
firms to prefer standardization. Given the fact that standardization is the feasible choice
of firms, the government prefers a tariff level of t„ which does fall into the standardization
regime (0, ti). Standardization then follows.
Proposition 5.6.3 summarizes the result.
Proposition 5.6.3 Suppose  that consumers' tastes of hardware and software  are  inde-
pendent and that 3 > 0.372.  Then, the government chooses the tarif level at t.(= t*)
and implements standardization.
0
Thus far, we have seen that when the government could commit to a tariff level before
the standardization choices of firms, standardization is always implemented independent
of the quality difference between hardware and software. The optimal trade policy or
tariff level may, however, change depending on the quality difference between hardware
and software.  When the difference is sufficiently large, a tariff level at ts is chosen.
Otherwise, the tariff level at t' is preferred.
5.6.2 The government being a follower
In the alternative case, the government and the firms change their positions in the sequen-
tial game they played. The firms decide first on standardization, and then the government
sets up the tariff level. Finally, price competition takes place between these two firms.
More precisely, the timing of the game is as follows.
Stage 0: Firms decide on standardization simultaneously.
Stage 1: The government chooses a tariff level.
Stage 2: Firms compete in prices by playing a Stackelberg game with
firm 1 being the leader.
This game is solved again by backwards induction. We have already the solution
of   stage   2.      Then,   let us consider the government's decisions given the firms' choices
of standardization. The government implements its optimal tariff policies under the
standardization or non-standardization regime chosen by the two firms. When the con-
sumers' tastes are identical, the two firms are indifferent between standardization and
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non-standardization. Therefore, the standardization choices of firms and the governmen-
t's decision on tariff level are independent of each other. The government then chooses
t, to optimize domestic surplus, and the two firms may choose standardization or non-
standardization randomly. The following proposition states the result.
Proposition 5.6.4 When consumers' tastes of hardware and so,Rware are identical, the
government chooses the tari# level at t, while the two jirms choose standardization or
non-standardization randomly.
0
The more interesting case comes when the consumers' tastes of hardware and soft-
ware are independent. To specify the government's decision on tariff levels, we need to
distinguish between the cases that the quality difference of hardware and software are
sufficiently large and small.
The quality difference between hardware and software is sufficiently large, i.e.
satisfies the condition 3 < 0.172 . In this case, the government will implement its
optimal tariff level of t, under standardization choices of firms and of t;J otherwise.  Now,
in stage 0 the two firms have to decide on standardization by anticipating the govern-
ment's reaction to a given tariff level. Lemma 5.6.1 shows, however, that both t, and
t%  fall  into  the standardization tariff regime  (0, tl) while the non-standardization regime
is  (t, t.). Therefore,  the two firms will agree on standardization,  and the tariff level of
t, is consequently implemented by the government. This can be stated in the following
proposition.
Proposition 5.6.5 When the quality di#erence between hardware and software is su#i-
ciently large,  i.e.  satisjies the condition 3 < 0.172,  the two ,firms agree on standardization,
and  the government chooses the  tarill  level  of t.
0
The quality difference between hardware and software is sufficiently small or
  > 0.372.  In this case, the government still chooses the tariff level of t, under stan-
dardization and tz under non-standardization. Anticipating the choices of tariff levels by
the government, the two firms decide then on standardization in the first stage. Lemma
5.6.2  shows  that  tji  = t,  =  t-  <  tl · This means that non-standardization  is an infeasible
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choice of the two firms. Standardization, however, increases both firms' profits and will
be chosen. Summarizing, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 5.6.6  If the quality diference between hardware and software is stdiciently
small, i.e. satisjies the condition 3 > 0.372, the two jirms agree on standardization and
the government chooses the tarill' level oft,(= t*)
0
5.6.3 Comparison between government as a leader and a fol-
lower
We may now compare the case that the government commits itself to a tariff level before
the standardization choices of firms with the case that it cannot. Our former analysis
shows that when the consumers' tastes of hardware and software are identical, the stan-
dardization choices of firms are independent of the government's trade policies, and thus
independent of the timing of the game in which the government's tariff is chosen.
When the consumers' tastes are independent, two cases must be distinguished, the
quality difference between hardware and software is sufficiently high or small. The gov-
ernment chooses the tariff level of t, in the former case and t* in the latter case. The two
firms agree on standardization in either case. Moreover, these choices are not effected by
the government precommitment to a tariff level. Thus, in summary we have the following.
Proposition  5.6.7 The government's precommitment to a tarif policy does  not  change
either surplus or tarif leveli  the standardization choices of ./irms are independent  of the
government 's trade policies  when  the  consumers' taste parameters are  identical.
0
5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we have studied the effects of government's trade policies on incentives
of firms to standardize their products. We have characterized the nature of standardiza-
tion regimes that will occur according to the level of domestic protection. The optimal
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trade policies are then discussed by distinguishing between government as a leader and a
follower.
The firms are assumed in our study to produce system goods, which consists of one unit
of hardware and one unit of software. The foreign firm is "superior" in producing both
hardware and software, but a follower in pricing as an entrant, and taxed by government's
tariffs. One interesting fact discovered in our study is that government's tariffs or trade
policies effect - and are effected by - the standardization choices of firms. The former
decides on the firms' standardization choices while the latter decides on the optimal
government's trade policies. These effects can be decided on for given consumers' taste
parameters of hardware and software and given the quality difference between hardware
and software.
One aspect of our study is on the effect of government's tariffs on standardization
choices of firms. When consumers' taste parameters are identical, the standardization
choices of firms are independent of government's tariffs. When consumers' tastes of hard-
ware and software are independent, however, government's tariffs effect the standardiza-
tion choices of firms. On the one hand, government's tariffs may always lead the two
firms to agree on standardization if the quality difference between hardware and software
is sufficiently small. On the other hand, when the quality difference between hardware
and software is sufficiently large, i.e. satisfies the condition 3 < 0.172, protectionism or
increasing government's tariffs erodes the foreign firm's technology advantages in both
hardware and software, and leads the foreign firm to agree on standardization. The do-
mestic firm, however, may either agree or does not agree on standardization depending
on the government's tariff level. Strong protectionism may provide the domestic firm
an overall advantage to reject standardization while trade liberalization may balance his
advantage and disadvantage such that he agrees on standardization. Since under our
assumptions standardization can not be achieved unless both firms agree on it, an inter-
esting political implication follows immediately. When the domestic government has the
possibility to impose, in advance, the standardization regime, then the government can
lead  the two firms to lobby  in  the same direction (oppose or support the given regime).
Another aspect of our study is the policy implications of the endogenous standard-
ization regimes to the nature of optimal tariffs. In particular, we have shown that the
unanimous agreement of the two firms on standardization induces a trade-off between
rent shifting and standardization motives in the determination of optimal tariff levels. In
that   context,  we have discussed that there  is no advantage  for the domestic government
to precommit to a tariff level. In particular, we have shown that neither surplus nor the
optimal tariff level is changed by the government acting as a leader.
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Chapter 6
Desirability of tying by
durable-goods producers
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we consider durable-goods industries where firms not only produce durable-
goods but also supply maintenance and repair services to their customers. Information
about complex, long-lived durable-goods may be costly and necessarily imperfect.  This
tends to make perfect, complete contracting infeasible and a contract law less useful in
the maintenance and repair services case. Suppose that contracts specifying future repair
prices cannot be written down. Then, an aftermarketi situation arises, where opportunism
(Williamson (1985)) may lead the producers to manipulate pricing to harvest supranormal
profits. We call the primary product market where durable-goods are sold the equipment
market The durable-goods and their maintenance and repair services are called equipment
and aftermarket-goods, respectively.
In several recent antitrust suits, the manufacturers of complex durable goods, such
as those of Kodak, Prime Computer, Data General, Northen Telecom, Picker, Unisys,
Xerox, and Siemens, have been accused of restraining trade by tying the aftermarket sales
of maintenance and repair services to the purchase of the durable-goods. For example, in
the Kodak case, the Independent Service Organizations (ISOs) brought an antitrust action
against Kodak to recover for policies Kodak introduced that limited the availability to
ISOs of replacement parts for copying and micrographic equipment manufactured and
1 Following Shapiro and Teece  (1994) we define an "aftermarket"  as a place where "aftermarket trans-
action" takes place. This aftermarket transaction has two characteristics: (1) the aftermarket product or
services is used logdher with a primary product, and (2) the aftermarket product or services is purchased
afler the primary product.
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sold by Kodak.  The ISOs alleged that Kodak had unlawfully tied the sale of services for
its machines to the sale of parts, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and had
unlawfully monopolized and attempted to monopolize the sale of services and parts in
violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.2
This vertical restraint of tying, imposed by manufacturers of complex equipment to
refrain their customers from selling or installing repair parts produced by competing
firms, which in effect means that consumers must purchase their full requirements from
the original equipment makers, has, however, caused some confusion in the courts. In
an earlier example of 1936, the United States Supreme Court affirmed a decision of a
lower court approving General Motors' requirement that GM customers install only GM
replacement parts. But following the tightening of the Clayton Act Section 3 criteria
in the Standard Stations decision, the early General Motors' decisions were criticized by
some courts. In 1959, an appellate court ruled that attempts by the Ford Motor Company
to force its customers to sell or install Ford-made or approved parts only might be found
illegal if they substantially lessened competition. For more details, we referto Scherer
and Ross (1990).  In a recent example from the United States also, the Prime vs Kodak
case, an independent service company alleged that Prime (now Computervision) had tied
the sale of software support and upgrades to the purchase of hardware maintenance from
Prime. Prior to the Supreme Court decision in the Kodak case, the Sixth Circuit had
accepted Prime's argument that competition in the equipment market would necessarily
discipline aftermarket prices. The Supreme Court overturned this decision shortly after
deciding in the Kodak case. The Sixth Circuit then decided that sufficient evidence had
been presented to support a finding that it was profitable for Prime to monopolize the
aftermarket services  3.
The common feature in these cases is that the defendants manufacture complex durable
equipment for which customers demand services, support, parts, or upgrades over many
years after the initial sale. The parts and services are complements to equipment: Low-
ering the price of equipment raises the demand for parts and services, and vice versa.
In these cases, the economic interaction between the original equipment market and the
aftermarket is central to the analysis.
The manufacturer's two competing incentives, namely on the one hand extracting
profits from customers who are locked-in into a brand of equipment by raising prices on
the associate aftermarket products, and on the other hand increasing profits from new
equipment sales by establishing a reputation for selling equipment with low maintenance
2See Shapiro and Teece (1994), for more details.
3See Borenstein, MacKie-Mason  and  Netz  (1995),  for more details.
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costs, have been discussed in detail in Voortman (1993) and Shapiro and Teece (1994),
and formulated and analysed theoretically in Borenstein, MacKie-Mason and Netz (1996)
and Blair and Herndon (1996). Economic theory, however, does not support the com-
mon argument by equipment manufacturers that strong primary market competition will
discipline aftermarket behaviour. As found by Borenstein et al. (1996), despite losing
profits in equipment sales from a reputation for exploiting locked-in customers, equip-
ment manufacturers have indeed incentives to exercise market power in their proprietary
aftermarkets. The same result is found in de Bijl (1995) for the monopoly case.
This chapter gains additional insights into above issues by modelling durable-goods
markets explicitly. A durable-goods market consists of an equipment market and an af-
termarket, both horizontally differentiated. The question we ask is: Although firms have
incentives to exercise monopoly power once their aftermarkets are tied to their equip-
ment markets, do firms have really incentives to tie their aftermarkets to their equipment
markets ? We study a duopoly to consider the incentives of durable-goods producers to
tie their aftermarkets to their primary markets. The strategies adopted by the produc-
ers and welfare implications of these strategies are analysed explicitly. We show that
durable-goods producers will prefer to compete on their aftermarkets rather than protect
their proprietary aftermarkets through tying if the consumer's reservation price is suffi-
ciently low.  If the consumer's reservation price is sufficiently high, however, these two
producers may prefer either to tie or to compete on their aftermarkets provided that the
aftermarkets are sufficiently less valuable; and tying is particularly preferred in this case
if  these two firms could coordinate   on   it.     If the aftermarkets are sufficiently valuable,
however, no agreement can be reached between these two firms. We also show that social
preference may be consistent with the firms' choices of tying. The analysis then confirms
the finding of Blair and Herndon (1996) that as far as the competitive and monopoly
equipment markets are considered, the vertical restraint of tying has little to do with
antitrust concerns.
To our analysis in this chapter, the life-cycle Cost concept introduced in Blair and
Herndon (1996), and Shapiro and Teece (1994) also, is worth of mentioning. Life-cycle
cost is the cost concerned by the buyers of durable-goods in their decision making process,
in which they take into account not only the original purchase price of the equipment,
but also expected maintenance costs, including that of supplies, parts, and services. It
is assumed that buyers can perform effectively life-cycle cost calculations and compare
products before making a purchase. Presumably, this means that under the vertical
restraint of tying, a buyer will select among alternatives while recognizing that buying a
durable-goods from a producer involves a commitment to paying for future maintenance
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and repair services in addition to the immediate price of that durable-good. Without the
vertical restraint of tying, however, a buyer makes her choice based on what she perceives
to be the best combination of the equipment and its maintenance and repair services.  This
means that the buyer makes her choice on the basis of what she perceives to be the best
deal to her. Thus, competition takes place whenever the initial purchase commitment is
made in the durable-goods markets.
The life-cycle cost concept leads us to a world where a customer perceives a durable-
goods, including the equipment and its maintenance and repair services, as a "pseudo-
system goods", and purchases from one or two firms by maximizing her total discounted
utility.  Thus, it seems that firms spread over an imperfectly competitive market, be-
ing horizontally differentiated in two dimensions, one for the equipment market and the
other for the aftermarket. Firms choose between protecting and opening their proprietary
aftermarkets, either through the vertical restraint of tying or opening their proprietary af-
termarkets to competition in order to maximize the present values of their total discounted
profits. This formulation is quite realistic because although actual equipment markets are
typically reasonably competitive, as discussed in Blair and Herndon (1996), the brands of
both the equipment and the maintenance and repair services are differentiated.
This chapter is closely related to the literature on compatibility decisions of firms
producing system goods in the absence of network externalities. See, for example, Econo-
mides (1989) and Boom (1995). A system goods consists of a set of components.  Any
incomplete set of components of a system goods is useless to the customers. In particular,
this chapter can be seen as an extension of the models of Matutes and Regibeau (1988,
1992).
Also related is the literature on customers locked-in and switching cost, considering
markets in which buyers make relationship-specific investments when complete contracts
cannot be written. Firms, who cannot distinguish between old and new customers, com-
pete to attract customers whom they can exploit later, that is, a firm sells a single goods
at  a single price (see Klemperer (1987b,   1995), for surveys).    The main difference  with
the literature on consumer switching costs and compatibility decisions of firms producing
system goods is that in an aftermarket situation, a firm sells separate goods (equipment
and aftermarket-goods), each at a different price.
In our consideration of the duopoly case two questions will be focused on. First, which
choices will the duopolists make: Imposing the vertical restraint of tying to protect their
proprietary aftermarkets from competition, or opening their aftermarkets to competition?
Second, what are the welfare implications of these choices?
We solve a two-stage game for its symmetric subgame perfect equilibria. In the first
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stage of the game, two firms decide simultaneously on whether to use the vertical restraint
of tying to protect their aftermarkets. In the second stage, the two firms compete in price
while taking the other firm's price as given. We present the model in Section 6.2. Then,
three cases of tying, tying by both firms, no firm choosing tying, and unilateral tying, are
discussed in Sections 6.3,6.4 and 6.5, separately. Equilibria are then analysed in Section
6.6. In Section 6.7, we provide an analysis of welfare implications of the durable-goods
producers' choices of tying, and Section 6.8 concludes.
6.2 The model
We consider a two-period model. Two firms, called A and B, offer horizontally differenti-
ated durable-goods in the first period and differentiated aftermarket-goods in the second
period. Both durable-goods and aftermarket-goods are substitutes. The unit cost of pro-
ducing a durable-goods for both firms is co, whereas repairing the durable-goods costs
both firms c 2 0. The parameters satisfy that c < co, that is, repairing is less costly
than producing a new product, or producing a spare part is less costly than producing
a complete product. There are no economies of scope and also no network externali-
ties. Throughout the chapter, co and c are assumed to be sufficiently small in order to
guarantee that there exist prices such that the duopolists are willing to produce. If the
firms choose to monopolize their aftermarkets through tying, then only two options are
available for customers who are in need of aftermarket-goods: XAA, firm A's durable-
goods and aftermarket-goods, or XBB, firm B's durable-goods and aftermarket-goods.
If the aftermarkets are exposed to competition, however, customers have two additional
options: XAB, firm A's durable-goods and firm B's aftermarket-goods, or XBA, firm B's
durable-goods and firm A's aftermarket-goods.
In period t € {1,2}, the duopolist i with i E {A, B} charges a price pt, 2 0 for
his products. He discounts his future profit with a factor 6 € [0,1), which means that
aftermarkets are always valuable and may be even as valuable as primary markets. The
duopolists maximize the present values of their total discounted profits.
In the first period, customers buy their equipment from one of the two firms in the
equipment market. In the second period, customers either use the goods they bought in
the first period again by buying aftermarket-goods from one of the firms to have their
original equipment repaired, or repurchase new equipment. From a customer's point of
view, the repaired goods have depreciated values with a depreciation factor equal to the
firms' discount factor.
If the two firms try to monopolize their aftermarkets, then customers are locked-in
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fully into the aftermarkets, to the extent that customers who purchase the aftermarket-
goods can only purchase from the firm from which they bought in the first period. If the
aftermarkets are exposed to competition, however, customers may purchase aftermarket-
goods from either firm.
Customers are assumed to distribute uniformly over a unit square with density 1 (see
Figure 6.1). Firm A is located at the origin (0,0), and firm B is located at (1,1). A
customer located  at  (x , y )  has a preferred equipment that  is  xi  away from firm  A's
equipment and a preferred aftermarket-goods that is 79 away from firm A's aftermarket-
goods. Similarly, the distances between the customer's preferred point and firm B's
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Figure 6.1 Consumers distribute uniformly over a unit square.
Therefore, a customer has a surplus of
U(pl„ dij =r- pli - adi,
from buying one unit of the equipment of firm i, i E  {A, B}, and a surplus oP
U(Pi„ d2,) = #(r - P,; - ade,)
from  buying one unit  of the aftermarket-goods  i,i€  {A, 8}, where 4=1-8,  with
0   €   [1,0),   represents the ratio  of the value after depreciation,   r   >   0   is the customer's
reservation price which is identical  for all consumers,  dt;  with  t€ {1,2}i s the distance
between the customer's preferred specification of the equipment (aftermarket-goods) and
4When a customer buys one unit of the aftermarket-goods and has her equipment bought in the first
period repaired, she gains a repaired good with a depreciated value in the second period.
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the specification of the equipment (aftermarket-goods) sold by firm i, i  E  {A, B}  (in
Figure 6.1, diA = ir?, diB =1- z?, d2/1 - Y91 0|28 -1-y  ),and a>0 represents the
degree of product differentiation. The parameters a, co, c are constant while r, B, and 6 are
variables known by firms. We assume that r > co > c, that is, that customers' reservation
price is larger than the firms' marginal costs of producing not only aftermarket-goods but
also equipment, so that firms are able to produce profitably. The present value of the
total surplus of a customer is
U(pli,Pb, di„ db) = (1 + B)r - Pli - BPb - a(dli + Bdb)'
if he  purchases equipment from firm i  and  aftermarket- goods  from firm j, i,j€ { A, B .
Customers decide on their purchases in the first period.
We assume that a customer expects a future repair price equal to the repair price she
observes when she enters the market in the first time to buy the equipment.5 This allows
the firm to establish instantly a reputation for not imposing the vertical restraint of tying
on customers in need of a repair.
6.3 Tying aftermarkets by both firms
Given that both firms choose to tie their respective aftermarkets, an equipment customer
of one durable-goods producer is excluded from the purchase of the other durable-goods
producer's aftermarket-goods. So, durable-goods customers can only go to their former
firm's aftermarkets for the maintenance and repair services. We may distinguish the local
monopolists case from the direct competitors case in order to derive the equilibrium levels
of prices and profits6 (see Figure 6.2).
Local monopolists.  In this case7, firm A serves all customers for which (1 + B)r - PIA -
BP,/1 -a(diA + adu) 20· Therefore, the customers served by firm A are located below
the line with equation
(1 + Bk - RA- BMA
(6.3.1)*A + Bd2A - a
so that firm A's total discounted profit is
5Expectations are required to be fulfilled in equilibrium as argued in de Bijl (1995)
6We do not, however, discuss the intermediate case, where the two firms' markets just touch each
other, but consumers on the markets' boundary stay out of the markets.
7From now on, the discussion for firm A holds also for firm B. For ease of exposition, we demonstrate
the equilibrium configurations only for firm A, and assume that the same holds for firm B.
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1
TA = -XMA - CO) + BON - c)][(1 + Bk - MA - BRA]2.2Ba,
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Figure 6.2 Tying aftermarkets by both firms (case B - 1)
Since customers in need of repair services have the option to repurchase new equip-
ment instead of buying the aftermarket-goods if the price in the aftermarket is too high,
a consumer's utility from consuming aftermarket-goods should not be less than that from
buying equipment. Therefore, firm A faces the following optimization problem:
1
Max   TA(PlA, P2A) = Z.r.<(Pt.4 - CO) + #(PYA - c)][(1 + #)r - PlA - #P2A]2Lpaw
S.t. U( '2Ai (12A  2 (/(PlA,dlA ,
U(PiA,P2A,dtA, (12/t) = U(P2/1, d,A) + U(PlA, diA) 2 0
Maximizing firm A's profit with respect to PlA and 1'2A and imposing symmetry on the
first order condition yield the equilibrium levels of firm A's prices and associate profit as
follows:
P AT +  PTAT =  [(1 + B)r + 2(co + Bc)1, (6.3.2)
PTI 2 r, (6.3.3)
lrIT= =LT[(1 + Bk -(co + Fc)]3 (6.3.4)z(Ba·
where TT denotes tying aftermarkets by both firms.
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The inequality (6.3.3) stands for the constraints of the optimization problem and can
be derived as follows. First of all, in firm A's market area the second of the constraints
given in the optimization problem is trivially satisfied. From the first of the constraints,
that is, U(1)2.4, 012A) 2 U(RA, dl.4 , or #(r  - p2/1  - ad,A)  2  r  - PIA  - adiA, we have that
PlA 2 (1 - B)r + BRA + (¥BtA- adlA·  Let MA =Oand substituting 0 for dlA in (6.3.1)
yield that PIA 2 (1 - B)r + 81'2A + aB which leads to that PiA 2 r.(1+ r-PlA-#M018             1
This solution is valid as long as the two firms' markets do not overlap in the equilib-
rium, that is, that (1 + B)r - IdI- 01 I-Ot< 0 holds, or that the reservation price
r is sufficiently low, namely, r < 30+2(co+Bc .  The customer surplus CSTT and the social2(1+B)
welfare SSTT in the equilibrium are
C STT= 2 [4 [ilt-914 [(1 + #)r - PII - #PI,I - a(91A t  92A ]d92AdglA
Jo Jo
=  63 = sis-B[(1 + B)r - (Bc + CO)13, (6.3.5)
where C = (1+0)r-JII-OPTI = [(1 + B)r - (Bc + co)], and
S STT     = 2TIT  + C STT = 20[(1+124°+Bc)13 (6.3.6)
Direct competitors. Under direct competition the whole market is served.8 Once again,
the situation that we shall consider is that a customer who purchases the durable-goods
from firm A in the equipment market is fully locked-in, and will also buy her aftermarket-
goods from firm A. The same holds for firm B. A customer will buy from firm A if
Pl/1 +  2A + a(di,4 + 0(;GA) 5 118 + 13PlB + a(diB + 0*8),
or if she is located below the line defined by the equation
8We do not discuss the adjacent market case here, in which firms' markets just touch each other
but consumers on the market boundary stay out of the markets. This is the case when the consumer's
reservation price is neither too high nor too low. We also refrain our discussion of this case from the
subsequent discussions of Sections 6.4 and 6.5.
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diA + FdvA = -2+                 2a
1 + 0 piB- PlA +   P28 -P2A 
Then,  firm A faces the following optimization problem for given prices of piB  and P2B
max  TA(PlA,J'2/1,PlB,1'28  =
 PlA - CO) + 0(P2A - C)(1 +d+ PlB - PIA +   P28 -1'2A )2
8#                        a
S.t. U(PlA,PYA, (11/1,06/1) 2 0
UBMAN) 2 U(PL,44·
Solving this optimization problem yields
PIT + m,II   = °(1+11)+22(co+Bc) (6.3.7)
pII        2 r, (6.3.8)
TATT     = QU+B)3 (6.3.9)16B
This solution is valid as long as the whole market is indeed served at the equilibrium
levels of prices, that is, (1 + B)r - p AT -  p I - a > 0, or if the reservation price is
sufficiently high, that is, r > 0(3+B)+2(Q+Bc .  The customer surplus  and the social welfare2(1 +B)
are
CsTT = 2ff -91A [(1 + B)r - p  - BPII - a(91A + 1992A)]6192AdgiA
= (1 -1. B)r - 50 -01 -(Bc + CO), (6.3.10)
SSTT = (1 + B)r - (co + Bc) +      4             6                                   (6.3.11)
a(1 + B) 342 - 140 + 3
Proposition 6.3.1 summarizes the results thus far.
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Proposition 6.3.1 Suppose that both equipment manufacturers protect their respective
aftermarkets through tying.  Then, the jirms are (i) local monopolists and the equilibrium
conjigurations  are  given  in  (6.3.2)  -   (6.3.6)  if r  <  ·30+2(co+04;  (iiI  direct  competitors  and
2(1+B)
the  equilibrium  conjigurations  are  given  in  (6.3.7) - (6.3.11) if r>c+a (3+B)+2(co+Bil2(1+B)
0
6.4   Competition on the aftermarkets
In the second case, we consider competition on the aftermarkets. This means that equip-
ment manufacturers do not use the vertical restraint of tying but let their aftermarkets be
exposed to competition.' Then, customers may choose between four combinations of the
equipment  and  the  aftermarket-goods: X A, XAB,XBAand XBB· wemay distinguish
between three cases (See Figure 6.3), but will discuss the first and third cases in our
derivation of the equilibrium levels of prices, profits, and the associate customer surplus
as well as social welfare at the second stage.
1                                             1                                     1
XA        BB
XAB XBB XAB XBB
XAA XBA XAA XBA
XAA BA
0                    10                    10                    1
Local monopolists Adjacent markets Direct competitors
Figure 6.3 Competition on the aftermarkets (case B = l)
Local monopolists. Given that the markets formed by different combinations of the
equipment and aftermarket-goods are locally monopolized, and that the aftermarkets are
exposed to competition, a customer will  buy a combination of X,j,  i, j  €  {A, B},  if
9An alternative situation is that when durable-goods customers have independent preferences across
periods, customers' changing tastes may completely nullify the anticompetitiveness of switching costs,
and the aftermarkets are quite competitive. This case might arise naturally if the purchasers in different
periods are different people, but second-period customers develop switching costs by being exposed to
first-period customers' purchases. For example, universities buy computers for students in the first period,
and individuals who were students in the first period purchase in the second. Former students have a
switching cost of learning the system their university did not purchase, but their underlying experiences,
for example, the business application they need, may be uncorrelated with their university ones.
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U(pli,P2j, dli, d21) = (1 + B)r - pli - BP23 - a(di, + Bd21) 2 0 (6.4.1)
Therefore, firm A's profit is equal to
.     PIA - Co) +   P2A - C)7TA(PlA,P2A, PlB,P28) = [(1 + 0)r - PlA -  A]22/3al
 
PlA - 0
[(1 + B)r - PlA - BP28]2 + [(1 + 19)r - PlB -  P2A]:  P2A - C)
2da2 2Ba'
Then, firm A maximizes TA(PlA,P2A, PlB,P28 under the constraint (6.4.1) and the con-
straint of
U(1)2/1,(12/1) 2 U(PIA,diA) (6.4.2)
From former discussion we know that the above constraints mean that the equilibrium
level of firm A's equipment price PTP should satisfy that pf7 2 r, where NN denotes
competition on both equipment markets and aftermarkets. Solving this optimization prob-
lem and then imposing symmetry on the first order condition by letting that Pl/4 - PlB
and P2A = 1)2B yield the equilibrium outcomes as follows:
1,7,2 + Pplt' - 2r(l+B)+3(qo+Bc) (6.4.3)5
 A 2 r, (6.4.4)
Tr ANN = 28102[r(1 + 0) - (CO + 0C)]3. (6.4.5)
This local monopolists case is sustained as long as (1 + B)r- (pf7 + BP ) -9 < O holds,
or that the reservation price is sufficiently low, r < 50+6(co+Fc .  The customer surplus is6(1+0)
C SNN = 4% f:Ct-'iA \(lt»- PTAN - BP AN -alglA + Bg,A)\d92AdgiA
= 2243=     18    I(1 + Bk- (co + 04]3, (6.4.6)
3B     125a20
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where C = (1+01'-p.2 -Bpr. = *[(1 + B)r - (co + Bc)], and the associate social welfare is0
SSNN = [(1 + 8)r - (co + Bc)]3. (6.4.7)
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Direct competitors in an entirely served market. In this case, the markets of dif-
ferent combinations of the equipment and the aftermarket-goods just touch each other,
and all consumers buy one of these combinations. The market area AA is then bounded
by the following lines:
djA = 0,
d2A = 0,
(1 + 0)r - PlA - #P2,4 - a(diA + 006A) = (1 + 0)r - PiB - 13P,A - 0(diB + #012,4),
(1 + B)r - PlA - BPMA - a(diA + Bd,A) = (1 + B)r - Pl,4 - BP2,8 - a(di A + /9(128).
Similarly, we can define the market areas AB and BA. So, firm A's profit function can
be written as:
TA(PlA,P2A,Pla,PlB  =     PlA - CO) +  (P2A - C)][  + 2182 214][  0 2212-.201
+ PlA - CO      21,   }[    21&2 222]
+9(P2A -
Then, firm A maximizes its profit TA <plA, p2A, pl B, P2 B  under the constraint of
U(P2Ai 012,1) 2 U(PIA, dlA)·
Solving this optimization problem and imposing symmetry on the first order condition
yield
PON =a + CO, (6.4.8)
p N = a -1- 4 (6.4.9)
a(1 + B)TANN =                                                                         (6.4.10)2
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This equilibrium is sustained as long as (1 + B)r - PfAN - BPNI - a(& + &#) > 0 holds,
or as long as that the customer's reservation price r is sufficiently high, r >  a + 3%£.
The customer surplus and the social welfare are given by
1 1
C SNN     = 4 2  2 \(1 +  B)r -  p AN  -  131,12  - a(91A +  092A')'Idg2AdgiA
= (1 + B)r - 46a(1 + B) - (co + Bc), (6.4.11)
and
l+B
SSNN = (1 + B)r -    40 - (co + Bc). (6.4.12)
Proposition 6.4.1 states the results derived in this section.
Proposition 6.4.1 Suppose that both equipment manufacturers leave their respective af-
termarkets open to competition.  Then, the two jirms are (i) local monopolists and the
50+6(co+Bc) ,equilibrium conjigurations are given in (6.4.3)-(6.4.7) ifr < (ii) direct com-6(1+8) '
petitors A an entirely covered market and the equilibrium configurations are given in
(6.4.8)-(6.4.12) if r > 3(1+0)0+2(co +Bc)2(1+B)
0
6.5 Tying aftermarkets unilaterally
In the last case, we consider unilateral tying of the aftermarkets. This means that one
equipment manufacturer ties the sale of his aftermarket goods while the other manufac-
turer does not. Without loss of generality, we assume that firm B uses tying while firm
A does not. Then, customers can choose between three combinations of the equipment
and the aftermarket-goods: XAA, XBA, and XBB· For the discussion of the equilibrium
levels of prices, profits, and the associate customer surplus as well as social welfare, we
distinguish, as before, between the local monopoly case and the direct competition case
(see Figure 6.4).
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Figure 6.4 Unilateral tying by firm B (case   = 1)
Local monopolists.     In  this  case, a customer  will  buy a combination  of  X,j,   ij   E
<AB,BA, BB),it
U(pl„ P23, dl„ d21)  = (1 + B)r - Pl, - BP23 - a(di, + Bdgj) 2 0.
Therefore, firm A has the following profit optimization problem to solve:
 PIA - Co) +  (P2A - C)
Max   TA(PlA,P2A,PIB) - [(1 + 0)r - PlA -  A]22Fa2
 
B(P2A - c) [(1 + B)r - piB - BP2A]2
2002
S.t. U(P2A, 012A) 2 U(plA, dlA),
U(Pli,P A, dli, d2A) 2 0, i € {A, B},
while for firm B, the profit optimization problem is
 PlB - CO) + 0(P28 - C)Max  TB A,PlB,P28) - 200 2 [(1 + B)r - PlB - BP2812
PlB - CO
1 [(1 + B)r - PlB - BPYA}2
213a2
S.t. U(1)2B, 068) 2 U(PlB,dlB),
U(PIB,Plj, dlB, 4) 2 0, j f {A, B}.
It is straightforward to see that for both firms tying aftermarkets unilaterally is strictly
dominated by the strategy of competition on the aftermarkets. This is because of the fact
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that both firms' profits are then lower than the profits they get when competition takes
place on their aftermarkets for any given price vector (PlA, Pl B, P2A, P2B), and the feasible
domains are identical. We demonstrate this fact as follows.
Solving these optimization problems yields the equilibrium levels of prices and profits
of firm A and firm B as follows:
PN'= (lt#)rtllco-BC (6.5.1)12       '
·Ki = (1+0),+30(-cO (6.5.2)40      1
p BN - (1+B)it3co -BI (6.5.3)4 3
1, B = (lt/1).+11/9.-co (6.5.4)120      '
7r ANNT =  7rTBN = %3#[(1 + B)r-(co + 0#]3, (6.5.5)
where T N  and NT denote unilateral tying.
Direct comparison shows that r'r =,rTHN < TrIN holds. The local monopolists case
holds as long as (1 + #)r - PfAT - BPZT - <0, (1+ #)r - PIN - 131'I# - 9 < 0, and
(1 + B)r-p f# - BPN' -9<0. The last inequality subsumes the former two inequali-
ties, and means that the reservation price should be sufficiently low, that is, r < (co+Bc)+O1+B
The associate customer surplus and the social welfare can be calculated as follows:
CSNT = #. f -
91A 
1(1 + B)r - PN' - BPS - (*(91,4 + B92A ](192AdAA
+ f  IP-918'\(1 + Sr - PT  - 131'lt - a(,918 + 092Ajjd92AdglB
+ fA  f°B<(-91Bl\(1 +  Irjr - IgBN  -  BPI. - a('918 +  1 928)1dg:1BdglB
= 4(CA +  A + ( B - [(1 + B)r - (co + Bc)13 (6.5.6)
and
S SNT     =  41'I  + TANT  + C SNT
-
 %286021(1 -1. 0)r - (co t Bc)13, (6.5.7)
where CAA =        . 30 - <BB, and (BA =(1+B)'-(PlA+BP2A) = 2[(1+F)r-(co+Fe)] _ (1+0)r-(Pl B+OP2,4) =a
11+B) r-(co+Bc)
2o
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Direct competitors. In the direct competitors case, firms A and B compete for solving
their respective profit optimization problems.  For firm A, this profit optimization problem
1S
Max MrA PlA,PVA,Ple,PVB 
= I(Pl A _ CO)  #(P'A - C)][  + PlB - PlA )11 + P2B  - P2A  20   L2    20
+BCP2A - c)[  + PlA 2-QP1BjI    P2B QP2Al,
S.t. U(P2.4, dVA) 2 U(PIA,diA),
U(pl„P2A,di„ dYA) 2 0, i E {A, B},
while for firm B, it is
Max :rB PlA,P2A,PlB,P28 
= I(PlB - CO) + 0(P2B - c)][i  + PlA - PlB]rl + P,A -P2B  20   12    2a
1     PIA- PlB ,1 P2B - P2A,
+(Ple _ GO)[5       2a     l[i       2(      1,
s.t. U(P2B, d28) 2 U(PlB,dlB),
U(AB,P25,dlB,d,j) 2 0, j E {B, A}
From a pure mathematical point of view, solving these profit optimization problems yields
the two firms' equilibrium levels of prices defined by the following equations.
PlB-2Pl/ttatco=07 (6.5.8)
P2A-2P2B+a+c=0, (6.5.9)
Ba#(a +C- 1'2B) = (PlA - Co)2, (6.5.10)
6a(a + co - PlA  =   P28 - C)2. (6.5.11)
When B = O, these equations yield the two firms' equilibrium levels of prices and profits
as follows:
NT NT
(6.5.12)Pu   = Co' Pu   = a t 20 - c;
p iN  =  Co -a, PI#  = a+Co; (6.5.13)
trANT = 0, lr N =-a. (6.5.14)
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However, when B = l, the resulted equilibrium levels of the two firms' prices are reduced
to
PlA+RB=6atco + 4 (6.5.15)
PlB + P2A= 10a + co + c, (6.5.16)
(PM - co) + 2(PIN - c) = 1la, (6.5.17)
2(PN' - Co) + (PZT - c) =lla. (6.5.18)
But, using the equation (6.5.15) to solve for PlA in equation (6.5.10) we have no solution.
Therefore in this case no equilibrium exists.
From an economic point of view, however, the rest ri ction of B E  ( 0,11 must be assumed.
Then, using continuity property we can easily generalize these results to conclude that the
equilibrium levels of prices and profits approach those given in (6.5.12) - (6.5.14) when B
goes  to zero while no equilibrium exists  when  B  goes  to  1.
Moreover, by the continuity property the direct competitors case holds as long as
(1+ )r-pfAT-/9pZAT-9 > 0, (1+d)r-PT#-19PIN-  > 0, and (1+0)r-PTN-#PN -9 >
0. These conditions are satisfied when the customer's reservation price is sufficiently high
and B goes to zero. This means thatr> 9+ co. Moreover, when B goes to zero, the
customer sur lus and the social welfare are
given by
C SNT = .IJ .d [(1 + 0)r - PN - BPN - a(91A + B92A)]192AdglA
+ fd f \(lt»-PT.N - BP .-a<918 + #92A)ldg'AdglB
+      2 \11 +  B)r  -  pI   -  BPI   -  a<918 +  B91B)1428418
3(r-co) 4- &2 (6.5.19)4  ' 16
and
SSNT     =  3Epl  _  1* , (6.5.20)
Summarizing, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 6.5.1 Given unilateral tying of the aftermarkets, the two jirms are  B) local
monopolists and the equilibrium conjigurations are given in (6.5.1)-(6.5.7) ifr < .+(CO+40) .
1+0)  '
(ii) direct competitors in an entirely covered market and the equilibrium conjigurations
approach those given in (6.5.12)-(6.5.14) and (6.5.19) - (6.5.20)  i f r>9+c o and B goes
to 0;  and  (iiv  no  equilibrium  exists if r  is su,Oiciently  high and B  is su,Oiciently close  to  1.
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6.6   Equilibria of the game
Having discussed the alternative choices of the firms in tying their respective aftermar-
kets, we are now in a position to turn to the preceding stage of the two-stage game for its
symmetric subgame perfect equilibria. At the first stage, the two firms solve the reduced
normal-form game as given in Figure 6.5. We may distinguish subsequently between the
local monopoly case and the direct competition case in our discussion of the equilibria of
the game.
Tying Not tying
Tying 7FTT 7TTT 7rTN TrNT
Not tying TINT,lITN .KNN,lINN
Figure 6.5 Reduced normal-form game.
Local monopolists. In this case, direct comparison between the firms' profits as given
in equations (6.3.4), (6.4.5) and (6.5.5) shows that 7rTT < 7TNT = 71'TN < TNN. This leads
the two firms not to tie their aftermarkets but to compete on it.
A local monopoly is sustained when the consumer's reservation price is sufficiently
low, that is, when r < min{ 3a+2(cot,Bc)   50+6(co+Bc)  at(co+Bc) 1  _ 50+6(co+Bc '. Summarizing,2(1+B) ' 6(1+0) 1 1+B 5 -   6(1+B)
we have the following proposition.
Proposition 6.6.1  If the consumer's reservation price is su,Oiciently low, r < 5.+6(co+Bc)6(1+0) 1
then both jirms are local monopolists and choose not to tie their aftermarkets but to com-
pete on it.
0
This is a quite intuitive result, which can be interpreted as follows. When the con-
sumer's reservation price is sufficiently low, the market is not covered and both firms are
local monopolists. In this case, opening aftermarkets to competition increases the variety
of the products supplied and thus meets the diversity of the consumers' tastes.  As a
result, more consumers will stay in the markets. This not only gives the capacity for both
firms to increase the prices of their "pseudo-system" goods (it is straightforward to check
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that pfAN + #PNMN > PIAT + dpII), but increases also their respective market shares.  Thus,
the profits of both firms are increased through competition on the aftermarkets. This
might not be the case, however, when the consumer's reservation price is sufficiently high
and the markets are covered, as shown in the following.
Direct competitors. In this case, both firms get profits
TT _   TT    a(1 + 0)3 - a(1 + 0) (1 + 8)2T    - TA  =              -
160        2      80  '
if they tie their respective aftermarkets, and
NN _ NN O(1 + B)T          -  TA      =
2
if they choose not to tie their respective aftermarkets but compete on it.
To derive the subgame perfect equilibrium in this case, we need to take the unilateral
tying case into consideration, for which we may distinguish between the two cases that B
goes to zero and B goes to 1.  In the former case, direct comparison shows that KTT ) TNN
Moreover, it is easy to show that both lrNN > *TN and irNN , 'rNT hold because 71·TN
goes to -a and ,rNT goes to 0 when B goes to zero. Thus, two subgame perfect equilibria
arise, and these two firms either both tie their respective aftermarkets or compete on their
aftermarkets. Since profits are higher if both firms tie their aftermarkets, both firms' tying
of their aftermarkets may survive as a unique equilibrium if they could coordinate on tying.
In the second case, we have already shown that no equilibrium price exists as B goes to
1, and thus no equilibrium exists for this game. We may prove as follows, however, that as
B goes  to  1, one  firm may prefer to tie its aftermarket whenever the other does not. First,
it is easy to check that 71-TT goes to 7rNN as d goes to 1. Second, we may prove that KNT 2
KNN and :rTN 2 KNN if any equilibrium exists as B goes to 1.  In fact, let B = 1, then
TrNT  =  '!TNT tpTAT,I) AT, T: BN,p BN j Z 'ITNT iPITBN,1}2 ,P  , T)28Nj  =  14  P. R  - Coj +'4p I   - c .
But the equation (6.5.17) shows that pIN -co + 2(PIN - c) = 1 la holds. Therefore, we
have  that  TNT  2 110. Similarly,  we  can  show  that  xTN  2   114'.We know, however,  that
rNN = a if B = 1, so we have that both rNT , KNN and rTN > TNN hold.
Finally, in the case that B goes to 0, the direct competitors case holds as long as the




Thus, in summary we have the following proposition.
Proposition 6.6.2 Suppose that the consumer's reservation price is stdiciently high,  i. e.
r , 30(1+0)+2(co+Bc) holds.  Then, the two jirms either tie or compete on their aftermarkets2 (1+Q)
if they discount their aftermarket projits stdiciently; and tying is particularly chosen if
both jirms coordinate on it. Otherwise, no equilibrium exists.
0
This result should be also intuitive and can be interpreted as follows. When the con-
sumer's reservation price is sufficiently high, the potential markets are completely covered,
and the value of the aftermarket becomes important.  If the value of the aftermarket is
sufficiently unimportant, unilateral tying will not only lead the two firms to loose their
market shares significantly (because consumers' diversity of tastes can not be fullfiled and
some consumers will then stay out of the markets), but also make their primary markets
less valuable than competition on aftermarkets, and thus hurts both firms most severely.
As a result, these two firms may either agree on tying their respective aftermarkets or
competition on their aftermarkets. Furthermore, tying of the aftermarkets may take place
if the two firms could coordinate on it because this will make their respective primary
markets more valuable and thus increases their profits significantly. If their aftermarkets
become very valuable, however, no agreement can be reached between the two firms. This
is because either firm prefers tying whenever the other does not and vice versa. They can
not, however, reach an agreement on the prices they prefer to charge.
6.7        Welfare
Having derived the firms' equilibrium choices of tying, we are now able to analyse the
welfare implications of these choices explicitly. This analysis may answer the social an-
titrust concerns discussed in our introduction section. The analysis can be performed by
distinguishing again between the local monopoly case and the direct competition case.
Local monopolists. The discussion shows that two firms will behave as local monopo-
lists if the customer's reservation price is sufficiently low.  In this case, our analysis shows
that the following holds:
S sTT _ 201(1+B)r-(go+Be)13
81002
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S SNT = 259528323[(1 + #)r - (CO + dc)]3,
SSNN = 1253[(1 + B)r - (CO t Bc)]3.
Direct comparison shows that SSNN > SSTT > SSNT. Since the two firms will compete
on their aftermarkets when the consumer's reservation price is sufficiently low, the social
welfare is then maximized.
Direct competitors. The discussion shows also that the two firms will act as direct
competitors if the customer's reservation price is suffciently high. Moreover, the social
welfare holds as follows:
a(1 + B) 302 - 14/3 + 3SSTT = (1 + 19)r - (0 + Bc) + 4 60    '
a(1 + B)SSNN = (1 + fljr - (Co + PC) -
4    '
SSNT = 3(r - co)    1104      -  l6  if r>9 E t c o and B=0.
It is straightforward that SSTT > SSNN > SSNT holds. Using continunity we can easily
generalize this result to conclude that SSTT > SSNN > SSNT for  close to zero. Thus,
social welfare is maximized if the two firms could coordinate on tying. To summarise, we
have the following proposition.
Proposition 6.7.1 The social preference  and the ,/irms' choices Of tying  are  consistent
if the consumer's reservation price is su#iciently low, or if it is su,Oiciently high but the
aftermarkets are su,Oiciently unimportant and the two jirms could coordinate on tying.
0
This proposition is quite direct also in the case that the consumer's reservation price
is sufficiently low. In this case, competition on aftermarkets, on the one hand, increases
the variety of the products supplied and thus meets the diversity of consumers' tastes
and benefits the consumers. On the other hand, it also gives the firms more potential to
increase both their prices and market shares, and thus their profits because of consumers'
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increased willingness to pay. Therefore, it benefits also the firms. As a result, the social
welfare is increased by competition on the aftermarkets. In the case that the consumer's
reservation price is sufficiently high, however, the two firms can only reach an agreement
if the aftermarkets are sufficiently unimportant. In this case, although the aftermarkets
are not so valuable, tying of the aftermarkets makes the primary markets more valuable
and thus benefits the firms. Since the market is covered, and consumer surplus does not
change significantly relative to the benefits which the two firms gain from tying of their
respective aftermarkets, an agreement on tying reached between these two firms will then
maximize the social welfare if the two firms could coordinate on it.
6.8 Conclusion
The vertical restraint of tying by durable-goods producers involves antitrust concerns
and stimulates economists to find theoretical foundations. Up to date, however, existing
results on this issue are quite controversial. While firms are shown to have incentives to
exercise monopoly power in their proprietary aftermarkets (see Borenstein, MacKie-Mason
and   Netz   (1996), for example), monopoly power  in a monopolized aftermarkets rarely
exists for a durable-goods producer, as argued in Shapiro and Teece (1994). Moreover,
price discrimination, maintaining equipment market control and positions are argued to
be among the alternative reasons of durable-goods producers' tying. Finally, welfare
implications of the vertical restraint of tying remain ambiguous.
Our analysis may add new insights to these controversies. We have extended a stylized
model of Matutes and Regibeau (1988), where two durable-goods producers decide simul-
taneously on whether to use the vertical restraint of tying to protect their proprietary
aftermarkets from competition. The symmetric subgame perfect equilibria of a two-stage
game are demonstrated.
We show that when the consumer's reservation price is sufficiently low, both firms
prefer competition on, rather than tying of, their aftermarkets. When the consumer's
reservation price becomes sufficiently high, however, both firms may prefer either com-
petition on or tying of their aftermarkets provided that they assign their aftermarkets a
sufficiently low value. Tying of their aftermarkets is particularly chosen if both firms could
coordinate on it. Moreover, while welfare remains ambiguous in the existing literature on
tying of the aftermarkets, our analysis of welfare implications is clear-cut. That is, the
social preference is consistent with the firms' choices of tying if the customer's reservation
price is sufficiently low, or if the consumer's reservation price is sufficiently high but the
aftermarkets are sufficiently unimportant and both firms could coordinate on tying.
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Thus far, we have interpreted 6 simply as a discount factor. This discount factor,
however, could also embody changes in the expected size of a market. If the market is
declining in size, for example, the future market share is then less valuable, implying
a higher 6 but a lower B. Thus, the social welfare is maximized if both firms tie their
aftermarkets to their equipment markets provided that the consumer's reservation price
is sufficiently high, and therefore leads to the consistence between the firms' choices of
tying and the social preference (or welfare).
Briefly speaking, we have confirmed, first of all, in an imperfectly competitive market
the Blair and Herndon's (1996) findings in the competitive and monopoly markets, that
is, the vertical restraints of tying have little to do with the usual antitrust concerns.
Second, we have improved Borenstein, MacKie-Mason and Netz's (1996) result by showing
that the durable-goods producers not only have incentives to exercise market power in
a proprietary aftermarkets protected by vertical restraints of tying, but may also choose
to coordinate on tying to protect their aftermarkets provided that both the consumer's
reservation price and the discount factor are sufficiently high. Finally, there will exist
consistency between the firms' choices of tying and the social preference if the consumer's
reservation price is sufficiently high and the two firms could coordinate on tying of the
aftermarkets which is sufficiently unimportant to them.
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Samenvatting
Dit proefschrift analyseert de oorzaken van het in toenemende mate heterogeen wor-
den van producten in een moderne markteconomie, zowel in fysieke verschijning als in
kwaliteit. Als oorzaken kunnen worden genoemd: mededinging van derde goederen, eve-
nals niet-uniforme maar geconcentreerde dichtheden van consumenten, en competitie en
co6peratie. De toepassingen zijn tweeBrlei. Een politiek kan worden bepaald ten aanzien
van de verbinding door de duurzame-goederenproducenten van de primaire markten met
hun na-markten op grond van de hierdoor gegenereerde welvaartseffecten. Daarnaast kan
een internationaal handelsbeleid worden bepaald inzake de standaardisering van bepaalde
goederen door de overheid en door bedrijven. De analyse wordt gericht op de wijze waarop
een binnenlandse duurzame-goederenproducent, die een gevestigde kwaliteitsvolger is, on-
der internationale competitie en overheidsbescherming met een buitenlandse duurzame
goederenproducent tot overeenstemming zal komen op standaardisering. De belangrijkste
conclusies luiden als volgt.
Ten eerste. Beschouw een verticaal gedifferentieerd duopolie A la Shaked en Sutton
(1982),  met een nauw kwaliteitsspectrum voor de beide bedrij ven. Deze worden dan  in een
beperkte productruimte gevoegd, waarin de competitie z6 sterk kan worden dat het effect
van de externe goederen strikt gedomineerd wordt en beide bedrijven altijd zullen trachten
hun producten maximaal te differentiEren in het gegeven spectrum. Aan de andere kant,
wanneer het toegestane kwaliteitsspectrum groot is, zullen de beide bedrijven voldoende
ruimte hebben om kwaliteitskeuzen te maken. Competitie zal in dit geval matig zijn en
het effect van externe goederen wordt groter. Bij afwezigheid van kostenverschillen is het
standaardresultaat  dat de lage-kwaliteitsproducent (bedrijf  1) meer productdifferentiatie
wil omdat dit de prijsmededinging vermindert en de winsten verhoogt (Tirole, 1988).
Wanneer het effect van externe goederen toeneemt, zal bedrijf 1 meer competitie ervaren.
Dit  effect  van de externe goederen is bovendien groter voor bedrij f  1,  dan  voor  de  hoge-
kwaliteitsproducent (bedrijf 2). De conclusie is dus dat de concurrentie die bedrijf 1
ervaart van bedrijf 2 stijgt naarmate de kwaliteit van externe goederen groter wordt.
Bedrijf 1 is dan gebaad bij meer productdif- ferentiatie van bedrijf 2. Ondanks de stijging
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van de mate van productdifferentiatie zullen de evenwichtsprijzen en -winsten van beide
bedrijven afnemen ten gevolge van de toegenomen concurrentie.
Stel vervolgens dat in een soortgelijk verticaal gedifferentieerd duopolie, de kwaliteit
van de externe goederen op nul wordt gesteld en beide bedrijven twee andere strategis-
che variabelen ter beschikking hebben: kwaliteit en prijs. Er kunnen zich drie gevallen
voordoen: (a) samenwerking inzake beide variabelen, (b) mededinging op kwaliteit en
samenwerking op prijsgebied, (c) mededinging op beide variabelen. De analyse toont dat
beide bedrijven zullen samenwerken voor wat betreft kwaliteit, alsook bij prijzen, en dat
zij hun producten maximaal zullen differentiBren.
Ten derde. Beschouw twee bedrijven met zowel horizontale als verticale productdif-
ferentiatie, analoog aan binnen- en buitenlocatiespelen in locatietheorie. Een geconcen-
treerde consumentendichtheid veroorzaakt een centripetale marktkracht in het binnenlo-
catiespel en vergroot de asymmetrie tussen de bedrijven in het buitenlocatiespel.  Het
gevolg is dat de bedrijven in de binnenmarkt naar elkaar trekken en hun productdiffer-
entiatie in het binnenlocatiespel doen afnemen, terwijl zij van elkaar wegtrekken in de
buitenmarkt en hun productdifferentiatie in het binnenlocatiespel verhogen.
Ten vierde. Beschouw bedrijven die systeemgoederen produceren. Een systeemgoed
bestaat uit verschillende componenten. Elke component afzonderlijk genomen is nut-
teloos. Een binnenlands bedrijf produceert systeemgoederen, maar ervaart competitie van
een buitenlands bedrijf dat een hogere kwaliteit produceert en beschermd wordt door han-
delspolitiek, zoals tarieven. De vraag rijst of beide bedrijven het met elkaar eens kunnen
worden over standaardisering van hun componenten, gegeven de overheidsbescherming.
We laten zien dat handelsliberalisering samenhangt met standaardisering van de compo-
nenten van systeemgoe- deren, terwijl protectie kan leiden tot niet-standaardisering als de
parameters van de consumentensmaak onafhankelijk zijn. Wanneer echter de parameters
van de consumenten- smaak identiek zijn, is de standaardiseringskeuze van de bedrijven
onafnankelijk van de handelspolitiek van de overheid. Noch de welvaart, noch het opti-
male tarief kunnen worden gewijzigd door een eventueel precommitment van de overheid
tot een bepaald tarief; de overheid zal altijd de standaardisering ondersteunen.
Ten vijfde, beschouw een bedrijfstak waarin duurzame goederen met na-markten
geprodu- ceerd worden. De producenten zullen dan hun na-marktprijzen als strategis-
che variabelen gebruiken om hun winsten te maximaliseren. Dit kan leiden tot aan-
klachten terzake kartelvorming. Echter, in geval van een duopolie toont de analyse dat de
duurzame- goederenproducenten aan mededinging op de na-markten de voorkeur geven
boven bescherming van de na-markten door middel van prijskoppeling, indien de reserver-
ingsprijs van de consument voldoende laag is. Maar als deze prijs voldoende hoog is en als
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de na- marktwinst voldoende verdisconteerd is, dan zijn beide strategie8n, prijskoppeling
of mededinging, voor de producenten aantrekkelijk. Prijskoppeling wordt in dit geval wel
geprefereerd als beide bedrijven dit kunnen co6rdineren. Maar deze afspraken zijn niet
mogelijk als de na-markt hoog genoeg gewaardeerd wordt. Tenslotte blijkt het sociale
optimum consistent te zijn met een keuze van prijskoppeling door de bedrijven.
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